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We cannot solve our problems with the same thinking that created them. 
 
The only real valuable thing is intuition. 
 
Everything that can be counted doesn’t necessarily count; 
Everything that counts can not necessarily be counted. 
Albert Einstein 
 
Banking Institutions are more dangerous to our liberty than standing armies.[…]The modern 
theory of the perpetuation of debt has drenched the earth with blood, and crushed its in-
habitants under burdens ever accumulating. 
Thomas Jefferson    
(Author of the Declaration of Independence, 3. US President) 
 
It is well enough that people of the nation do not understand out banking and money sys-
tem, for if they did, I believe there would be a revolution before tomorrow morning. 
Henry Ford     
(Founder of the Ford motor company, pioneer of industry production) 
 
The Government should create, issue, and circulate all the currency and credits needed to 
satisfy the spending power of the Government and the buying power of consumers [and 
businesses]. By the adoption of these principles, the taxpayer will be saved immense sums of 
interest. Money will cease to be the master and become the servant of humanity. 
Abraham Lincoln    
(16. President of the US, modernizer who fought slavery) 
 
I have unwittingly ruined my country [with the Fed’s fractional banking system].  
Woodrow Willson  
(Signee of the Federal Reserve Act, US President) 
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Abstract  
Since the launch of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in January 1999 till 
today in 2015, the Euro has ascended to become the second largest reference currency in 
the world. With about €1.6 trillion of currency in circulation it is at present even positioned 
above the US dollar with €1.3 trillion. The Eurosystem now comprises 19 EU countries with 
about 340 million people and inherits an outstanding role for the economy of the EMU, 
world trade, and international finance. Despite its importance, a recent independent empir-
ical review that conclusively analyzes all key factors and efficiencies remains much obso-
lete. Thus, this research and review sets out to empirically-theoretically compile the last 16 
years of the EMU with a focus on monetary developments, functioning of monetary trans-
mission channels (MTCs) and mechanisms, as well as the performance of the Eurosystem 
and its ECB governed monetary policies (MP). For the first time it reviews a complete set of 
16 MTCs and systematically evaluates the functioning of the Eurosystem and its role for the 
real economy and its people. It finds a high efficiency loss in all MTCs related to fractional 
reserve banking, excessive EU indebtedness, or legal frameworks such as MFI, financial, or 
equity law. Scientifically, based on all data and results, there is no way to reach a different 
conclusion and reminder that stresses the need, exigency and must to replace an old-
fashioned reserve banking system by digital full-reserve banking via monetary reform at the 
earliest feasible date possible.  
 
SEARCH TERMS 
Monetary policy, monetary theory, EMU, European economic and monetary union, re-
search review, monetary developments, monetary transmission, ECB, Eurosystem, central 
bank, EU, finance, inflation, HICP, correlation, VAR, forecast, empirical, reserve banking   
 
Monetary Developments and Transmission in the Euro Area 
Monetary System and Policy, Money Supply, and Real Economy in the Euro Area 
— An Appraisal of Research and Efficiency of the Monetary Transmission Process — 
 
 
 
NOTE: Figures, Tables, and Chapters are cross referenced throughout the work, so that the reader can jump 
to the respective reference with a ‘mouse click’ on the link (the chapter number). The pdf document structure 
provides links to all main chapters. The appendix begins with links to references and supplementary material.  
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Abstract (German Translation) 
Seit der Einführung der Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion (EWWU), im Januar 
1999 bis heute im Jahre 2015 ist der Euro zur zweitstärksten Basiswährung der Welt aufge-
stiegen. Mit einem Bargeldumlauf von über 1.6 Billionen Euro erreicht der Euro derzeit so-
gar ein höheres Geldvolumen als der US-Dollar mit einem Gegenwert von 1.34 Billionen 
Euro. Das Eurosystem umfasst mittlerweile 19 EU-Mitgliedsstaaten mit einer Bevölkerung 
von über 340 Millionen und spielt eine bedeutende Rolle für die Wirtschaft der EWWU, den 
globalen Welthandel und für die internationalen Finanzströme. Trotz dieser großen Bedeu-
tung fehlen weiterhin umfassendere und unabhängigere empirische Studien und Über-
sichtsartikel, die alle Schlüsselfaktoren, aber auch die Effizienz des Eurosystems, beweis-
kräftig analysieren. Dieser Forschungs-Review versucht daher die letzten 16 Jahre der 
EWWU empirisch, theoretisch und mit Hinblick auf die monetären Entwicklungen als auch 
auf das Funktionieren Monetärer Transmissions-Kanäle (MTKs) und Mechanismen, sowie 
der Geldpolitik (GP) der EZB aufzuklären. Zum ersten Mal werden alle 16 MTKs rezensiert 
und die Performance des Eurosystems und der EZB nachhaltig und systematisch überprüft. 
Ein hohes Maß an Ineffizienz konnte in jenen MTKs nachgewiesen werden, die mit dem 
partiellen Mindestreserve-System in Verbindung stehen, sowie mit dem hohen EU-
Überschuldungsgrad, als auch anderen legalen Rahmenbedingungen, wie dem Bank-, Ak-
tien- und Finanzrecht. Daher erlauben alle Daten und Ergebnisse nur eine wissenschaftliche 
Schlussfolgerung, dass eine vollständige Monetäre Reform benötig wird, um das partielle 
Mindestreserve-System durch eine digitale Voll-Reserve zu ersetzen - so bald wie möglich. 
 
SUCHBEGRIFFE (German Translation) 
Geldpolitik, Monetäre, Theorie, Europäische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion, EWWU, wis-
senschaftlicher Review, monetäre Entwicklungen, Transmission, EZB, Eurosystem, Zentral-
bank, EU, Finanzen, Inflation, Korrelation, VAR, empirische, Minimumreserve 
 
Monetäre Entwicklung und Transmission im Euro-Gebiet 
Geld-System und Geld-Politik, Geldmengen-Angebot und Real-Wirtschaft in der EWWU 
— Eine Begutachtung der Forschung und Effizienz der Monetären Transmission — 
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MRO  Main Refinancing Operations 
MS  Monetary System 
MTTs  Monetary Transmission Theories 
NCBs  National Central Banks 
NDER  Narrowly Defined Effective Rate 
NIIP  Net International Investment 
Position 
non-MFIs  all non-bank firms, institutions, 
and the general public 
NPV  Net Present Value 
OCT  Optimal Control Theory 
OMO  Open Market Operation 
OPPs  Optimal Policy Projections 
PA  Principal Agent 
PP  Purchasing Power 
PPP  Purchasing Power Parity 
PSPP  Public Sector Purchase Program (of 
ECB) 
PT  Prospect Theory 
Q  Quarter (Yearly Quater, 3 Seasonal 
Month) 
ROE 
Return On Invest  89 
RQFII 
Renminbi-denominated Foreign 
Institutional Investor Program  99 
RWA  Risk Weighted Asset Ratio 
SEPA  Single European Payments Area 
SIPS  Systematically Important Payment 
Systems 
SME  Small and Medium Size Enterprise 
SMP  Securities Markets Programme 
TA  Transaction 
TMC  Total Market Capitalization, Total 
Market Capitalization 
tn  Trillion 
ULC  Unit Labor Cost 
v  Velocity of Money, also V 
VAR  Vector Autoregression 
WACC  Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
ZLB  Zero Lower Bound 
ZNLB  Zero Nominal Lower Bound 
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1 Preface of the Research Study 
1.1 Preamble 
Money is at the very core of the economy as its most fundamental element. If the financial 
markets are compared with the heart money is the liquidity that supplies all economic or-
gans, firms and households. Its supply also has to be tightly regulated to achieve optimal 
conditions - like the right blood pressure and circulation - to maintain the body and many 
more analogies can be found within ‘bionics of economics’. Too much money in the system 
leads to inflation, too less makes prices fall: and both always impact the business cycle and 
economic growth: deciding about many millions of job that are created or not in the EMU. 
Finding the best trade-off or equilibrium is the purpose and objective of many monetary 
policies (MPs), and every decision, and every lack of a decision, as well as the legal struc-
ture of the entire monetary system (MS) always has tremendous effects on new money’s 
monetary transmission into all branches of the economy. This imperative makes MP, mone-
tary developments, and monetary transmission very important for policy makers, the econ-
omy and all of its producing and consuming actors, and every other stakeholder who is af-
fected by it world-wide. The MS and its MP structure the financial and business sector and 
have a more powerful and renewing impact on the economy than is usually believed today.  
Since the formal introduction of the Euro in 1999, and its launch as daily legal tender in 
2002, the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the European Union (EU) 
both have benefited much from related economic, monetary, financial, and political mech-
anisms of integration, standardization and centralization. Billions of costs (up to €75bn p.a., 
estimate base on ECB data) are saved every year that now indirectly contribute to a higher 
output potential (ca. 0.2-0.4% of GDP growth, p.a., estimate based on ECB data).  
But the novelty of a common currency of a nationally diverse group of countries, which has 
almost reached eye level as international exchange media with the world’s top valuta, with 
€1.0 trillion Euro compared to €1.24 trillion US dollar, also poses some risks and challenges. 
Heterogeneities persist and a political fiscal union is still far-off while a sovereign debt crisis 
(EC) has recently depreciated the Euro and delays a recovery from the financial crisis (FC).   
Hence, an understanding of the EMU’s monetary and economic developments is crucial for 
opinion building and informed rational decision making, for all economic participants: in-
cluding corporations, banks - in this study further referred to as commercial banks (CBs) 
and other monetary financial institutions (MFIs) - and also private persons and households.  
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Basic facts and circumstances are among the most important and relevant ones to under-
stand the macroeconomic effects in the EMU. But they must cover all monetary transmis-
sion channel (MTCs) in play, and thus need to be systematic, comprehensive and scientific.   
Scientifically - from a basic research perspective - it is already interesting to research the 
multi-national Eurosystem, since it is a unique MS of a still new and first ‘supranational 
monetary entity’ in the world. Integration and convergence in the EMU assessed from an 
applied research perspective is also insightful and must aim at improving the macroeco-
nomic conditions, advancing MP operations and options to benefit the real (EU) economy.   
In the last decades, Globalization has further interconnected the world, and the FC and EC 
have revealed a high, and further ascending, level of international interdependency. Ante-
cedents of the Eurosystem have much connected it with the rest of the world (RoW), and 
form the rudiment of the EMUs monetary, fiscal and economic aggregate researched here.  
Europe’s monetary and political convergence and integration has significantly improved 
price stability throughout the Euro area with its 19 member, and also in the EU of 28 mem-
bers. Even beyond, the Eurosystem has also contributed to a lower global inflation rate.  
During this time period, from 1999 on until today in 2015, the Eurosystem, managed by the 
European Central Bank (ECB) and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), had to get 
through a number of serious financial shocks with stark economic impact, which originated 
domestically and internationally, while price stability had to remain the ECB’s top priority.  
After 16 years of this unique monetary union it is high time to scientifically understand how 
well the EMU’s MS and the ECB’s MP are functioning and benefiting all European members 
and its people. How appropriate or successful has been the ECB’s MP and the legal frame-
works of the fractional reserve based Eurosystem, and its monetary transmission? Ques-
tions - that have been neglected by far for too long by MP research, reviews, or journalism. 
To answer these questions the performance of the Eurosystem has to be truly assessed. 
Hereby a vast extent of forms and functions of monetary transmission to be covered and 
the question must always be ‘how efficient and effective’ is any MP deal for the economy. 
Hence, a broadly-analytical ‘research and review’ approach is chosen here. It shall provide 
all-encompassing, valid, and graspable answers to the basic key questions that are funda-
ments to a conclusive and true understanding, and to see the big picture, in an unbiased all-
embracing, independent research review, which is still very scarcely found today, in 2015.     
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1.2 Research Objective 
An independent scientific description of the Eurosystem and an assessment of its perfor-
mance must fulfill several criteria: it has to be comprehensive, systematic, illuminative, 
conclusive, revealing, evaluative, but at once also must provide key facts in a graspable 
way. In consideration of the extensive topic of ‘monetary developments and monetary 
transmission in the EMU’ a new hybrid form of a research thesis is developed here that 
follows a ‘chimera-strategy’ including a ‘long’ overview providing review to cover and up-
date all key topics, which is evenhandedly combined with newly conducted analytical re-
search that sheds more light into all key topics and estimates of MP and MS performance. 
To achieve this mission the subordinate goals aim to illustrate, analyze and also to ‘reality 
check’ still prevailing macroeconomic theories of today. Empirical research has to challenge 
the ‘general economic believes’ that persist and dominate recent views. It has to reconcile 
and verify facts and theory to yield a correct and updated interpretation, in a businesslike 
and scientific manner. Hence, several chapters are going to deal with the question of how 
well existing models and theories explain monetary and economic data of the EMU, and 
how well these data fit into our understanding of accepted stylized facts and coherencies?  
Preparation, processing, comparing and compiling of basic-but-key time series records like 
the monetary aggregates, lending activity, interest rates, economic growth as gross domes-
tic product (GDP) in real and nominal terms, and many more shall provide the basis to un-
cover the underlying power behind monetary approaches, to help advance their usage, and 
to better predict macroeconomic conditions like markets, Fx, Nx, interests, or consumption.   
This research aims to unveil financial and economic interdependencies in a qualitative and 
quantitative manner, partly also in a spatio-temporal fashion to reveal dynamical states of 
EU heterogeneities. Analytical frameworks and basic-but-key statistical procedures are em-
ployed to advance monetary theory (MT) and empirical research shall sharpen our view to 
uncover the real coherencies and primary causes of a complete set of MTC effects. Finally, 
the performance of the ECB’s MP and the MS of the Eurosystem is going to be assessed.  
The highest culmination of relevant and impactful monetary research articles lies before 
and around the introduction of the Euro, when consolidated data was still lacking. This re-
search objective makes the review unique and provides it with a special focus that seems to 
be much more relevant, as compared to the conventional focus of the few other reviews.      
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1.3 Scientific Proceeding and Guide to the Research 
The functioning of the monetary system impacts all of us, which is conspicuous for a sup-
posedly ‘dry subject’ most of us, even business experts, have not so much notice of, nor 
sustained interest in. Nevertheless, this study is going to convey that the MS and its MP is 
in fact one of the most relevant topics of our economy, culture, and political system. Its 
legal settings still determine non-descript how property is distributed and re-distributed 
EMU wide, even world-wide, as all fractional reserve banking system show high similarity.  
Hence, it ‘should be’ really interesting and relevant for everybody, as all of our lives, poli-
tics, and ‘our countries’, and the EU, depend on it and are determined by it, in many ways. 
Centuries have been strongly influenced by the monetary system and its transmission 
mechanisms - involving CBs and other MFIs, which are still the main beneficiaries of frac-
tional reserve banking. The MS also sways the future of the EU, its economy and people.   
MP research is an applied research and includes basic research, theory and empirical re-
search. To make the entire result content informative and graspable for a broader group of 
readers the Introduction (see chapter 2) already ‘reviews’ a broad content of prevailing and 
canonical MTs and macroeconomic theories, and comprises background information about 
the MS and its money. It introduces the history and major structures of the EMU, its proce-
dures, fractional reserve banking, its legal instances, the ECB’s purpose and objectives. The 
monetary aggregates are introduced, the two ways of money creation by the ECB and MFIs, 
types and mechanisms of inflation and monetary transmission, as well as recent models.  
The ‘Materials and Methods’ (see chapter 3) describe the statistical methods, universal 
standard formulas, and software tools used. The ‘References’ are given in section 6.2, and a 
fully detailed complete documentation of all results for all figures is found in section 6.3. 
The main body of the ‘Analytical Research Review’ (see chapter 4) begins with a retrospec-
tive interpretation of time series analysis and correlations of the last 16 years. It analyzes 
inflation, GDP, monetary aggregates, the velocity of money and its impact on output, mon-
ey multipliers and real money balances, as well as debt generation in the Eurosystem, in-
cluding the special cases of Luxembourg and Greece, and the financial crisis (FC) and EU 
sovereign debt crisis (EC). The Eurosystem’s time-dynamic balance sheet and ECB instru-
ments are reviewed and the euro area’s monetary transmission is newly categorized in 16 
MTCs and systematically researched and modeled. The ‘Conclusions’ (see chapter 5) sum-
marizes and integrates all findings and gives key recommendations towards a full-reserve. 
2 Introduction, Background, and Monetary Policy Review / 2.1 / 2.1.1 
Page | 15 
 
2 Introduction, Background, and Monetary Policy Review 
2.1 The ECB, the Eurozone and Eurosystem 
2.1.1 Background on the Eurosystem and its Convergence Criteria  
 
The history of the European Union (EU), the Eurozone and its single currency - involving a 
common monetary policy (MP) governed by the European Central Bank (ECB) - is globally 
unique and outstanding. Its origin dates back to the European Economic Community (EEC) 
founded 1957 by the Treaty of Rome, which amended to previous pillars the EEC, the Euro-
pean Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the early European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity (ECSC) of 1952. Already in 1962 the Commission of the EEC announced anew its inten-
tions, and common objectives, to establish the European Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU). It started its realization in 1989 (Scheller 2004) by applying a three stage strategy on 
the basis of the Werner (1971) and the Delors report (1989). Interim hurdles to implemen-
tation of the EEC and the EMU were the delays caused by the collapse of the Bretton-
Woods Monetary Management System (1973), against the background of the oil crisis, and 
the lack of defining consistent Europe-wide standards towards a sound fiscal and monetary 
policy, also known as stabilization policy (Görgens et al. 2014). Then, the following German 
reunification in 1989 and the disappearing political bisection in Europe re-catalyzed the 
formation of the EMU again by allowing for the Treaty of the EU, known as the Maastricht 
treaty of 1993 (EC 2012; Görgens et al. 2014). It still represents one of the most important 
EU achievements that formally established the EU and EMU with a single common currency 
(Görgens et al. 2014). The three capital stages to implement the EMU have been as follows:  
(I) completion of the domestic market, common control and liberalization of eco-
nomic and financial policy (in 1990), 
(II) a ban on (directly) financing public budgets with central bank’s money (in 1994), 
and the establishment of a central bank precursor institution, the EMI (European 
Monetary Institute), to prepare for the Eurozone and the ECB system, and stage  
(III) the final introduction of the Euro, the ECB, and the EMU (in 1999). Of the 28 
EMU member countries 19 have already successfully joined the Eurozone, some-
times also referred to as the ‘19 EMU stage-III members’.  
The euro convergence criteria, also known as Maastricht criteria (ex-Art. 121 of the EC trea-
ty; now Art. 140 of The Treaty), were passed as the main prerequisite and tasks for EU-
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countries to be fulfilled and maintained, to technically qualify to join the EU monetary un-
ion. The criteria intent to support monetary and fiscal stability in five cardinal standards:  
(1) A low level of inflation as measured by the harmonized index of consumer prices 
(HICP), and in comparison to the unweighted arithmetic mean of similar HICP infla-
tion rates in those top three EU member states (that are not significantly below the 
Eurozone average, p.a.) with the lowest HICP inflation plus a 1.5% tolerance margin 
(first indent of Art. 140(1) prot. 13). (The Balassa-Samuelson-Effect is part of a re-
thinking of pre-union criteria for a more practicable ‘EMU-reference corridor’). 
(2) Acceptable fiscal budgeting: annual deficit spending per Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) must not exceed 3% (second indent of Art. 140(1), 126).  
(3) Gross domestic debt must not exceed 60% of GDP per fiscal year (Art. 140(1), 126). 
(4) Applicant countries are obliged to maintain exchange rate stability by not devaluat-
ing the central rate of their Euro-pegged currency, and they must also adhere to 
sound practices such as avoidance of any severe currency tension within the two 
years of the respective convergence tests (EC 2012; third indent of Art. 140(1)).  
(5) Low long-term interest rates: the unweighted arithmetic mean yield of 10 year gov-
ernment bonds (of three members with lowest HICP) may not be exceeded by 2%. 
(Fourth indent Art. 140(1) of the Treaty, EC 2012, prot. 13). 
Additionally, there are some other qualitative criteria that are not fully defined legally or 
standardized in a quantitative manner. Together these measures shall achieve a higher 
homogeneity in the community, in fiscal and monetary matters, and a sustainable conver-
gence, stability and monetary capacity. ‘Nominal convergence’ refers to the formal Maas-
tricht criteria and ‘real convergence’ refers to real economic structure (Görgens et al. 
2014). At least once every two years but usually annually the ECB Council reports to the 
Commission on the annual progress in its Convergence Report, as is specified by the Treaty 
(European Commission 2012; Art. 140). Although the criteria are still authoritative some 
have been slightly melted as members were facing difficulties to adhere during crises.   
After four decades of setting the goal of a common currency the Euro was introduced on 
January 1, 1999 in agreement with the cutting-edge Maastricht Treaty. The exchange rates 
of the 11 first countries were fixed one day earlier and a European Currency Unit (ECU) cur-
rency basket was calculated in US$ to accommodate the varying quantitative contribution 
of each member currency, respectively (Görgens et al. 2014; ECB 2015b; Ehrig et al. 2011). 
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The exchange rates of all members were fixed from 1999-2002 and operations to change 
the legal tender, Euro coins and banknotes were launched three years later in January 
2002. Some stage III euro members have also launched it months later (ECB 2015b).    
Since its introduction the Euro has grown to become the world’s second largest reference 
currency next to the US dollar with about one trillion of currency in circulation (US dollar ca. 
€1.24tn). In subsequent years, eight additional EU-member countries have joined the euro 
area, the monetary union’s Eurosystem, the Eurozone, which now comprises a total of 19 
countries with a 340 m people economy. It also plays an important role for stage I and 
stage II members and in many EU overseas countries with EU-pegged currencies. Most oth-
er EU countries, especially the new members, also peg their currencies in one way or the 
other to the Euro and have improved their monetary stability ever since (ECB 2015b).  
The EMU is still the most far reaching commitment strategy to European integration and 
the common Euro with its reputation of secure prices became one of its key symbols. 
 
2.1.2 The Benefits, Functions and Policies of the Monetary Eurosystem 
The establishment of the monetary union with 19 culturally diverse European countries, i.e. 
third EMU stage member states, is being viewed as a unique and outstanding achievement 
in world history. Key drivers of European cooperation and monetary unification have been 
the improving economical competitive advantages of its national economies’ local factors:  
(1) Significantly lower transactional costs (currency management, exchange and hedg-
ing costs) that can account for up to 1.5% of Eurozone-GDP (e.g. 150 billion p.a., 
2014, own calculation o.c. (ECB 2015a based)), termed frictional transactional costs. 
(2) Less currency based distortion and volatility, as well as less risk in nominal exchange 
rates and related uncertainty in planning, and less need for rescheduling and mana-
gerial efforts (totaling 0.4%-0.5% of GDP, derived from EMU trade (ECB 2015b)). 
(3) Higher transparency and convergence of prices in the euro area, improved intra- 
and extra-EMU competition and economizing, better utilization of resources and 
processes and supply chain optimization (0.25% of GDP p.a., o.c., ECB 2015a based). 
(4) Improvement in EMU-wide maintenance of price stability, monetary performance 
and global monetary leverage based on political-legal commitment and ECB policy. 
(5) Guaranteed long-term commitment to sound fiscal and MP in the euro area and 
stability assured by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and euro rescue funds. 
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(6) Lower interest rates with the exception of the FC linked EC (EMU bond yield have 
improved again to initial lows of ca. 2%, post ‘euro bailout fund’ of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the Commission, the EMS, and the ECB in addition to its low 
interest MP) (ECB 2015a). Low interest rates intent to foster investment decisions. 
(7) More tourism (ca. 6% o.c.) and cross border business, cluster formation, and so on.  
All these benefits come at the cost of monetary autonomy and some limit to fiscal home 
rule of the member countries - a political long-term commitment that provides internal 
stability. To estimate the real costs of the monetary union the underlying risk portfolios are 
to be considered that may account for potential occurrences of asymmetric shocks to de-
mand and supply, prices, debt, or interest rates of the individual member countries. If these 
historically grown asymmetries (Cornelius et al. 2000) don’t converge they could provoke 
shocks that unfold new costs and lower economic growth in the EU. Thus, ongoing econom-
ic, monetary, fiscal and political leadership are needed anew. The EMU is still new political 
multi-national monetary entity. Its common destiny fuels the EU’s integration convergence.  
Most MPs of the ECB are implemented by the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). 
The ECB heads and governs the ESCB and serves as its umbrella organization (European 
Commission 2012; Art. 8). Together they are the only legal provider of currency that serve 
MFIs and safeguard the constancy of the Euro’s purchasing power, inside and outside of the 
Eurozone (e.g. adjustments to the depreciation of foreign currencies). The stability of the 
Euro is favorable to business in the euro area but also for world trade and world prices.  
2.1.3 The Primary Objective of the ECB and the ESCB 
The primary goal of the ECB and ESCB is to maintain price stability in the euro area. Without 
prejudice to this goal, it shall support the ‘general economic policies’ in accordance with 
Article 3 and 128 of the Treaty of the Union. Hereby it shall contribute to economic stabil-
ity, growth and development, e.g. via its MP operations, or by evaluating and reporting the 
fulfillment of Maastricht criteria of the members states (Art. 127; European Commission, 
2012). All of these MPs actions have to be in accordance with a free market economy (Art. 
119, 127 of The EU Treaty) and intend to promote business growth and sustainable eco-
nomic development and stable prices to improve the competitiveness of the EU’s local fac-
tors (Porter 2008). The ECB must be consulted, or invited, on any proposed union act in the 
field of competence (Chapter II MP; European Commission, 2012) and shall foster and pro-
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mote suitable coordination of all member’s economic policies. The meaning of ‘supporting 
general economic policies’ comprises to achieve low interest rates, high employment, eco-
nomic growth, stability of the financial markets and sector, and exchange rate stability, in 
an independent way, while keeping price stability unaffected. Although not explicitly speci-
fied legally, the official objective of price stability is to achieve an annual HICP price stability 
of below but close to 2% (ECB 2015b). As money supply serves as nominal anchor of medi-
um term inflation and prices, the ECB has also set a M3 reference growth rate to 4.5% p.a. 
(based on the expected inflation targets and a GDP growth of 2-2.5% p.a., as well as a ‘me-
dium-term’ decline in the velocity of ‘M3 money’ per year of 0.5-1% (Council 1999).   
2.1.4 Functions of Price Stability in the Euro Area 
It is widely accepted in the field of MP research, and thus also part of the ECB policy, that 
stronger increases in the aggregate price level can become problematic at a transition point 
when inflation or deflation exceeds ca. 2-3% per year. Although some MP theories claim, if 
wages rise in tandem and proportional with price index increases, including nominal inter-
est rates, and keeping purchasing power (PP) hardly affected, inflation would theoretically 
be less problematic. This might be the case for some of the new European stage III member 
countries due to a consequence of the Balassa-Samuelson-Effect. But in general, the real 
economy has to bear a cost if the PP of the Euro decreases. This is sometimes called fric-
tional ‘costs of inflation’ (Mankiw 2014; Walsh 2010; Friedman & Woodford 2010; Görgens 
et al. 2014). Price stability, as maintained by the ECB (0-2% of HICP, and close to 2%), has 
several fundamental advantages, which are widely accepted in economics (Mathews et al. 
2013; Mankiw 2014; Illing 1997). They arise due to the absence of frictional disadvantages 
of expected and real PP changes and comprise economic welfare and employment effects, 
as well as fostering prosperity and growth potential by improving: (1) the transparency of 
relative prices, (2) by economizing resource allocation and better informed consumption 
and investment, (3) more cost-effective supply-chains, by advancing the conditions of com-
petition and by increasing the common market efficiency, (4) by stabilizing the welfare of 
households, and (5) the robustness of domestic demand. In addition, (6) optimizing the 
productive potential of the economy by lowering transactional costs, (7) reducing the risk 
premiums of interest rates that are linked to expected inflation and thus investment and 
consumption costs, and (8) by preventing relative distortions in nominally fixed contracts 
and laws like taxes, social security, fringe benefits, insurances or the welfare system, (9) by 
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avoiding ‘shoe leather’ and (10) ‘menu costs’, and (11) by preventing casual emergence of 
potential disincentives for economic decision making and behavior, as well as (12) by abol-
ishing non-performance based relative redistribution of PP of the respective currency, (13) 
causing delays and distortion in Fx rates, and (14) reducing uncertainty and planning relia-
bility that is divesting general monetary convenience (ECB 2004; Mankiw 2014; Mathews et 
al. 2013), and (15) less  the different rigidities in prices and wages. Several mechanisms ex-
ist to minimize the costs of inflation like index coupled wages, taxes, prices and rates.  
Especially in the Eurozone sound macroeconomic conditions and low inflation helps to save 
more translational costs then elsewhere, due to the ongoing need of convergence and inte-
gration of variant economies to from one attractive market, also for inflow investment. 
The history of inflation in euro area countries shows a strong trend towards equalization 
with low and very low inflation rates, also prevailing cumulatively. PP stability has much 
improved from 1999 when the Euro was introduced till today (Eurostat 2015). Price stability 
has ameliorated since also due to the deep-seated objective to meet the convergence crite-
ria (see 2.1.1). This was further underpinned by the subsequent introduction of the Single 
European Payments Area (SEPA) in 2008/2010/2014 with its 28 national members (includ-
ing also nearly all pre-euro stage I and II members), the global price level trends, and the 
common currency exchange rate (Fx) effects. The SEPA, for instance, betters the cost rela-
tion and cumulatively lowers or maintains prices stability. This might also help balance the 
HICP index in the EU, including stage I and II countries that catch up to meeting the Maas-
tricht criteria due to economic incentives. The HICP standard is a Laspeyres type price index 
and weighted by the relative aggregate of expenditures of households for covered products 
per country, but doesn’t include business investment and governmental spending. Not-
withstanding, GDP deflators similarly depict a trend towards price stability (Eurostat 2015).  
Nevertheless, if we look at the relative cost of living, the price levels and its annual changes 
in euro area countries several asymmetries and differences persist. Again, the Balassa-
Samuelson effect helps explain why arbitrage mediated purchasing power parity (PPP) is 
not directly and immediately reached in the EMU: The Euro area consist of richer and poor-
er countries, because of the variable productivities, respective PPPs and price divergences 
of mainly ‘non-tradable goods and services’. Heterogeneous inflation can be a result of di-
verging productivity kinetics (Görgens et al. 2014; Balassa 1964; Samuelson 1964). These 
asymmetries decline when relative productivity adopts, and prices slightly increase, due the 
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fact that tradable goods orient towards the world prices and global price standards of 
world trade. Increased international price competition and a bigger total pool of traded 
products and intermediates, and intensified global supply chains, also keeps EU prices con-
stant. The effect also predicts, that prices of ‘non-tradable good and services’ will increase 
faster. This leads to a slightly higher inflation in those catching-up EU countries that today 
still exhibit a lower GDP per capita (Görgens et al. 2014; Balassa 1964; Samuelson 1964). 
2.1.5 The Structural and Operational Framework of the Eurosystem 
The Eurosystem, with the ECB and the national central banks (NCBs) that together form the 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB), is unique in the world but its architecture, pro-
cesses, and structure resemble the U.S. Federal Reserve System (Fed), the Bank of England 
(BoE), and also the Deutsche Bundesbank (DB), among all other central banking system that 
seem to have served as a standard. This similarity facilitates a high level of comparability.  
The headquarters (HQs) and Executive Board of the European Central Bank being located in 
Frankfurt (a. M.), in southwest Germany, is headed and led by the ECB’s ‘Governing Coun-
cil’, which is made up of six members: the president, the vice president, four council mem-
bers, and the directors of all national central banks (NCBs). The ECB’s Council is the su-
preme decision-making body of the Eurosystem (Scheller 2004; ECB 2015b). Its decision-
making is based on the majority principle built on an intra-Eurozone currency-weighted 
representative ‘rotation system’ (ECB 2015b; EC 2013). The Council governs the MP in the 
EU together with the NCB as the heart piece of the Eurosystem (Scheller 2004; ECB 2015b). 
Its legal framework is given in Art. 127 of the EC Treaty and the Statute of the European 
ESCB and ECB (EC 2012; EC 2003; EC 2013). This has led to the world’s highest independ-
ence index (CBI: ECB 0.83 > Fed 0.51) for the ECB in 2003 (Crowe & Meade 2008; Mathews 
et al. 2013) and is a very significant improvement of the mean CBIs of euro area members. 
Admittedly, so called independence of central banks doesn’t mean it is not led by private 
and political interest groups: e.g. the Fed is even officially semi-private and the ECB is also 
very likely to be influenced by politics and MFIs, but final prove is often missing for this 
widely found assumption. Additionally, independence of central banks can be, and is found 
to be, harshly criticized as undemocratic (Mathews et al. 2013), and to asymmetrically privi-
lege only CBs and other MFIs at the expense of all economic actors, a lacking mandate for 
its economic policy, and a lack of performance control of  MP in monetary transmission.  
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Still, central bank’s independence is widely thought to benefit price stability and this hy-
pothesis can be much supported by correlations that are widely found (Mathews et al. 
2013; Mankiw 2014; Friedman & Woodford 2010). Following this theory, the ECB’s and 
ESCB’s independence is much conductive to maintain price stability and includes: institu-
tional, personnel, financial (e.g. separated from the EU budget), and functional autonomy. 
Only specific and even negligible earnings (e.g. a surplus on interests paid, and earnings 
that may arise from coining money, etc.) are paid to the European government. From a 
business point of view the ECB is not very profitable for that it may print money. Theories 
that suggest profitability as indicator of functionality would judge it as clearly dysfunctional.  
Albeit some underlying links to the government may remain, these are still customary to all 
central banking systems in the world (Mathews et al. 2013). For example, the members of 
the ECB Executive Board are appointed by the European Council for a maximum of eight 
years. They are selected by the political Heads of State of the 28 EU member countries in 
accordance with the euro-area related political principles of occupation. However, the legal 
framework of the ECB and its Executive Board, backed by the European Court of Justice, 
shall still assure their independence in general and legal terms: for instance no governmen-
tal body in the EU or elsewhere may instruct or direct the ECB/ESCBs MP decisions (Article 
130 of The Treaty) to not adhere to its general tasks specified in Art. 127, 133, and 138 (EC 
2012). Or, exchange rate MP is headed by the Council of Finance Ministers (Svensson 1999).  
The ECB has several means and tools to regulate the money supply, interest rates, price 
stability, and to also indirectly enable GDP growth (ECB 2013b; Neyer 2007). Most opera-
tions and instruments involve the sector of the commercial banks (CBs) and other MFIs 
(Neyer 2007). Money creation is a two step procedure: the primary money creation by the 
ECB is subsequently amplified by the MFIs in a privately owned and of course much more 
powerful secondary (book) money creation network strategy (DB 2015). The CBs and other 
MFIs thus represent the only relevant interface and instance of the ECB with the real econ-
omy and is also often privately managed and much ‘out of ECB control’. Most new money is 
released into the economy in the form of new debt that has to be repaid to MFIs that are 
allowed to retain the principal on top of the interests as earnings, while only a 1% fraction 
of reserves has to be temporarily deposited with the NCB’s accounts (DB 2015). Thus, MFIs 
are the main part of the money creating sector, which poses many risks and principal agent 
problems (PAPs) (Ross 1973), as MFIs are often at least partially privately owned, incorpo-
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rated (privately owned by majority stake), or led. This money creation is often referred to 
as ‘private money creation out of nothing’, or ‘out of thin air’, or in the scientific literature 
‘check, book, MFI’s (DB 2015), or virtual money creation’.  
This way the secondary ‘MFI and CB money creating sector’ almost solely regulates the to-
tal supply of new money that is released into the economy and also the money stocks (with 
the exception of outright transactions and QE introduced later in this chapter). The behav-
iors of CBs and MFIs is thought to be only influenced by the economic incentives given by 
the market and the ECB’s key European rates and MP operations (DB 2015; ECB 2015b; 
Neyer 2007). However, how much market forces are really at work remains to be measured 
and proven and is elusive until today. The ECB is intended to only adjusts MP operations to 
indirectly influences the behavior of MFIs and CBs with respect to their lending activity, 
setting of effective interest rates, managing the currency in circulation, reserve accounts, 
market and repurchase agreements, and alike. Noteworthy, CBs and other MFIs are often a 
private decision-making instance that also sets the pace and intensity of transmitting the 
ECB’s MP actions. Thus, MP actions are only as efficient and effective as the banking market 
- a much forgotten scientific topic that is evaluated in this analytical review.  
A professionally-effective legal overview of the ECB’s instruments and operational frame-
work are given by the ‘guidelines of the ECB’ (ECB 2013b; EC 2013) and the ‘Statute of the 
ESCB’ (EC 2003), according to Article 8 of The Treaty (EC 2012) and is reviewed (Neyer 
2007). They precisely define the legal MP instruments, tools, approaches and operations 
that the Eurosystem has at its disposal - most of which are factually in practical use. The 
following list summarizes in detail the full scope of ECB MP actions at hand to meet its op-
erational targets, such as the quantity of money in circulation and development of mone-
tary aggregates, and to set and signal the bank call rate, and long term rates (ECB 2013b): 
(1) Open market operations (OMO): the purpose of MP actions comprising OMOs are initi-
ated by the ECB is to steer interest rates, to manage liquidity in the market, and for 
communication policy to ‘single the MP stance’. Its five instruments are specified as: 
 
(1.1) Reverse transaction (repurchase agreements, collateralized loans, liquidity means)  
(1.2) Outright transactions (open market transactions for eligible assets, structural) 
(1.3) Issuance of ECB debt certificates (to create liquidity shortage, via ECB obligations) 
(1.4) Foreign exchange swaps (Art.127+219, intervention, ERM2/ECOFIN, spot/forward) 
(1.5) Collection of fixed-term deposits (NCBs remunerated deposits, to absorb liquidity)  
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They are executed as standard tenders, quick tenders or bilateral procedures. With re-
gard to the type of their procedures they can be categorized as follows (ECB 2013b):  
(a) Main refinancing operations (MRO, these include reverse transaction with a one 
week maturity and frequency, and the NCB standard tenders). 
(b) Long-term refinancing operations (including reverse transaction with a three-month 
maturity and a monthly frequency, and the NCB standard tenders).  
(c) Fine tuning operations (these are ad hoc measures at the end of the two week re-
serve maintenance period, reverse transactions, foreign exchange swaps, collection of 
fixed-term deposits, NCB quick tenders, and bilateral procedures, by the ECB council).  
(d) Structural ESCB operations (reverse open market operations, standard tenders that 
are non-regular and not standardized a priori, NCB vis-à-vis the financial sector type). 
(2) Standing facilities: overnight liquidity management with NCBs, pre-specified interest 
rate against eligible assets, EMU wide terms, (and: bilateral standing Swap Fx lines). 
(3) Minimum reserves: a legal requirement for credit institutions to hold minimum depos-
its on accounts with NCBs (European Commission 2003; Art. 19), which is to be uniform 
throughout the euro area and in the respective NCBs. It can be used as a link-up and 
stabilization tool in MP to influence borrowing, interest rate, check money creation and 
the overall money supply. Currently, the MFI’s minimum reserve base rate is only 1% 
(1999-2011: 2%) and includes overnight deposits, deposits of up to two years, and ma-
turity of also up to two years, and money market papers. Minimum reserves are based 
on the CB’s monthly balance sheet’s ‘liabilities with reserve requirements’ (ECB 2015b). 
The ‘central rates’ are the pivot regulators and parameters of many of these MP instru-
ments of the ECB. They are referred to as ‘the rate of marginal lending facility (MLF)’ (this is 
the rate for overnight liquidity from the central bank), the ‘main refinancing operations 
(MRO)’ (fixed rate; one-week liquidity providing MROs, LTRO rates orient on the MROs but 
can deviate), and the ‘deposit facility’ (the rate of overnight deposits with the central bank).   
Although financing of national budgets is prohibited, quantitative easing (QE) in the form of 
buying long-term government bonds is not explicitly forbidden in the treaties, e.g. if they 
are not bought directly from a member country but from an ‘investor’ of the secondary 
market, which are often mainly MFIs and other central banks, and to a lesser extent other 
private investors. QE is often an outright transaction (see point 1.2). Such transactions rep-
resent an ongoing controversial subject, and politically discussed topic also by EU members. 
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The ECB officially may only carry out its tasks under the provision of all previous Treaties of 
the Union and the Statute of the ECB (EC 2012; EC 2013). These prohibit financing of gov-
ernment budgets, also e.g. via Government bonds, later referred to as G-bonds. Thus, all 
examples of covered bond purchase programs (CBPP) (1-3, 2015), and the asset backed 
securities purchase programs (ABSPP) are designed to intent to only buy from secondary 
markets. Regularization or a normative QE-MP with fair economic incentives is still elusive. 
As its main function and core business, only the Eurosystem (the ECB and ESCB) is allowed 
to authorize and issue Euros (Art. 128 of the Treaty): banknotes and coins - defined as the 
only legal tender within the EMU. Annually, the ESCB assures the right amount of physical 
money (operational and managerial ECB function: planning of production, distribution, and 
replacement of legal tender, coins and bills) (EC 2012; Art. 16; 128). Through all of its in-
struments the ECB regulates and controls the monetary base M0 (for definitions see chap-
ter 2.2.3) that is highly profitable ‘supplied’ by MFIs later on. As a result it also indirectly 
regulates M1-M3 with instruments 1-3 that are mentioned above (ECB 2015b; Neyer 2007). 
 
2.2 The Money of the Eurosystem 
2.2.1 Characteristics, Dimensions and Types of Money  
Since Aristotle’s Politics in the 4th century BC of ancient Greece, discerning ‘Oeconomics’ 
(housekeeping) and ‘Chrematistics’ (wealth acquisition) there are three defined functions 
of money (things that buy), highlighted in table 1 (Mankiw 2014; Mathews et al. 2013). 
 
 
Table 1 The Three Functions and Dimensions of Money 
(1) Medium of exchange: portable, liquid, concentrated form of interchangeable value. 
(2) Unit of account: terms that makes things commensurable and negotiable. 
(3) Store of value: freezing of purchasing power including the concept of price stability. 
These three dimensions of money are given in all marketable securities at varying degrees. 
Money traits of liquidity, commensurability, and store of value are newly decomposed here 
into: (I) freely transferable, (II) assignable, (III) divisible, (IV) negotiable, and (V) storable.   
Money has evolved: from direct barter, to standard trade goods, to standard coins of pre-
cious metal, to fiat coins of less precious metal, to paper promises of precious metal, to fiat 
money without a standard, to digital promises of fiat money including digital promises to 
pay digital promises, and totally unbacked securitization of money for non-MFIs. The devel-
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opment was driven by previous limitations and caused by the basic needs to better the util-
ity of money by making payments more convenient and secure. The very old idea that a 
central bank system with fiat money offers benefits over the gold standard is actually al-
ready found in Adam’s Smith seminal work The Wealth of Nations (Smith 1776). Although it 
was implemented only lately, e.g. in 1971 by the Federal Reserve System after the collapse 
of the Bretton-Woods System, but monetary reform was only conducted 50% and thereby 
stopped midway: a designated full-reserve was impeded (Douglas et al. 1939), and legal 
propositions (MM 2015) are still ‘on hold’. The Eurosystem has directly started midway in 
1999 with Fiat money, only backed by the government’s monopoly and a fractional reserve.  
 
Table 2 The Three Types of Money in the Eurozone 
(1) Legal tender: official cash coins and paper money, the ‘only government backed fiat money’. 
(2) Reserves: in electronic deposit or as legal tender (exclusively for MFIs): it includes the minimal 
reserve (legal requirement), excess reserves, and other temporary MFI deposits. These central bank 
accounts are also used for ‘netting’ purposes of interbank settlements in a time period that is often 
minimized to ‘real-time’ (e.g. multilateral net settlement systems, TARGET2 real time gross settle-
ment system RTGS, Euro 1, Bankers Automated Clearing System BACS in the UK, and many more). 
Today, a bank without reserves can source liquidity on the ’ECB fostered’ interbank lending market. 
(3) Demand deposits: only an accounting number for non-MFIs, a theoretical-legal promise to ‘pay’. 
 
 
Due to historical, political and, psychological, and ‘market stewarding’ reasons the ESCB still 
has many commodities like gold reserves in their possession: e.g. due to the previous gold 
standard (and other reasons) the ESCB still deposits 505 tonnes and the Fed 8.133 tonnes 
of gold, in the first quarter of 2015. Other assets are foreign currencies stored, from NCBs 
of former times, some date back to the Bretton-Woods System and other Fx treaties. 
In times of a gold standard Gossen’s laws of diminishing utility with quantity was in effect. 
This led to higher prices if money was scarce, which drove gold mining. Gossen’s second 
law amplifies the effect on GDP, as the diminished utility of money divided by a higher price 
shrinks the consumption twice (Anderegg 2007). It remains elusive how Gossen’s law are 
still in effect in the modern monetary theory (MMT) and neo-Chartalism’s fiat money sys-
tem. Marginal transaction (TA) utility of money diminishes with holding cash but different 
to a gold standard system. The EMU’s TA power of money is discussed in the result section.   
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Figure 1 Schematic Representation of the Three Dimensions of Money  
Monetary aggregates (M0-M3) (see 2.2.3) are defined by the ECB based on their respective 
liquidity (M0 having the highest and M3 the lowest) and schematically slope in a 3D vector 
space of money dimensions (Figure 1). Monetary aggregates are introduced in Figure 2. 
 
2.2.2 The Types of Depreciation of Money’s Purchasing Power  
There are seven types of inflation categorized here by causation as newly completed list:  
(1) Cost push inflation (e.g. of diverse asset types: like rising wages, taxes or oil prices, 
mainly due to imported factors of production, domestic factors of production, etc.) 
(2) Demand pull inflation (e.g. increase in employment and improving consumer index, 
consumer expenditures, private investments, government spending, export driven 
inflation, imported inflation, price responsiveness, etc.) 
(3) Profit push inflation (mark-up pricing, monopolization, price agreements, etc.) 
(4) Money inflation (e.g. a higher increase in base or book money then demanded, etc.) 
(5) Exchange rate inflation: (e.g. depreciated Fx rate makes imports expensive, etc.) 
(6) GDP driven inflation (e.g. stagnation, a fall in real GDP in a recession, etc.) 
(7) Behavioral-informational inflation (e.g. expected inflation drives prices, etc.) 
All seven causations work in opposite direction for deflation (14 points in sum): 
For example growth deflation (e.g. a rise in real GDP in a boom phase), etc.  
Inflation can be also categorized according to its intensity and speed of price increases, as:  
(1) Mild inflation (>2% p.a.) 
(2) Moderate inflation (>2-10% p.a.) 
(3) Strong inflation (10-100% p.a.) 
(4) Hyperinflation (>100% p.a.) 
(5) Deflation (<0% p.a.), etc. [until hyper-deflation (<-50% p.a.)] 
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2.2.3 Money Creation and Monetary Aggregates in the Eurosystem 
Only the ESCB and ECB is entitle for cash generation of central bank money, legal tender in 
the Eurosystem, and it has several monetary instruments available (see chapter 2.1.5). They 
organize to pass the lawful money (coins and bills), to the private commercial banks (CBs) 
that serve the demand of all non-banks (Non-MFIs). Four traditional hypothetical theories 
exist on money creation of MFIs (Werner 2014), which tells it own tale of a deep deception:  
(1) Financial Intermediation: banks are like any other economic actor, they gather resource 
and re-allocate them in a full-reserve like system in which banks act as intermediaries. 
(2) Fractional Reserve Theory: CBs are intermediaries and only create money in systemic 
interaction, also known as the ‘money multiplier’ model, reserve based. 
(3) Credit Creation Theory: a fractional reserve system with money creation loopholes also 
for individual banks, and in their systemic interaction; money creation by extending credit 
without the need of immediate reserves, e.g. capital and minimum reserves are only met at 
particular reporting intervals and only punctually managed including interbank lending.  
(4) Liquidity and Property Deprivation Theory (DT): Theory 1-3 is amended by fractional 
reserve MFIs creating a vicious cycle for the real economy by soaking out its liquidity. This 
creates growing debt and other liability dependencies; book money is created out of noth-
ing and the principal must be paid back in real money, while non-MFI positive money is 
kept too scarce. Inevitable defaults and sellouts drive deprivation of the real economy. Li-
quidity always ends up in MFIs again where it illegitimately re-leverages PP via (2+3). MFIs 
use external money for purchases, while MFIs and MP keeps the EMU debt level constant.      
(1) is the traditionally naive public view, (2) a professionally accepted view of the 20th cen-
tury that forgets about the principal repayment and network, and (3) a revitalized theory 
that ‘banks can create money out of nothing’, empirical evidence backed (Werner 2014), (4) 
a summarized updated view and theory shared by a growing number of researchers.  
The ECB’s and the German NCB’s (Deutsche Bundesbank) only official statement is that the 
Eurosystem would be ‘a fractional reserve system’ that is ‘secured by the central bank’: if a 
MFI obtains another asset-backed demand deposit at its NCB it is referred to as ‘central 
bank’s book money creation’, which is a promise to instantaneously obtain legal tender 
payout (currency creation) (DB 2015). This can be either an active (monetization of MFI 
assets) or passive (credit, repurchase agreement) way of central bank’s money creation. 
This ‘stand-by pledge’ of the NCB to furnish currency for CB and other MFI reserve deposits 
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is the reason to group both types of money, cash and reserve securities, as real central 
bank’s money (Figure 2, left). It includes both currency of banks and non-banks as well as all 
central bank reserves. Virtual money is later created as MFI checkbook money (e.g. retail 
banks book money creation) by multiplication in MFI accounts (Figure 2, right). This can be 
either passive (no change in total amount of non-MFI money [demand deposits and cash] 
for an increase in book money, e.g. via depositing cash with a bank; but this also allows for 
more active book money creation) or active book money creation (this is an increase in the 
total amount of non-MFIs money and an increase in CB book money, e.g. via a new credit, 
or if the CB/MFI buys assets) (DB 2015, Geld und Geldpolitik). This procedure is also known 
as ‘credit extension’ or ‘balance sheet extension’ and it is a serious debate about the slack, 
minimal, or even lack of real limitations for this procedure to ‘create money out of nothing’. 
The only explicit limits are: (1) minimum reserve requirements of 1%, (2) Target 2 opera-
tional buffers (which are also relatively very low) and (3) customer’s cash (also relatively 
low in comparison to higher monetary aggregates). Thus, there is no effective control over 
the book money creation by law or ECB: the fractional reserve system is thus not ‘ECB se-
cured’ as is claimed - at best it is influenced, which is also non-rhetorical: a big difference.  
Book money creation leads to several different forms of money with different degrees of 
liquidity, money dimensions, and specifications. A systematic and schematic overview of all 
European monetary aggregate definitions of the Eurosystem- that are in regular use in MP 
science and publications as they are a statistical ECB standard - is provided in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 Schematic Overview of Central Bank’s Definition of Monetary Aggregates 
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In economic theory, MFIs hold as much currency as needed. At the profitable equilibrium 
they take loans (ECB money creation) or pay them back (ECB money destruction) depend-
ing on the financial market conditions and the specific liquidity demands, e.g. of customers.  
They can create checkbook money via book keeping entry at the reciprocal fraction of min-
imum reserve rate requirement (i.e. 1%, reserve base, see 2.1.5) and under the provisions 
of the Basel Accords also known as Basel I, II, and III (BIS 2011). These require ‘capital ade-
quacy ratios’: a bank’s non-risk based leverage capital ratio that determines the maximum 
amount of loans (EU: CRD IV, CRR); this is generally 4.5% (common equity tier 1 (CET)/risk 
weighted assets ratio (RWAs)  0.045) of common equity since 2015; still providing for a 
leverage of 22.22 fold. However, these measures don’t legally limit the amount of lending. 
There is also no de facto limit on lending in the UK (Ryan-Collins et al. 2014), Canada, and 
only minimal limits on lending in most of the other central banking systems of today (2015). 
The central bank ultimately also acts as lender of last resort (LOLR) by mechanisms to back 
the fractional reserve with guarantees: the Financial Service Compensation Scheme (FSCS) 
in the UK (£85.000), or also the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in the U.S. 
($250.000), and the ECB Eurosystem assures a 90% of €50.000 (Demand Deposit Insurance 
Guarantee Scheme; in its EU Directive 94/19/EC). This guarantee was recently advanced to 
100% of €100.000. As was seen in the crisis, all systems seem to be also secured with ‘tax 
payer’s funds’ or prices in the end. The ECB has also acted as LOLR to the entire financial 
sector after the FC in 2008, although this is not a true legal part of its mandate (ECB 2013b).      
All monetary aggregates are derived from the consolidated (or also unconsolidated) mone-
tary financial institution (MFI) balance sheet (inter-MFI positions canceled out) of the euro 
area. They also take account of some central government monetary assets and liabilities 
(ECB 2015b; EC 2013). All aggregates contain only positions of residents from the euro area 
which are held locally by resident MFIs (ECB 2015b). Monetary aggregates also include liq-
uid asset denominated in foreign currency but not bank’s cash and currency (EC 2013).  
The first monetary aggregate is the monetary base (M0), also known as base money, or high 
powered money. It represents the central banks released, security accounted and author-
ized, ’legal tender’ made out of the currency of non-MFIs plus the CBs reserves (that are 
interchangeable) at the central bank. It doesn’t include MFI cash point money, and if all is 
included one speaks of total central banks money (or currency) and not of base money.   
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The narrow money aggregate (M1) is defined as the cash of non-MFIs (all non-banks), plus 
all of their demand deposits. These are MFI liabilities to non-MFIs. Another way to define it 
is: M0 plus demand deposits of non-MFIs minus all reserves of MFIs. It also includes balanc-
es that can immediately be turned into currency (called overnight deposits in the EU). 
Broader, or rather ‘intermediate money’ (the official ECB nomenclature), (M2) is defined as 
M1 plus all of the official MFI reported 2-year time deposits, and those deposits with a 3-
month notice period (see Figure 2)(EC 2013; ECB 2015b). [MFIs are the reporting sector.] 
Broad money (M3) is referred to as M2 plus marketable instruments issued by the MFI sec-
tor: all money market fund (MMF) shares and units, 2-year-maturity bonds and repurchase 
agreements (repos) of non-MFIs. A high degree of price certainty and liquidity makes these 
instruments close substitutes of deposits (in M2). Noteworthy, all aggregates exclude MFI 
owned cash and book money (EC 2013; ECB 2015b) that is to be assessed differently.  
Seldom, money in the broadest sense (M4) is used to find a way to describe money aggre-
gates beyond the previous definitions (not an ECB definition). Liquidity decreases from M0 
to M3. M4 represents M3 plus long-term deposits that bear lower money-dimension values 
(see 2.2.1). Long-term instruments (>2 year maturity) are considered portfolio instruments 
rather than means of carrying out transactions (EC 2013; ECB 2015b) (see Figure 2).  
Admittedly, a dynamic real-time assessment of money is not fully possible for the monetary 
aggregates, only for ‘cleared stacks of stocks’, not flows (and flow information), a drawback 
of statistics (ECB 2012). Today, it is also not possible to obtain information of how much 
money and property is privately distributed from MFI accounts, which is of course definitely 
needed in a fractional reserve banking system: inevitably precipitating a future public scan-
dal. Also, when redemptions come closer to maturity e.g. of M2, M3, or M4, they become 
substitutes of a more liquid and more narrowly defined aggregate but are still grouped into 
the traditional and originally defined classes. These hidden MFI dynamics, and M4, remain a 
steady uncertainty factors in the canonical assessment of money aggregates. To give a sta-
tistical example: there might be heterogeneously dispersed ‘long-term portfolio’ liabilities 
coming closer to redemption; and high volume transactions between the periodically reoc-
curring reporting dates. M4 may substitute M3 when close to redemption, but isn’t consid-
ered in the aggregate M3 making it a ‘hidden liquidity factor’, especially if unevenly distrib-
uted. Additionally, everything that happens in between the reporting dates escapes the 
stock data view reported by MFIs (balance sheets) and averts a full statistical assessment. 
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The first-order lever of MPs, to regulate the quantity of money, is the supply of legal tender 
(MECB) affecting the checkbook money, interest rates, prices, and all lending. It is defined as:  
 
                                                       
Formula 1 Central Bank's Money: Definition of Total European Legal Money 
Entry: MECB: ECB money, C: circulating currency of non-MFIs (non-Banks, customers) including con-
vertible currencies denominated in foreign currency, RMR: minimum reserves, RER: excessive reserves  
 
                                                      
Formula 2 Monetary Base (M0): Definition of High Powered Money 
Entry: MECB: ECB money, CMFI: currency in hand of CBs and other MFIs, CNon-MFI: currency in hand of 
non-MFIs (non-banks, firms and all others), RMR: minimum reserve, RER: excessive reserve 
 
The monetary base can be also subdivided into the two following elements: (1) a tightly 
controlled non-borrowed monetary base (i.e. from market operations) and (2) a less tightly 
controlled borrowed reserve (ECB loans) (Mathews et al. 2013), see Formula 3. Formula 4 
defines the ECB’s monetary aggregate definitions (M1-M3) (ECB 2015c; ECB 2012), and (M4). 
 
 
     
     
   
Formula 3 Mishkin’s Division of M0 in Borrowed and Non-Borrowed M0 (Base Money) 
Entry: M0: Monetary Base, MBR: Borrowed Monetary Base, MNB: Non-Borrowed Monetary Base 
 
                      
                            
                     
                        
Formula 4 ECB Definition of the EU Monetary Aggregates  
Entry: TD: time deposits (1: 2-year deposits, or 3-month maturity), (2: MFI marketable instrument 2-
year maturity, additional conditions, 2-year bonds, MMF money market fund, repurchase agree-
ment), (3: long-term deposits > 2-year maturity independent of redemption date), R: total reserves 
(excess reserves + minimal reserves), D: demand deposits (overnight deposits, checkbook money) 
The monetary base - the legal tender or M0 - is multiplied by a factor to arrive at the mone-
tary aggregates of banks money. The higher monetary aggregates are, as discussed above, 
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the result of fictional CB and MFIs book money creation that only has the base money (M0) 
as its base at a 1% minimum reserve ratio (liquidity ratio): 1 % of the real money must be 
available to MFIs customers, but absurdly it is not truly available - as it already has to be 
fixed as minimum reserve: uncovering another erroneous banking principle and deep flaw. 
The Phillips ‘money multiplier’ (Phillip 1920) is considered as an important parameter of 
fractional reserve lending and is introduced later in chapter 2.3.7 - but is used misleadingly. 
2.3 Research Theories of Monetary Policy and Monetary Transmission 
The intrinsic strategy and real objective of monetary theories (MT) is to disclose and enable 
an understanding that should help to optimize monetary policy (MPs) to benefit the quality 
and quantity of output of the real economy - and hereby should not interfere with business 
evolution. It deals with a limited set of resources, potentials, and economic-financial capac-
ities. There are three conventional ways of putting MP to the test (Sperber & Sprink 1990):  
Table 3 Key Performance Measures of MP 
(1) Ability to plan and control the money supply: target accuracy, operational goals 
(2) Stringency of operations on transmission in the real economy: output parameters  
(3) Decomposition of MP transmission on output and price: real, relative parameters  
The ECB has implemented a two pillar approach for its empirical MT-based MPs including (I) 
economic and (II) monetary appraisal, assessment, and empirical analysis (ECB 2015b). The 
ECB’s decisions are declaredly based on MT and models but remain empirical and incre-
mental (ECB 2015b). MTs are predicated on the interrelation and interaction of economic 
and monetary factors, and the interrelationship of real and nominal values. Ultimately, this 
applied MT science aims to improve the effect of MP on the real economy. This process is 
known as monetary transmission that always takes place in response to MP (introduced in 
2.3.8). A simple overview of MT is absent in most textbooks (Friedman & Woodford 2010; 
Mankiw 2014; Walsh 2010; Mathews et al. 2013; Giddy 1994; Levinson 2005; ECB 2004). 
Hence, a novel list of categorized MTs is given here as basic overview (see Table 4):  
Table 4 A New General Categorization of Relevant Monetary Theories 
(1) Currency System Theories 
(1.1) Digital Money Theories : noncash full-reserve, digital, serial, trackable money 
(1.2) Modern Monetary Theory (MTT): the sole use of fiat money (Chartalism) 
(1.3) Commodity Money Theories (commodity standards like gold-standard) 
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(1.4) Barter Money Theories (barter exchange based systems) 
(2) Money Creation Theories 
(2.1)      Bank Intermediary Theory (banking as regular business theories) 
(2.2)      Full-Reserve Banking Theory (fully allocatable money theories) 
(2.3)      Fractional Reserve Banking Theory (based on minimum reserves) 
(2.4)      Credit Creation Theory (fractional reserve banking loophole theories) 
(2.5)     Money and Property Deprivation Theory (CBs reuse liquidity for enrichment) 
(3) Macroeconomic Monetary Theories 
             (3.1)     Classical Theory (loanable funds, classical dichotomy, neutrality of money)  
(3.2)      Theory of the Keynesian Economic Framework, IS-LM, and related MTs  
(3.3)      ADAS Theory: Aggregate Demand-Aggregate Supply (Keynesian Economics) 
(3.4)      Liquidity Preference Theory (Keynesian Economics, Friedman’s QTM, etc.) 
            (3.5)      Quantity Theory of Money (QTM): diverse QTM theories, e.g. Fisher’s QTM 
(3.6)      Inflation Theory (e.g. pricing theories, price push and demand pull theories) 
(3.7)      Employment Theory (e.g. Phillip Curve Theory: unemployment vs. inflation) 
(3.8)      Interest Rate Theory (e.g. Fisher’s equation, and all related MTs) 
(3.9)      Monetary Aggregation Theory (money and property accumulation theories) 
(3.10)    Monetary Transmission Theory (MTTs): (channel focused MTs, see 4.3.8) 
(3.11)    Empirical Monetary Theory (monetary and fiscal real world data based) 
(3.12)    Monetary Game Theory (e.g. Nash equilibrium, dilemma-creation strategy) 
(3.13)   Monetary Econometrics:  static and dynamic modeling (monetary-economic) 
(3.14)   Monetary Economics: relationships between real and nominal variables 
             (3.15)   Asset Price Theories: the action and reaction of asset prices, and related MTs 
(3.16)   Financial Accounting based theories: cash flows and balance sheets functions 
(3.17)    Other MTs  
(4) Monetary Policy Theories 
(4.1)    Theoretical Research (technical Neo-Monetarism and Post-Keynesianism)  
(4.2)    Empirical Research (analysis, models, rules and recommendation of MP) 
(4.3)    Behavioral Research (expectations, Barro-Gordon, asymmetric information) 
(4.4)    Crisis Management MP Theory: e.g. shock-stabilization management theory  
(4.5)    Politico-Economic Research (business cycle, growth, macro incentives)
(5) Monetary System Design Theory 
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(5.1)   Systems Design Theories (Revolutionary Theories) 
(5.2)   Optimization Design Theories (Evolutionary Theories) 
(6) Holistic Monetary Theories (combining all above MTs) 
 
MT can be further categorically structured as money demand and supply theories, or via 
time in retrospective, current, and future MTs, including forecasts. A key focus is given to 
MTTs and MTCs (see 3.10) - since all MP decisions always result in monetary transmission.  
2.3.1 The Classical Supply Side Theory, and Loanable Funds Model 
‘Money is neutral’ in the classical model and doesn’t affect the real economy in the long-
run due to flexible prices. In these ‘supply oriented models’ output is a function of a given 
production capacity. Eventually, the real interest rate (r) adjusts to equilibrate supply and 
demand for an economy’s output of products and services. On the supply side, monetary 
expansion improves capital accumulation (and potentially technology) but increases in out-
put are offset by inflation. In Wicksell-Ohlin-Robertson’s loanable funds model this results 
in investment equaling savings (I=S)(Keynes 1936). A fall in savings or an increase in invest-
ment raises the real interest rate (r). An increase in demand for real investment drives in-
vestment only to the extent at which higher interest rates enable more savings (Mankiw 
2014). Theoretically, but in full-reserve banking, a natural economic equilibrium could form.  
2.3.2 The Neo-Classical Quantity Theory of Money (QTM) 
The initial core of the neoclassical QTM is a direct proportional relationship of money sup-
plied and the economy’s level of prices. Additionally, the velocity of money and output (real 
GDP, rGDP) also balance the formula. The here provided link of inflation coupled to excess 
money supply is in fact a very old one. It is a traditional and well known observation since 
maybe even ancient times. It was reclaimed later by Fisher, and then by Friedman and 
Schwarz the alter two received a noble price for their work. The scientific central tenet of 
classical QTM dates back to Nicolaus Copernicus in the 15th century (Volckart 1997), and 
Jean Bodin who introduced the velocity concept of money in the 16th century. Then, John 
Locke revived and advanced it in the 17th, and David Hume in the 18th century, and Simon 
Newcomb who developed its modern transactions form in the 19th century. Classical QTM 
was later enhanced by Irving Fisher (1911), who also discerns between currency and book 
money and velocity. He yielded today’s Neo-QTM formula that was simplified by Keynes 
and Friedman’s use of national income - however Fisher’s TA-based QTM is more accurate.  
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Formula 5 Quantity Theory of Money (QTM) Equation and Fisher’s Amendment 
Entry: MD: money demanded (C: currency, B: book money), YD: aggregate demand, q: quantity of 
goods and services purchased V: income or transactions velocity of money, P: price level (index, or 
GDP deflator), Y: (net) output (as rGDP) = gross output - intermediate consumption, k: money affini-
ty coefficient per income, ideally MD=MS; T: transactions (TA), Fisher’s QTM uses T instead of Y 
In equilibrium, money demanded for TAs equals money supplied (MD=MS=M) yielding:    
                
 
   
  
  
 
 
  
 
      
 
    
 
Formula 6 Transactions QTM Equation and Velocity of Income at Equilibrium Level  
Entry: k: a variable or constant of how much money people want to hold (money affinity coefficient 
per income), AD: aggregate demand of the total of all transactions, all: aggregate demand for all 
transaction of Y (GDP, income) only, T: transaction (TA) volume, PY: nGDP, Y: rGDP, P: price level 
 
It is important to discern here between two major types of velocity: (1) the income velocity 
of money is the smaller one. It represents the frequency at which money changes hands for 
all GDP relevant goods and services. And (2) Fisher’s transactions velocity of money that 
represents a broader, and also a more complex, definition of the frequency at which money 
changes hands in all domestic transactions of residents, also including financial portfolio 
investment, and all TAs that take place whenever property changes hands (=all deals in the 
economy). TAs multiplied by the price level represents the nominal output. If interest rates 
rises velocity rises as demand for the TA-component of money declines, as also noted by 
Baumol and Tobin (Mathews et al. 2013). Rearranging the QTM for M and P finally yields: 
  
       
  
 
              
     
 
 
Formula 7 QTM Formula Integrating the Income Dependent Money Affinity Coefficient 
Entry: M: quantity of money, Y: net output, P: price level, v: velocity of money, D: demand, S: supply 
 
Monetary demand mounts from the need of all functions of money listed in chapter 2.2.1: 
for instance, the transactional component (medium of exchange dimension) finds equilibri-
um with the function of liquidity preference, the convenience component (storage dimen-
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sion) finds balance with the function of property’s opportunity costs, and a durability com-
ponent (stability dimension) equilibrates with the function of all opportunity costs of infla-
tion and interest rates; divisibility and assignability given (see Figure 1 and Table 1).   
Traditionally, there are two traditional schools of thinking about the quantity of real money 
balance demanded: Keynes Liquidity Preference and Friedman’s Modern QTM proposition, 
predicated on which most other theories are based on, or generally relate to. To introduce 
these major concepts about the demand for money and to provide an understanding for all 
related concepts, these two MTs are introduced and reviewed in the following sections.  
2.3.3 Keynesian Economics and Liquidity Preference Theories 
In Keynesian economics, opposite to the classical view, also the demand side can be influ-
enced by MP operations (e.g. via expansion of base money, I, i and r) effectuating output in 
the short to long-run. Investment depends on the interest rate, but demand linked to out-
put is also stimulated by MP that lowers the real interest rate, or grows the base money.  
According to Keynes, short-run demand for real money balances (M/P) is proportional to 
real income (Y) and k (a money affinity coefficient per income or transactions). In equilibri-
um real money balance demanded equals balances supplied. Output as supply is constant 
in the short-run and can be exogenously altered by MPs (e.g. via r). This in turn also affects 
the demand for real money balances (Keynes 1936; Mankiw 2014; Mathews et al. 2013): 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
 
 
 
                   
Formula 8 Keynesian Liquidity Preference and Advanced Money Demand Function 
Entry: M/P= real money balance, M: quantity of money, L: liquidity preference, r: real interest rate, 
Y: income, D: demand, S: supply, k: money affinity coefficient, Eπ: expected inflation, P: prices, i: 
nominal interest rate, r: real interest rate, +/-: having a positive or negative influence, respectively  
 
The QTM balance form integrates money balance supply and demand at equilibrium level:  
 
 
 
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
    
Formula 9 Equilibrated Real Money Balance Formula 
Entry: M/P= real money balance, real purchasing power of the stock of money, D: demand, S: sup-
ply, k: money affinity coefficient per income, Y: net output (e.g. rGDP), P: price level  
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If people want to hold more money k grows or rather the velocity of money (V) falls: the 
frequency of money changing hands decreases (Mankiw 2014; Mathews et al. 2013). This 
shifts the TA-function of money (medium of exchange) towards a convenience function 
(liquidity and storage of value). A higher preference of holding cash or checkbook/demand 
deposits increases the average meantime between all money transactions, hereby increas-
ing k. Hence, and with respect to Fisher’s amendment in Formula 5, there are different k 
and V coefficients for the monetary aggregates: there is a different affinity for coins, notes, 
overnight deposits (checkbook or demand deposits), loans, marketable securities, and all 
other monetary assets. Different forms of real money balances can be used to describe 
money demanded and supplied in an economy to tackle different research questions.  
2.3.4 Friedman’s Modern Quantitative Theory of Money  
Friedman tried to further the basic QTM formula and as a result he restated his own Mod-
ern Quantitative Theory of Money (Friedman 1956). Here, he tried to include a main focus 
on asset yields integrated in the concept of Keynes Liquidity Preference. He allowed for a 
more comprehensive view that includes asset demand factors like expected real returns in 
the money preference function, permanent income also as the net present value (NPV) of 
future incomes, and a variety of real asset return variables that ‘make’ money being invest-
ed or divested: Δr, Y and πe affect the real money balance demanded, while money and 
goods or assets are substitutes and their demand is ‘return driven’ (Mathews et al. 2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
         
         
         
   
Formula 10 Friedman’s Restatement of a Modern QTM Equation 
Entry: (M/P)D: Demand for real money balances, YP: permanent income (present discounted value), 
rb: expected return on bonds, rm: expected return on money, re: expected return on equity, π
e: ex-
pected inflation rate (=expected return on goods without depreciation), +/-: positively or negatively 
related to demand for money balances, respectively 
 
While Keynes’ liquidity preference theory argues that income is positively and nominal in-
terest rates i are negatively related with real money balances demanded, Friedman’s Mod-
ern QTM comes to a new conclusion by subdividing the demand of holding money into four 
categories: cash, bonds and equity preference, and preference for goods and houses. The 
opportunity costs for holding money are given in the difference to returns on other assets.   
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2.3.5 The Keynesian IS-LM Model and the AD-AS Model 
Aggregate demand (AD) is a function of quantity demanded at any given price level - the 
same holds true for aggregate supply (AS) (Mankiw 2014). It can be derived from QTM 
(Formula 5) as (M/P) depends on kY - if VM is fixed Y must go down if P rises. AD declines if 
prices rise during inflation and the real wealth of economic actors (private households, 
firms) falls in the short term. The AD-AS function also delineates the dependency on output 
or income, in the short-run when prices are sticky, and in the long run when they become 
flexible (Mankiw 2014). It can be also effectively integrated into the IS-LM model, which is 
compatible with regard to dimensions, for closed and open economies (see 6 Figure S7-12).  
The generic IS-LM model (investment-saving, liquidity preference-money supply) is a holis-
tic integration of the Keynesian Economics Framework giving rise to a graphical model 
(Keynes 1936; Samuelson 1947; Hicks 1939). It serves as an econometrics tool for micro-
economically grounded structural model evidence. The Hicksian IS-LM model combines the 
Keynesian cross (Samuelson 1948) and liquidity preference model (Formula 11) and hereby 
identifies the point that satisfies the equilibrium of the goods market, where the LM curve 
simultaneously meets the equilibrium in the real money market. Hence, it can be also used 
as macro model to identify suitable MPs in a semi-quantitative way (Poole 1970). The ISLM-
ADAS model established here is a graphical-arithmetical advancement (see 6 Figure S7-12). 
                                 
 
 
         
Formula 11 The Basic IS-LM Formula: Income and Liquidity Preference Function 
Entry: M: money, i: nominal interest rate, I: investment, D: demand, Y: net output/income, T: tax, C: 
consumption, G: government spending, (M/P): money balance, adjusting variables: r, Y 
 
The generic IS-LM structural model predicts in the short-run, when prices are sticky, that an 
increase in the money supply (e.g. QE) benefits output and income (Y) of the real economy 
by lowering the real interest rate (r). This shifts the LM curve to the right and increases ag-
gregate demand and Y (Mathews et al. 2013). The effect can be dissociated and simplified:  
 
 
                                        
                                       
                                 
Neutrality is given if in the long term prices adjust and rGDP equilibrates to its initial level. 
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2.3.6 The Fisher Effect on Liquidity Preference and the Cagan Model 
According to QTM, if money supply grows ceteris paribus (c.p.) price levels will mount in the 
long run. The ‘Fisher Effect’ additionally states that an estimated increase in expected infla-
tion also affects nominally bound contracts with future interest payments, as it heightens 
the mean nominal interest rates (i) by adding up to the real interest rate (r) (Formula 12), or 
again more precise: r is the difference of interests and inflation in real terms (Fisher 1930).     
 
  
   
   
   
   
   
                                
 
  
 
 
 
 
                              
   
Formula 12 Fisher Equation and Liquidity Preference Effect 
Entry: I: nominal interest rate, r: real interest rate, : inflation, E: expected, L: liquidity demanded, 
Y: income, r: real interest rate, +/- indicate a positive or negative influence, respectively; note: ex-
pected inflation can drive nominal interest rate, which in turn can also (slightly) drive inflation 
The Cagan model further exemplifies the role of expected inflation on real money balances:  
 
 
 
 
 
           
   
 
   
    
 
      
    
  
      
     
Formula 13 Cagan Model of Expected Inflation and Money Supply on Prices 
Entry:  Pt: price level at point t of interval, M: quantity of money, tn: time point of interval, µ: sensi-
tivity of future money supplies and expected inflation, πE: expected inflation, π: current inflation 
 
The price level (P) is determined by the weighted average of all future money supplies 
(Mankiw 2014; Cagan & Friedman 1956). µ defines the sensitivity of future money supplies 
(and expected inflation) and is used as parameter to adjust and fit its impact: a high level of 
µ (max: 1) models a strong and long term impact, while a low level of µ resembles only a 
short-term weak impact on today’s price level, inflation and the real money balances de-
manded (assuming that V and Y is constant) (Mankiw 2014; Cagan & Friedman 1956). With 
this model Cagan could fundamentally support the views of Monetarism that a link exists 
between the growth and expected growth of money and prices in hyperinflation. He also 
tested exceptional international datasets by fitting the model to the monetary dynamics 
observed (Cagan & Friedman 1956) and could match this empirically data to the model. 
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Furthermore, Cagan also asserted that the demand for real money balances declines during 
intermittent and high inflation, confirming both the ‘Fisher Liquidity’ and the ‘Cagan Effect’ 
(Cagan & Friedman 1956). Both, Fisher and Cagan have revealed an important monetary 
feedback loop that amends the original QTM formula by the factor of expected inflation 
and money supply in the future that influences demand of real money balances. Only if the 
sensitivity µ equals 0 the original QTM equation is obtained (Mankiw 2014). Thus, it repre-
sents an important option to extend the QTM and IS-LM-ADAS or New-Keynesian models 
(Friedman & Woodford 2010) with a non-linear parameter. It also illustrates an auto-
dynamic expectations-threat of a ‘viscous cycle of hyperinflation’ for MP, together with the 
Fisher Effect (expected inflation drives nominal interest rate that may also drive future 
prices, or expected prices). Both explicatory effects feed forward into more inflation.    
2.3.7 The Money Creation Multiplier 
The money creation multiplier (m) effect, or Phillip’s money multiplier effect (Phillip 1920), 
describes a semi-furtive virtual amplification of central banks money by MFIs and CBs using 
demand and time deposit accounts in fractional reserve banking, and via ‘credit extension’.  
The multiplier can be integrated into the aggregate money demand based QTM formula: 
            
  
 
         
    
  
 
  
   
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Formula 14 Money Multiplier Integrated into the QTM Formula 
Entry: m: money multiplier, M0: monetary base, MD: money demanded, MS: money supplied, Y: real 
income or rather net output (real GDP), P: price Level, v: income velocity of money, C: currency in 
circulation (banknotes), D: demand deposits, R: reserves (current accounts and deposit facility) 
 
The money multiplier describes both: (a) ex ante, the maximal amount of money that could 
purportedly be created from all available central bank money (M0; but importantly: as stock 
value at time t that never tracks intermittent flows), and (b) ex post, how much money was 
factually created in the monetary aggregates at the periodically reoccurring (SNA 2008/ESA 
95-based ‘end-of-month’ ECB/2008/32) reporting points in time (ECB 2012). A big technical 
security vulnerability is the reporting of only monthly stock and not flow data owing to re-
cent ESA-95 ‘transaction method’ reporting standards, which makes all inter-month flows, 
no matter how big they are, completely invisible to reporting: a clear security vulnerability.    
2 Introduction, Background, and Monetary Policy Review / 2.3 / 2.3.7 
Page | 42 
 
The monetary base (M0) and key interest rates have the main MP influence on money sup-
ply but MFIs are also much in play led by profitability aimed codetermination. If we assume 
that banks (MFIs) compete to maximize profits, they actually should not have any excess 
reserves, according to all recent theories (Görgens et al. 2014; Illing 1997; Anderegg 2007). 
Later chapters reveal recent excessive reserves of MFI and a lack of competition (4.2.2.3). 
Accordingly, the reserve and currency coefficients could be simplified in Formula 15:   
  
 
   
                                  
                                   
 
     
   
Formula 15 Reserve and Currency Coefficient 
Entry: R: total reserves, C: currency in circulation (excluding MFIs), : reserve coefficient (reserve 
deposit ratio), : currency coefficient (currency ratio, the affinity real legal tender, cash), rMR: mini-
mum reserve rate, rER: excessive reserve rate, D: demand deposit (overnight deposit) 
 
Based on Formula 2 and Formula 15 the coefficient formula for M0 is derived as follows: 
 
                              
Formula 16 Monetary Base using money Reserve and Affinity Coefficients 
Entry: M0: monetary Base, R: reserves, : reserve coefficient, : currency coefficient 
 
 
Hence, the optimal level of base money (M0) depends on the coefficients α and β. α is de-
termined by the (weighted) ECB minimum reserve requirements for the specific liabilities 
subject to reserve requirements, while the introduction of β is useful as it isolates and in-
cludes the variable of mean liquidity preference toward pocket money. The money creation 
multiplier (m) can thus be derived via α and β (adapted from Görgens et al. 2014): 
 
                          
                          
                       
         
          
  
 
            
            
 
   
   
 
   
     
 
       
   
   
    
  
        
 
Formula 17 Generic Derivation of the Money Creation Multiplier 
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Formula 17 Generic Derivation of the Money Creation Multiplier 
Entry: C: circulating currency, RMR: minimum reserve, RER: excess reserve CBs, Dnon-MFI: non-bank 
liabilities subject to reserve requirements, deposits of monetary aggregates, : reserve coefficient, 
: currency coefficient, 1-4: denoting the various monetary aggregates, respectively. With this for-
mula the amount of amplified money and its coefficients are found for (a+b); see also previous page 
2.3.8 Monetary Transmission Channels (MTCs) and Theories (MTTs) 
MP decision-makers rely on a set of appropriate operational tools and an accurate analyti-
cal assessment of the situation to find the right timing and magnitude for their MPs actions 
for that they best translate into the real economy via various monetary transmission mech-
anisms (Mathews et al. 2013). Monetary transmission theories (MTTs) describe and analyze 
these interrelations and coherencies, theoretically and empirically, to optimize MP output.  
Monetary reform that installs a semi-digital full-reserve is by far the best solution found by 
MP research, and is fully in line with important MP expert views (see 5.2 for more infor-
mation), but it is still not clear if it will be implemented or when. Thitherto, optimizing MP 
led monetary transmission of all MTCs remains the only, although liberticidal, alternative.   
MTTs and MTT tools help meeting MP objectives (listed in chapter 2.3) and targets by 
searching for better settings and optimal macro and monetary environments for the econ-
omy: with stable prices, economic growth, a better business cycle and future standard of 
living. For research purposes MTTs are to be ‘decomposed’ into multiple monetary trans-
mission channels (MTCs) and pathways so that all of the individual MP effects can be stud-
ied in a ‘reductionist approach’. These channels may be re-linked into a holistic cooperative 
network to model complexity of all MTC effects that transmit throughout the economy in 
many overlapping time windows. Many MTT and channel based models have at its core the 
IS-LM framework, which has had a huge impact on MP theorists (a new IS-LM-ADAS model 
is proposed in this study as graphical-arithmetical platform; see Appendix  S7-13).  
At the ECB ‘Technical Monetarism’ and ‘Technical Keynesianism’ are often replaced by an 
‘empirical approach’, ‘MP rules’ (e.g. the Taylor rule) and MTC based models fed by central 
bank’s own data of its two-pillar research strategy (ECB 2015b). Although MP tries to be 
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less discretionary and supportive today, its main operational targets are still the quantity of 
money, interest rates and a low inflation - targets are empirically-incrementally actuated. 
MTTs help understand coherencies, causalities and pathways by decomposing them into a 
set of key monetary transmission channels (MTCs) that all affect economic output (e.g. 
GDP). An new systematic overview list is elaborated here that reviews important and rele-
vant MTCs in effect, driven by today’s MP (see Table 5 adapted from Mathews et al. 2013). 
Table 5 Newly Completed Overview Table of Monetary Transmission Channels  
 MTC1: Real Interest Rate (Traditional View): low interest rate drives expenditure  
 MTC2: International Account, Fx (Asset View): low interest rate drives Fx and exports 
 MTC3: Keynes’ Stock Market or Tobin’s q Channel (Asset View): equity drives investment 
 MTC4: Financial Wealth Channel (Asset View): securities and income drives consumption 
 MTC5: Traditional Credit Channel (Credit View): liquidity drives bank lending, investment 
 MTC6: Balance Sheet Channel (Credit View): less moral hazards more lend-
ing/investment 
 MTC7: Cash Flow Channel (Credit View): nominal interest rate, CF lending channel 
 MTC8: Unanticipated Price Level Channel (Credit View): less moral hazards, more lending 
 MTC9: Household Liquidity Channel (Credit View): less financial distress, more expenses 
 MTC10: Expectation Channel (Prospect View): Fisher and Cagan, prospected expenses 
 MTC11: Money Multiplier Channel (Fractional Reserve View): elasticity of money supply 
 MTC12: Monetarism Channel (Traditional View): Cambridge Effect: money drives prices 
 MTC13: Governmental Channels (Fiscal View): fiscal money supply drives GDP (incl. debt 
based investment heightening of the real economy’s money supply) 
 MTC14: Behavioral Economics (Behavioral View): psychology drives output 
 MTC15: Commercial Banks Channel: idiosyncratic or private MFI decisions affect output 
 MTC16: Portfolio Channel: monetary vs. non-monetary portfolios shifts affect output 
 
MTC1: Real Interest Rate Channel (Traditional View): IS-LM and AD-AS modeling view 
 
                                  
Entry: M: money, r: real interest rate, I: investment, Y: output, income (e.g. GDP), C: consumption  
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The real interest rate (r) has a stronger impact on GDP in the long run than in the short run 
when prices are sticky as aggregate price level adjust slowly. Thus, effects in MTC1, among 
the strongest of all 16 MTCs, are naturally delayed and timely blurred over several quarters 
and usually years, like a return on macro-investment. The effects resulting from a change in 
rST will slowly alter the effect of rLT, through the relevant time-window, time t (Formula 18).  
 
           
 
 
                
 
 
 
Formula 18 Long-Term Real Interest Rate in Monetary Transmission 
Entry: r: real interest rate, t: time, i: interval point in time; simplified formula to exemplify the effect 
If MP achieves a low real interest rate, e.g. via QE, M0 or key rates, it profits investment and 
consumption, including durable goods and housing, yielding a higher output (real GDP). 
MTC2: International Account/Fx Effects (Asset View): MTC2 comprises effects of the ‘Inter-
national Account’, international trade and capital flows. MP affects Fx via the relative infla-
tion rate that effectuates the relative interest rate and spot and forward exchange rate 
(Giddy 1976; Sperber 2015). The Fx rate effects of MTC2 can be also explained in the IS-LM-
ADAS open-market model (see 6 Figure S7). The medium-term equilibrium rule of purchas-
ing power parity (PPP) weakens the exchange rate at the difference of inflation rates.  
 
   
  
 
  
  
                 
  
              
Formula 19 Monetary Effect on Foreign Exchange Rate under the Law of One Price 
Entry: Fx: foreign exchange ratio of currency ratio A/B, PA,B: price level of country A or B  
Keynes’ Interest Rate Parity aka the International Fisher Effect states that (Giddy 1976): 
                   
         
   
 
     
    
 
          
  
          
  
 
        
  
 
                 
     
     
    
       
Formula 20 Keynes Interest Rate Parity Theorem and International Fisher Effect 
Entry: i: interest rate in country A and B, future rate, spot rate, Fx: foreign exchange rate [A/B] 
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Fx arbitrage converges towards an equilibrium in which the swap rate approximates 0. MP 
affects MTC2 and hereby the exchange rate (Fx, Forex) and expected inflation and subse-
quently export and import, consumption and tourism, by altering the aggregate purchasing 
power of the economy in the world market. The Fx rate of ‘free’ floating currencies, like the 
Euro or Dollar, equilibrates in the Fx market and intersecting demand and supply for the 
currencies is linked to domestic interest rates and prices of goods and services, only with 
the exception of some traded raw materials that may adjust differently in the international-
ly markets and that sometimes may be more sticky (since differently determined) then the 
Fx rate. There are manifold domestic and international factors and functions that eventual-
ly affect the Fx rate: income, prices, politics, media, prospects, flow of goods and services, 
capital, interest rates, etc (Sperber 2015). As a result, the Fx rate fluctuates more dynami-
cally or volatile, or variable for many currencies than for example aggregate prices levels 
do. Capital transactions also adjust to equilibrate day-to-day Fx rates, but effects are also 
mid-term and long-term. This can be simplified and summarized (Mathews et al. 2013):  
 
                          
Entry: M: money, r: real interest rate, π: inflation, Fx: Fx exchange rate, Nx: net export, Y: income  
 
MTC3: Keynes’ Stock Market and Tobin’s q Channel (Asset View) MP affects the real econ-
omy through its effects on the valuation of equities (stocks) (Mathews et al. 2013; Keynes 
1936; Tobin 1969). Keynes sees a positive effect of a rising stock market on the rate of in-
vestment, that is often described today as Tobin’s q MTC: if money increases, interest rates 
(yields) on bonds falls, stocks become more attractive and rise, q rises, property and wealth 
rises and drives new expenditure in investment and consumption. 
 
  
                     
                           
         
Formula 21 Tobin's q Formula 
Entry: q: Tobin’s q, market value of firms (selling price, total value of shareholder’s equity, or NPV: 
net present value), replacement costs (e.g. of a green field investment substitution or book value) 
    
  
  
                  
Entry: M: money, L: liquidity, B: bonds, S: stocks, q: Tobin’s q, I: investment, Y: GDP 
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MTC4: Financial Wealth Channel (Asset View): According to Franco Modigliani, MP affects 
the spending and total consumption also of durable goods when stock prices rise, which is 
thought to increase with the ‘perceived long-run wealth’ of an economy (Mathews et al. 
2013), though it may only be a short-run effect and could be neutralized via circumstances. 
 
                                                                   
Entry: M: money, P: price, C: consumption, I: investment, Y: GDP 
MTC5: Traditional Credit Channel (Credit View): liquidity drives bank lending and output 
Bank lending channels benefit output because more deposited savings are available for 
lending, investment and durable consumables, like residential housing (Mathews et al. 
2013). Asymmetric financial information benefits the MFIs that act as ‘mediators of scale 
and scope’ in the credit and financial markets (Mathews et al. 2013) acting via: lot size, 
term, and risk transformation (Sperber 2015) and the money creation multiplier (Görgens 
et al. 2014). Newly created money mainly enters the real economy as loans with interest. 
The CBs reserve accounts at the NCBs increase (due to the ECB operations outlined in The 
Structural and Operational Framework of the Eurosystem) and fractional reserve money 
multiplication allows for higher volumes of TA bank deposits, loans and thus more invest-
ment, consumption and GDP (with a smaller monetary base): 
                                                          
Entry: M: quantity of money, I: investment, C: consumption, Y: GDP 
This effect is thought to be bigger in the euro area than in the US that inherits a stronger 
bond market. In 2011, total bank loans in the euro area made up almost 142% of GDP and 
only 55.6% of GDP in the US. Loans to non-MFI were after all 52.4% of GDP in the Eurozone 
and only 22% of GDP in the US (Mathews et al. 2013). Additionally, the effect of MTC5 is 
also more dominant for smaller and medium size enterprises (SME), while larger firms have 
other, better, i.e. more affordable channels (e.g. stocks and bonds) (Mathews et al. 2013). 
MTC6: Balance Sheet Channel (Credit View): stocks reduce moral hazards and drive lending 
 
                                                        
Entry: M: money, I: investment, Y: GDP, moral hazard and adverse selection 
 
Like for Tobin’s q the short-term effect could be neutralized by the effect of the long run. 
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MTC7: Cash Flow Channel (Credit View): the cash flow channel assumes that MP can lower 
the nominal interest rate i and improves the balance sheets of firms and households. This is 
thought to reduce moral hazards, to increase lending and to drive investment and GDP. 
 
                                                        
Entry: M: money, I: investment, Y: GDP, i: nominal interest rate, moral hazard and adverse selection 
 
Like previous channel’s MTC7 has a short-term effect can be neutralized in the long run. 
MTC8: Unanticipated Price Level Channel (Credit View): inflation can drop the debt burden  
 
                                                               
Entry: M: quantity of money, debt nominally fixed, liabilities of firms in real terms  
 
MTC9: Household Liquidity Channel (Credit View): households’ liquidity drives GDP  
 
                                                                   
Entry: consumption of durables and housing, M: quantity of money, Y: GDP 
MTC10: Expectation Channels (Prospect View): Fisher, Cagan, and expectation models 
Forecast of economical, political, and monetary development drives economic behavior. 
MTC11: Money Multiplier Channel (Reserve View): Fractional reserve lending effect 
Money creation multiplier drives money elasticity and ‘pre-amplifies’ loan market effects. 
As the same effect can be yielded in a full-reserve system it can be considered as a zero 
sum effect at best, but generally a negative effect if the channel operates below 100% effi-
ciency, which is impossible to achieve. It is thus a ‘negative impact channel’ for the real 
economy. Positive impact arises only due to a higher elasticity of the money supply and due 
to private non-governmental spending effects that can be easily compensated in a full-
reserve system that works at higher efficiency and effectiveness due to no monetary losses.  
MTC12: Monetarism Channel (Traditional View): Cambridge Effect (money drives prices) 
Money drives prices (%ΔM ≡ %ΔP) and stimulates short term and nominal GDP growth. 
MTC13: Governmental Channels (Fiscal View): the public sector effect on GDP, spending 
Government spending increases the money supply in the real economy, especially via debt. 
MTC14: Behavioral Economic Channel (Behavioral View): psychology in markets on output 
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The psychological and behavioral part of MP influenced economic decision making. 
MTC15: Commercial Banks Channel: the MFI-networks form an own decision making in-
stance in most MP MTCs and are influences by private and idiosyncratic factors. The confi-
dence of CBs and other MFIs and their (very own) risk perception of economic trends (and 
entities) can much influence e.g. the granting of loans. The CBs channel also depends on 
the homogeneity or heterogeneity of CBs and other MFIs in the currency area (e.g. Euro-
zone is very heterogeneous). Diversification, or the market power of the banks, and on the 
microeconomics of the individual settings (local demand, supply) also play a role. MTC15 
also comprises any deviation from perfect competition and profit maximization strategies, 
and the ‘level of distribution of earnings’, capital consumption and ‘uncontrolled write offs’. 
MTC16: Portfolio Channel: preferences between monetary and non-monetary portfolios 
Portfolio shifts can play an important role on the financial setting of firms and investment.  
 
 
 
 
 
     
    
          
Formula 22 Portfolio Money Demand Function  
Entry: rs: expected real return on stock, rb: expected real return on bonds, Eπ: expected rate of in-
flation, W: real wealth that can be approximated by income, -/ +: negative or positive role on liquid-
ity preference for real money balances, respectively  
Money differs from other assets in its risk-to-return ratio (Mathews et al. 2013). Its nominal 
rates are often fixed (e.g. for 1-2 years, or longer) and are only exposed to the risk of infla-
tion and default, while other assets also depend on diversifiable and non-diversifiable risks 
like beta (β, the general market risk that arises from market exposure). This can be concep-
tualized as shown in Formula 22 (Mankiw 2014). A comparable and related portfolio theory 
is known as Friedman’s QTM, which was already introduced earlier (see Formula 10). 
2.4 Empirical Monetary Policy Research 
2.4.1 Empirical Monetary Policy Theory  
Empirical research on MP is an applied science. A great body of work has focused on the 
Federal Reserve System since its establishment by the Federal Reserve Act in 1913, the 
Bank of England (BoE), and other traditional central banks. Much less independent research 
is available for the much younger Eurosystem, established in 1999 (see 2.1 and 2.4.9). 
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The comparison of a variety of international monetary systems and their effect on econo-
mies is an important discipline of empirical MP research. Peculiar trends are revealed and 
specific lessons are also learned from country cases: e.g. hyperinflation in ancient Roman 
Egypt, during the French Revolution, the US Revolutionary and Civil War, in Early Soviet 
Russia, The German Weimar Republic, Hungary after WWII, Brazil in the 90s, Yugoslavia 
during the UN boycott, Japan’s stagflation in its lost decade, the UK’s credit crunch, the list 
is long and spans thousands of years. Also data (see overview on www.dollardaze.org) from 
many country specific cases allows to extract and research meaningful information and an 
understanding of macroeconomic dynamics, causes and effects, to improve MT (Hanke & 
Krus 2012; Hayashia & Prescott 2002). Empirical research of the Eurosystem is one of these 
very important prototype MP cases and its functioning and performance will have a huge 
impact on other central banking systems that operate in many countries world-wide  
For example, inherent to hyperinflation cases is: (1) a higher and rapid growth of money 
that is not covered by economic growth; (2) coinciding wars and political instability, (3) ill-
advised fiscal policy or very high indebtedness or other liabilities and financial tensions.        
The EMU represents a unique case to study the MP effects and MTs in a heterogeneous 
country group with a monetary union that ‘must’ politically, fiscally and economically con-
verge.  Much empirical MP research exists with different roots (Keynes 1923; Douglas et al. 
1939; Friedman & Woodford 2010; Friedman 1968; Friedman & Schwartz 1963). Today’s, 
empirical MP recommendations go back to Knut Wicksell who suggested that central banks 
should set ‘natural rates’ that stabilize inflation at a low level: if rates are too low inflation 
rises, if rates are too high inflation would fall (Bernanke & Mishkin 1997). This traditional 
view is still found in many or most recommendation models, MTs, or rules (e.g. Taylor 
Rule). But empirical research also shows that a low key rate and too much base money 
could hamper ‘financial stability’ by causing crisis, mainly because of unfolding too much 
extra leverage in fractional reserve banking that then strives to store PP more speculatively. 
2.4.2 Normative Empirical Models and Empirical Theories 
There is a huge amount of different normative empirical models and empirical theories 
published so far - some started as generic and graphical models and ended as highly sophis-
ticated and complex MP computer simulation, econometrics tools, prediction systems and 
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reference rules and frameworks (Friedman & Woodford 2010). Table 6 aims to give a brief 
overview of some of the main findings, models and theories that have evolved over time.  
Table 6 Normative and Empirical Models of MP  
 Optimal Control Theory (OCT), discretionary MP, Keynes models (Keynes 1923/30)  
 Friedman refutes OCT and suggests ‘Simple Rule Approach (SRA)’ (Friedman 1948)  
 Flexible prices and sticky price enter the models (Keynesianism, Monetarism, 50s) 
 Descriptive functions for MP (Dewald & Johnson 1963) 
 Dornbush’s overshooting model of MP and exchange rate effects (Dornbush 1976) 
 Co-modeled functions of fiscal policy and central banking (Fair 1978) 
 OECD Interlink: short-Keynesian-long-neo-classical (Blundell-Wignall et al. 1984) 
 A Fed-reaction function of MP in response to economic data (McNees 1986) 
 Taylor’s rule: MP to stabilize output and prices (Taylor 1993b; Taylor 1979), (The 
Taylor Rule - A Monetary Rate Model) 
 Multi-equation international empirical models (Bryant et al. 1993) 
 Inflation targeting (Bernanke & Mishkin 1997) 
 Quantitative evaluation of MP rules (Rotemberg & Woodford 1997) 
 New Keynesian Philips curve with nominal rigidity (Clarida et al. 1999) 
 Econometric robustness analysis (Levin et al. 1999) 
 Woodford’s general theory of micro-founded rules (Giannoni & Woodford 2002) 
 New Keynesian model and analysis of MP (Woodford 2003)  
 Policy projection model tools (Svensson & Tetlow 2005) 
 Nominal rigidity models (Lawrence et al. 2005) 
 Simple rule approach can be helpful, but OCT is also needed (Mishkin 2007) 
 DSGE(+VAR): dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model, Keynesian model also 
based on price and wage stickiness, combining rational expectation and microeco-
nomic foundation, to evaluate MP welfare effects (Rotemberg & Woodford 1997) 
 ECB-DSGE: a DSGE model for MP in the Eurozone (base on Smets & Wouters 2010) 
 Taylor model in Eurozone and foreign exchange rates (Molodtsova et al. 2011) 
And many more sophisticated models that tackle a specific question. Importantly, they all 
fail to fully resemble the real world economy as they are not holistic enough and cannot 
cope with all important complexities - also due to a lack of data. Nevertheless, they bear 
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some utility for predictions of more general trends, or assist in basic and applied research 
questions. Some make risk assessments more feasible, or offer a general reference rule, or 
model the likelihood of macro-economical trends based on statistical analysis former data.   
Several rational expectations models appeared after the transition of the US economy’s 
Great Inflation of the 70s to the Great Moderation. They already resembled the new think-
ing about MP seeking price and output stability (Friedman & Woodford 2010). Most models 
are to be regarded as reductionist tools that may help to model only a sub-fraction of real 
world events and until today there is no precise holistic model that can integrates efficien-
cies of all MTCs, except maybe the basic preliminary first-try multi-matrix-model of this 
study (see 6.1 Figure S18). Thus, MP decision making furthermore relies much on human 
intellect that is only supported by mathematical models and tool (e.g. inflation targeting), 
theories (Keynesianism, Monetarism), or MP schemes (e.g. Taylor rule) to still incrementally 
and empirically deal with specific monetary scenarios and situations, including MP CM (cri-
sis management). MTCs can be optimized and used separately, but for MP the variegated 
impact of MTCs also makes a holistic-integrated-network ‘estimate’ more essential to esti-
mate and score the overall effects of MP to stabilize prices and economic growth - at once.   
2.4.3 Inflation Targeting 
Since Fisher and Friedman, Monetarism has (re-)gained much momentum for MP and cen-
tral bank’s mandated priority, i.e. the Fed, BoE, DB, and also the ECB, was readjusted to-
wards the goal of maintaining price stability in the medium term, also as a major rule: 
achievable by controlling money supply more proportional to economic output, in axiomat-
ic accordance also with Keynes and QTM (see 2.3.2). This type of empirically derived rule 
for MP that has become an implicitness was later standardized and globally termed ‘infla-
tion targeting’ (Bernanke & Mishkin 1997). It became a more general rule for independent 
central banks around the world: Bernake and Mishkin defined as its requirements: (1) tar-
get series definition, (2) target level definition, and (3) target time horizon (Bernanke & 
Mishkin 1997). The ECB has specified it as: HICP, below but close to 2% in the medium 
term, as its performance benchmark. The HICP rate is more relevant on a yearly basis, but 
the ECB still lacks a more precise definition of ‘medium term’ to be ascertained. Coinci-
dentally, slightly before the Euro was launched in 1999 a peak of MP research publications 
was reached that proposes ‘inflation targeting’ in many facets (Haldane 1998; Lowe et al. 
1997; Bernanke & Mishkin 1997; and all related references within these works). 
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In open economies there is also model evidence that inflation targeting should not be per-
formed too strictly in the short-run (Ball 1998), as it might cause fluctuations in output and 
Fx rates. This hypothesis is not empirically proven yet, but seems to play a vital role for ECB 
MPs decision making, or rather short-run price fluctuations also escape its direct control. 
 
2.4.4 The Taylor Rule - A Monetary Rate Model  
The Taylor model represents a simple rule how central banks should respond to the mone-
tary and economic settings to achieve a good performance of price stability and output. 
This approach has had significant influence on many MP decisions till today (Taylor 1993a).  
          
                
        
 
         
 
                           
                
                
       
    
          
 
                        
Formula 23 Taylor’s Representative Monetary Policy Rule 
Entry: rMRO: key rate (e.g. central European rate, main refinancing rate, or in the US the real fed 
funds rate), r: real equilibrium funds rate, π: inflation, πtarget: inflation target (e.g. 0< π <2%), y: GDP, 
α: output gap coefficient (default 0.5), β: inflation gap coefficient (default 0.5) 
If the ‘output gap’ (α) (the lack behind economic potential and employment) increases the 
key rate decreases to allow for more investment to close the full employment gap. If infla-
tion is above target then it is suggested to increase the interest rates to soak liquidity out of 
the money market. It is possible to extend this formula to build-in a forecasting model using 
a temporal feed forward loop and a parameter that describes the effectiveness of how the 
central rate affects the equilibrium interest rate and π in the market in a time horizon (tn). 
An inherent short-coming of the Taylor model, and all Taylor-like models, is that they are 
not suitable for zero nominal lower bound (ZNLB) interest settings (see 2.4.5) as the key 
rate (MRO) usually doesn’t turn negative, nor market interest rates. Another drawback is 
the requirement of a standardized parametric model but parameters may be not grounded. 
This may lead to corridor of recommendations that might become too vague, or unproven. 
New Keynesian models circumvent some of these issues (Eggerston & Woodford 2003).  
Taylor’s model is adjustable towards open economies via MCI/long-run inflation (Ball 1998). 
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2.4.5 The Zero Nominal Lower Bound (ZNLB) and Liquidity Trap  
If the overnight (or even the short-term) nominal interest rate (i) is at or closer to zero, sev-
eral famous monetary theorists and macroeconomists have argued, the central bank has 
exhausted its capacity to stimulate economic growth (Eggerston & Woodford 2003). This 
complex of problems is referred to as the ‘Keynesian liquidity trap’ (Keynes 1936; Hicks 
1939), a result of the zero nominal lower bound (ZNLB), also known as zero lower bound 
(ZLB). Since the interest rate cannot drop below 0% - the natural nominal interest rate of 
cash, and due to collective MFI behavior to not lend money for a negative interest rates to 
the real economy (due to ‘pillow-banking’), only for other MFIs, e.g. the interbank lending 
market where 1-3 month EURIBOR rates are negative throughout 2015. Some empirical MP 
research exists about the ZNLB in the euro area, e.g. (Protze 2008; and references herein).  
In turn of the economic downturn of the FC in 2008 - the worst recession since the Great 
Depression (Beblavý et al. 2011) - once again directly and solely caused by the financial sec-
tor -, the US and Eurozone, and other central banks, were taking unprecedented measures, 
standard (policy rate and overnight liquidity) and non-standard actions (any other opera-
tions), and until today lowered their key interest rates to close to zero. The legal frame-
works of the Fed and the Eurosystem comprise instruments to grow the monetary base 
even at the ZNLB, e.g. via outright monetary transactions, QE, buying foreign currency or 
assets (securities, bonds) or by making almost free loans to MFIs, (see 2.1.5). Bonds could 
be bought from the secondary market, and if still needed even from a semi-secondary mar-
ket, as ‘buyer of last resort’ to refresh the currency in circulation to act deflationary and to 
stabilize the economy - as a part of the ECB’s mandate (see 2.1.3). Additionally, a central 
bank can manipulate the price level by announcing MP actions that influence expectations 
of future prices or interest rates, but only little scope is left for the standard MP operations.  
Friedman and Woodford have rightly proposed drops of ‘Helicopter Money’ (Reichlin et al. 
2013). If economic incentives are not undermined they indeed represent a key solution. But 
the non-governmental sectors need to benefit equally. ‘Helicopter Money’ as fair drops for 
all people (e.g. financing a tax cut for investment) is an appropriate mean (Bernacke 2002).  
Empirical evidence supports the view that MP of a central bank can be as much effective as 
before or without a ZNLB. For instance, the federal funds rates (FFR) has been at the ZNLB 
since 2008’s ‘forward guidance’ of the Fed and it could be shown that monetary and fiscal 
policy were effective till 2010 with regulative potential (Swanson & Williams 2013). 
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Empirical ZNLB research also sources form the lessons learned in countries cases like Ja-
pan’s Recession in its lost decade. Empirical studies of econometric models are often not 
reliable at the ZNLB or liquidity trap: for example the Taylor and Taylor-like models don’t 
work at the ZNLB, as the central bank has to regulate the markets via ‘non-standard’ open 
market instruments that are not an integral part of such models (e.g. see 2.4.4). Some New 
Keynesian models can be used to circumvent some of these significant issues (see 2.4.4). 
2.4.6 Keynesianism, Post-Keynesianism, and New Keynesian Models 
The term Keynesianism was coined when John Maynard Keynes published his set of seminal 
economic assays in his General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money in 1936 
(Keynes 1936), during the US Depression that followed after Black Tuesday’s Great Crash; 
aside also a financial sector and monetary system caused crisis like almost all non-war eco-
nomic crisis so far. This also happened behind the background of all effected economic tur-
bulences like fluctuating output and high unemployment, which all together urged for a 
better economic and monetary theory and thinking (till today). He found that fiscal and 
monetary policy needs to be harmonized, coordinated and adjusted to provide for better 
economic settings, conditions and times (Keynes 1936). His main propositions were later 
summarized in the Post-Keynesian Hicksian IS-LM model (see 2.3.5) and Post-Keynesianism. 
According to these hypotheses governments should take a ‘broader approach’ and a more 
‘modern responsibility’ for economic stability and growth, also by extending public sector 
spending when needed in downturns: e.g. if required by demand, economic business cycle, 
recessions, temporary instability of the economy, or ‘whenever markets fail otherwise’.  
The General Theories (Keynes 1923; Keynes 1936; Keynes 1930; Clarida et al. 1999) provide 
compelling micro-founded evidence that ‘good government spending’ is pivotally required 
to manage economic fluctuations in the short-run, especially in crisis situations, like a re-
cession, and also to set the stage for potential long-run growth. Central banks can act faster 
but fiscal policy is more robust to stabilize economic fluctuation. Nevertheless, this bears 
the risk of lacking sound economic incentives: to efficiently and effectively provide utility at 
a good cost-benefit ratio, in comparison to utility and productivity driven types of private 
investment. To accommodate and respect this point, Keynesian Economics steadily urges 
for low real interest rates to foster private investment and private capital stock formation.  
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Post-Keynesian Economics also argues that a higher government spending in a recession 
leads to a ‘crowding-in’ effect that progressively revitalizes the economy via a government 
spending multiplier effect (Formula 24). Thereby, it severs as a powerful monetary trans-
mission channel (MTC, see 2.3.8), generally it should be higher in a recession to stabilize the 
domestic market known as ‘resource crowding in’, while fiscal policy should be contracted 
in times of a boom (Keynes 1936; Mankiw 2014) - to avoid a ‘resource crowding 
out’(Friedman & Woodford 2010; Keynes 1936; Clarida et al. 1999). Despite of its unambig-
uousness and simplicity this canonical rule is not always followed (e.g. Greece 4.1.1.1).  
  
  
 
 
     
                          
  
  
 
    
     
                       
Formula 24 Keynesian Fiscal Multiplier and Tax Multiplier   
There are several ‘New Keynesian Models’ that are based on the ‘Keynesian Framework’: 
for example the ‘FRB/US model’ that became the ‘workhorse model’ of a central bank’s 
board staff (Svensson & Tetlow 2005), or Woodford’s Keynesian General Theory Model 
(Giannoni & Woodford 2002; Rotemberg & Woodford 1997; Woodford 2003), and other big 
models that are used for ‘Optimal Policy Projections’ (OPPs). The New Keynesian FRB/US 
model incorporates rational expectations and is used in forecasts, modeling scenarios for 
MP, generating alternative Greenbook simulations with extensions, and probability tests. 
The model is not used for official Greenbook forecast that remain judgmental (Svensson & 
Tetlow 2005), but serves widely as MP tool. Woodford’s new Keynesian linear-quadratic 
model for MP is another widely acknowledged basic model of the Post-Keynesian Frame-
work (Woodford 2003; Giannoni & Woodford 2002). An example is the New Keynesian Phil-
lips Curve for which intertemporal IS relations are used, like in other ‘New Keynesian mod-
els’ (Clarida et al. 1999) (Formula 25). But all published models remain ‘work in progress’. 
          
                                    
                                                    
Formula 25 New Keynesian Phillips Curve and Intertemporal IS Relation 
Entry: y: log output, πt: period t inflation rate, it: period t nominal interest rate ĸ: supply coefficient, 
u, ρ: general disturbance terms 
 
Nearly all Keynesian and Post Keynesian theories and models are based on a full-reserve 
system, incompatible with fractional banking systems, and fully dysfunctional to measure 
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inefficiencies or effectiveness ECB money and MP: a flaw that is not overcome until today. 
New money, of course, always has an effect and can be efficiently used via MTCs - or not.  
Although this is known since a long time and in Keynesianism it was widely forgotten today.  
 
2.4.7 Monetarism and Neo-Monetarism 
The term Monetarism was coined for the works of Early Monetarist Irving Fisher (especially 
Fisher’s QTM ‘equation of exchange’, but also: Fisher Effect, Fisher hypothesis, Fisher Ef-
fect, Fisher separation theorem)(Fisher 1930), and Milton Friedman and Anna Schwarz from 
University of Chicago, who had to (!) (re-)proclaim that inflation is mainly a ‘monetary phe-
nomenon’, as money supply affects prices at least in the long-run (Friedman & Schwartz 
1963; Mankiw 2014): Friedman even believed in a ca. 1:1 relationship of money and prices.  
Since then Monetarists deduce as main function of MP to regulate the money supply in a 
way to maintain price stability and adequate interest rates. Seemingly opposite to Keynes-
ian Theory they generally discourages from higher governmental spending due to its effect 
on inflation, and the ‘crowding-out’ effect: when government spending competes with pri-
vate spending about resources such as money, driving the real interest rate up (Friedman & 
Woodford 2010; Friedman 1968). In such a form ‘crowding out’ can be repulsive for private 
investment and economic growth in the long-run. Friedman, like most Monetarist experts 
clearly advocated a full-reserve banking system (Goodhart & Illing 2003; Friedman 1948).  
 
2.4.8 The Dichotomy of Keynesianism and Monetarism 
Today, professed or not, the two Schools of Neo-Monetarism and Post-Keynesianism con-
tinue to be highly influential, also with respect to the empirical part of MP and its focus, 
interpretations, and recommendations. They oblige each other, converge on the generic 
rules of the Quantity Theory of Money (QTM) (see 2.3.2), and differ only in the specific 
weighting of factors and laws. There is still the view that monetarist prefer to assume a 
constancy of velocity and output in the short run, while Keynesian are more business cycle 
focused. Monetarist and the Cambridge School assume that inflation is mainly driven by 
money supply, while Keynesians agree but comprise additional models and types of infla-
tion in their theories, e.g. demand driven inflation in ISLM models (see 6, Figure S7, S10). 
Both schools of thought empirically and theoretically agree that MP has a short-term influ-
ence on the real economy, due to temporary nominal price rigidities, and a long-term effect 
on prices, and both can’t subvert QTM. Monetarism has its emphasis on the value of tight 
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MP and gives priority to price stability as discrete economic factor that supports growth as 
its narrow objective. Keynesianism also supports price stability but emphasizes more the 
role of fiscal policy, interest rates, output and the level of employment as ‘first-order goals’ 
that act in concert and have to be comprehensively modeled and included in MP objectives 
(Friedman & Woodford 2010). A difference in emphasis between Neo-Monetarism (Romer 
& Romer 1989) and the New Keynesian Economics (Clarida et al. 1999) is found regarding 
both expansionary or contractive fiscal and MP, and concerning the right combination and 
concerted action in different contexts of fiscal, economic and monetary policy. 
One crux of the matter is the quandary of achieving optimal fiscal and private spending by 
providing the right monetary-economic environment and incentives, concomitantly improv-
ing the globally competing local factor. Still both schools are known for their opposing 
claims, and these dichotomies have educative value: crowding-in (Keynesians), vs. crowd-
ing-out (Monetarists), ‘money doesn’t matter’ (Keynesians) vs. ‘money matters’ (Monetar-
ists), (Monetarists), anti-cyclic growth stimuli (Keynesians) vs. priority of price stability 
(monetarists), guided market development if needed (Keynesians) vs. only free market de-
velopment (Monetarists) coordinated MP and fiscal policy (Keynesians) vs. independent MP 
(Monetarists), and so on. Today, positions meet along the scale somewhere in the middle. 
For example, monetarists also re-introduced QTM, money balances, liquidity preference, 
and Friedman even also proposed a ‘monetary and fiscal framework’ (Friedman 1948). 
2.4.9 Independent MP Research about the Eurosystem 
The ECB has a scientific island position in the field of empirical research about the 
Eurosystem (ECB 2011a; ECB 2004; ECB 2015b; ECB 2015a). Its two-pillar approach (ECB 
2011a; ECB 2004; ECB 2015b) tracks and researches the economic and monetary develop-
ments, and several detailed reports, bulletins, ECB working paper series about MP, mone-
tary and economic developments are released every year (ECB 2015a). However, due to its 
close relationships to authors and researchers, and due to its public relation strategy the 
ECB, like most other central banks staff, has to be considered as ‘completely biased to-
wards its own short, medium and long-term objectives’. Central Banks or MFIs own re-
search studies cannot be considered as independent or unbiased research as principal 
agent problems arise (Ross 1973): Hence, all data and sources, reviews and bulletins, trends 
and coherencies must be independently re-elaborated. An external assessment of the ECB’s 
research was conducted only as ‘invited’ remittance work for the ECB (ECB 2015b).  
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For example, the ECB has reviewed its own conduct of MPs since 1999 (ECB 2011a): it con-
cludes its outstanding performance until today, despite all economic shocks. This research 
review is going to uncover the true performance on prices and GDP in an independent way. 
The ECB also claims that there is ‘high confidence’, and that the markets have ‘faith in the 
ECBs determination’ to maintain price stability (ECB 2011a), in the medium term. However, 
the recent devaluation of the Euro against the Dollar has much increased the factor costs 
for import-sourcing industries and partly also for import-intense consumption. The need of 
the expanded asset purchase program (APP) and the Euro Crisis have also caused reasona-
ble public doubts on the sustainability of the Eurosystem. Economic stabilization, job mar-
ket trends, GDP and investment targets post FC are also ‘only insufficiently achieved’. 
Besides the overwhelming amount of own central bank research there is also some inde-
pendent research: The majority of all comprehensive review works that systematically re-
search monetary trends and developments in the EMU are only spanning data from 1980 
till 2003 (Angeloni et al. 2001; Issing 2001; Ehrmann et al. 2001; Peersman & Smets 1999; 
Cassola & Morana 2004; Faust et al. 2001; Gerlach & Svensson 2003; Ehrmann et al. 2003; 
Peersman 2004; Clausen & Hayo 2005; Mojon et al. 2002; Chatelain et al. 2002; Gaspar et 
al. 2001; Angeloni & Ehrmann 2003; Sander & Kleimeier 2004; Aarle et al. 2003; Angeloni et 
al. 2003; Welfens 2001; Müller 2003; Cornelius et al. 2000; Meeusen 1999; Masson et al. 
1997; De Haan 2005; Pelkmans 1998; etc.). Most are all published around the turning mil-
lennium. The majority of reviews don’t cover the important recent trends in the EMU.    
‘Biased’ publications associated with the ECB or ECB affiliated authors have revealed a de-
cline in the money multiplier, an increase in the pass through spread, a one year delayed 
effect of interest rate changes on prices and economic activity, and a half year effect of a 
changed monetary base (Peersman 2011; ECB 2015b). Stylized facts in the euro area seem 
to resemble those of the US Federal Reserve System, such as aggregate monetary and real 
variables, and only some specific deviations in disaggregate loans and deposits are found 
(Giannone et al. 2012). Many ‘snapshots of ECB research’ exist that do not try to reveal 
causes or efficiencies but represent ‘detailed snapshots of trends’ (ECB 2015b; ECB 2015a).  
There is one independent research review that also reviews the EMU but again only from a 
central bankers perspective (Cecchetti & Schoenholtz 2010): it separately discusses HICP, G-
Bonds, GDP, yields, and current accounts trends. Additionally, only few independent books 
have been published about the topic: Although very interesting works, most of them clearly 
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have a different focus than this analytical review here and only secondarily cover, review or 
analyze the main coherencies of the monetary trends and MP transmission in the EMU, nor 
do they try to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of MP, or do they try to reveal the 
functioning of the MS and its causes - the most important part of MP research (Görgens et 
al. 2014; Hamori & Hamori 2014; Mercier & Papadia 2011; Haan & Berger 2010; Beblavý et 
al. 2011; Tamakoshi & Hamori 2015; Ehrig et al. 2011; Tsionas 2014; Hummel 2013; Bitzenis 
et al. 2014). But they are informative of how MP is still taught today.  
Several works have researched the influence of the US MP on EMU including its MTC 
mechanisms that act via the Fx rate, commodity prices, short-term interest rates, and the 
trade balance, among others (e.g. Boivin et al. 2008; or Neri & Nobili 2010). Until 2009, the 
pass-through (PT) has been correctly reported as inefficient (Blot 2013), but inefficiency 
was not correctly estimated, termed (‘a not complete PT’), nor concluded appropriately: 
PT-inefficiency is of course much higher than the sole difference in PT - a very commonly 
found but unacceptable ‘scientific flaw’ of MP research: inefficiency always must be esti-
mated or concluded. This most relevant study also correctly tests for homogeneity in the 
EMU and finds - also in line with this study - persisting sub-optimal features (Blot 2013).  
Another study finds a significant relationship between the major monetary aggregates, in-
terest rate and economic activity (Kapounek 2010). Furthermore, ‘money exogeneity’ could 
only be found for the monetary aggregate M1. ‘Money endogeneity’ hypothesis was veri-
fied for money aggregate M2 and M3 (exogeneity was rejected at 5% significance level) 
(Kapounek 2010). The causality was proposed to stem from economic activity that pulls the 
money demand and then supply (Kapounek 2010). Some interesting but basic and prelimi-
nary models are published for the Eurosystem, e.g. different types of New Keynesian DSGE 
models (Chen et al. 2014), but they also cannot provide a comprehensive understanding or 
modeling of the real developments and still serve only specific basic research questions.  
In summary, an analytical review that provides the ‘big picture of the monetary euro area 
trends still remains much elusive. Most related books and reviews have only partially cov-
ered the core trends, coherencies and topics, and only very few recent reviews exist, which 
are also only very scarcely empirical and mainly non-evaluative. Without any doubt, evalua-
tion of the efficiency and effectiveness is the most important part of MP research, like for 
any other economic or business field. The much-biased MP research of today has led to 
huge risky knowledge gaps. This research review sets out to begin with closing these gaps.  
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3 Materials and Methods 
3.1 Materials, Data Sources, and Software 
3.1.1 Databases and Data Retrieval 
If not otherwise stated differently, data was extracted from of the statistical data ware-
house (ECB 2015c) of the European Central Bank (ECB) or Eurostat (Eurostat 2015) for the 
euro-area-19 (changing composition), or euro-area-18 (changing composition), or world 
bank (WB 2015), or Fact Book (CIA 2015) and was processed, standardized, normalized, and 
chronologically time adjusted (to achieve compatible and complete data with fully match-
ing time data) with corrected mean and moving averages. A huge amount of additional in-
formation of database sources and statistical methods for all figures is given in the Appen-
dix (see chapter 6 and 6.3). ECB sample design was adapted for the title pages. Software 
tools are given in the next chapter (3.1.2) and statistical methods are given in section 3.2. 
3.1.2 Software Tools 
Microsoft Excel 2000 (2007) - also based on (Griffiths 2007), Microsoft Word 2000 (2007), 
Microsoft PowerPoint, R (3.1.3), Mendeley Desktop Reference Manager (1.13.8, Mendeley 
Ltd., 2015), Origin, Chrome Internet Browser, Google and Google Scholar searches, NBER, 
SSRN, Hidden Markov Chain Probability Modeling was performed using the Microsoft Excel 
platform and ModelRisk (Vose Quantitative Risk Analysis) and Excel, Microsoft PowerPoint, 
Gretl, Gauss-Markov modeling was further processed with Microsoft excel (2007), semi-
quantitative IS-LM-ADAS modeling was performed using Microsoft Excel 2000 (2007), Busi-
ness Intelligence Microsoft SQL server 2008 excel data and predictive analytics, X-12-Arima 
model tool for excel, Excel analysis tools (regression, multivariate regression, statistics and 
diverse correlation formulas), Microsoft PowerPoint 2000 (2007). Image processing was 
performed with Macromedia’s Freehand and Adobe Photoshop CS4. Econometric functions 
were visualized with Online-Physics’ 3D Function Blotter (Live-Physics.com).    
3.2 Statistical Methods 
3.2.1 Arithmetic Mean, Standard Deviation, Standard Error of the Mean (SEM) 
Arithmetic mean (measure of central tendency, the mean of n values of a):     
 
 
   
 
       
Friedrich Bessel’s Corrected Sample Standard Deviation (SD):      
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Standard Error of the Mean      
  
  
  ; Variance (VAR)         
3.2.2 Pearson’s Correlation Test and Linear Regression Analysis 
Statistical PPMCC Analysis (Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient Studies):  
Dependency, as a linear association of two individual data sets, was assessed in Pearson’s 
product momentum correlation coefficient of each array of data (X, Y), only in standard 
two-dimensional setting, and according to the formula: 
 
                
       
 
         
        
 
           
 
   
  
Formula 26 PPMCC - Pearson’s 2D Product Momentum Correlation Coefficient 
Entry: x, y: arithmetical mean of the samples, R: Pearson’s R (correlation coefficient) 
Coefficient of Determination of Regression Analysis: 
     
    
 
        
 
    
 
       
 
 
Formula 27 Coefficient of Determination of Regression Analysis 
Entry:                                                                     
Linear, logarithmic, and polynomial regression analysis were performed according to com-
mon standards to reveal two-sample dependency as coefficients of determination. 
 
3.2.3 Stationary VAR Analysis 
Stationary VAR analysis (vector auto-regression analysis): if stationarity was not given (via 
regression tests) it was derived via the difference of incremental time series steps resulting 
in N-1 data points, or linear trend fit for dynamic sample based chain-rule forecasting 
methods (Theil 1966; Sims 1980; Davidson & James 2004) based on time lagged data inter-
vals. A VAR structure to model time perseverance of a vector (yt) of i time series for multi-
variate auto-regression is conventionally given by (Sims 1980):  
                             
The basic p-lag vector autoregressive (VAR(p)) model has the form: 
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e.g. bivariate VAR(1) model: 
                                     
                                     
Formula 28 p-lag VAR (Vector Autoregression) Model 
Entry: yt: vector i time series, n: VAR order number and amount of (time) lags to be included into 
the calculation, Ap: (n*n) coefficient matrix A, ε: error vector, xt: exogenous vector with factor D 
 
    
    
    
   
  
  
  
   
   
    
    
 
   
    
    
 
   
    
    
 
  
      
      
      
   
   
    
    
 
   
    
    
 
   
    
    
 
  
      
      
      
   
  
  
  
      
Formula 29 Matrix Form of an n-Variate VAR(P) Model 
Entry: as specified for the formula above, VAR were ‘well specified’ and included enough lags to 
bypass background autocorrelation 
3.2.4 Residual and Data Autocorrelation 
Autocorrelation was assessed for VAR analysis, regression analysis, and multivariate regres-
sions, or additionally and newly to characterize the real-world macroeconomic data sets 
with respect to business cycle effects (Andrews & Monahan 1992; Newey & West 1987).  
3.2.5 Engle’s ARCH (Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity) Test 
ARCH test was performed to measure if the variance of the error (of VAR models, and re-
gression time series data) displays autoregressive behavior. Autocorrelation in the squared 
time series - i.e. conditional heteroskedasticity is measured for all models (Engle 1982; 
Andrews & Monahan 1992; Newey & West 1987). Let the first order auto-regression be:  
      
                   
  
The conditional variance of a one-period forecast (E), V(yt, yt-1) depends upon past infor-
mation. The conditional mean of yt= Ayt-1, the unconditional mean is zero. The conditional 
variance of yt=δ
2, the unconditional variance of yt=δ
2/(1-A2). 
The conditional variance of yt is thus:  
                         
          
  
Hence, the null hypothesis of Engle’s ARCH autocorrelation of the squared time series is:  
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Formula 30 Null Hypothesis Test of Engle‘s ARCH Autocorrelation of Squared Series 
Entry: V: variance, yt-1: conditioning variable, yt: random variable from conditional density function, 
wt: white noise error process, εt: innovation process with mean zero (yt=εt + cond. mean of process), 
α: regression coefficients [for autocorrelation in the squared residuals of the time series] 
3.2.6 Student’s T-Test (W. S. Gossett T-Test) 
The scientific ‘signal-to-noise metaphor’ was assayed based on the Gossett’s T-test formula:  
  
     
 
    
  
 
    
  
   
Formula 31 Basic Formula of the Gossett T-Test for a Signal’s Confidence Interval  
Entry: VARi: variance, n: amount of measurements, x: arithmetic mean of population 
     
3.2.7 Net Present Value (NPV) 
          
  
      
 
   
             
  
   
 
Formula 32 Discrete and Continuous Riemann Net Present Value (NPV) Formula 
Entry: -C0: initial costs of change or investment, T: number of periods, t: time of the cash flow, r: 
discount rate, Ct: net cash flow at time t, dt: time period of measurement (viewed as continuous), rt: 
rate of cash flow per time 
 
3.2.8 MCI (Monetary Condition Index Formula) 
The MCI is based on (Ball 1998; ECB 2015b): it is adjusted as the weighted average of the 
real short-term interest rate (r) and the real effective exchange rate (Fx) to their value in a 
base period (1999). The weights (6:1 for r:Fx) stem from OECD interlink model (Blundell-
Wignall et al. 1984), of a time span of two years. 
     
 
   
    
 
    
    
 
   
 
   
 
Formula 33 MCI Formula (Monetary Conditions Index Formula) 
Entry: MCI: Monetary condition index, n: amount of measurements, r0: real interest rate at refer-
ence period (1999), Fx0: real effective exchange rate at reference period (1999), n: amount of mov-
ing average interval time points, t: time, ECB version of the MCI index  
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4 Analytical Research Review  
4.1 A General Analysis of the Monetary Eurosystem   
Today’s MPs and MTs are strongly influenced by two major economic schools of thought 
(see 2.4.8): Keynesian Economics (see 2.4.6) (Keynes 1930; Keynes 1936; Clarida et al. 1999) 
and Monetarism (Friedman & Schwartz 1963; Friedman 1968; Fisher 1930) (see 2.4.7). 
These two theories offer some dichotomy and a different focus, modeling and weighting 
(see 2.4.8) of variables. Both are predicated upon the Quantity Theory of Money (QTM) but 
use it in different ways: Briefly, monetarists see a ‘major’ direct relationship between mon-
ey and prices, at constant velocity, or prioritize price stability, and QTM. Keynesians see 
more factors dynamically at work and prioritize output and employment in MP strategies.  
As QTM still represents the core of all monetary theories (MT) it is of first importance to 
apply the neoclassical QTM formula (see 2.3.2) to the case data of the EMU from 1999 till 
2015: Hence, this chapter analyzes the monetary aggregates, the velocity of money, output 
and price levels that are all part of the QTM formula and serve in the evaluation of MP and 
the monetary system (MS). Interrelations and correlations are derived and a VAR model 
forecast is provided. Real money balances, used by both schools, and the offsetting item of 
debt formation, also in two extreme country cases, are reviewed. In general, the most basic 
trends, dependencies, and factors found are also the most important and relevant for MP. 
4.1.1 Inflation, GDP and Money Growth, and its Forecast for the Eurozone 
The ECB primarily aims at maintaining price stability of close, but below, 2% in the medium 
term. If this refers to the EMU’s entire 16 years then the ECB is in fact on target with slight-
ly below 2% of price increases on average, using its own HICP ‘inflation targeting’ measure. 
However, if different time intervals or measures are chosen, the result can look different.  
The annual volatility of inflation clearly has overshot its target and spans: -0.5% (in 2009, 
and 2015) or 4% (in 2000 and 2007). This is a difference of 4.5% in range (see Figure 3). Alt-
hough these were relatively moderate and very temporary price shocks, it can be estimated 
that this volatility had an impact on the real economy, causing a loss of GDP growth [ca. 
0.15%], albeit this effect is still marginal according to recent empirical research (see 2.1.4). 
The growth rates inter-correlate and reveal their interacting dynamics since 1999 till today. 
Statistical stationarity can be shown for the data. Correlation results reveal a dependency 
of inflation on monetary aggregate M3 (R=0.39), for GDP and M3 (R=0.3), and GDP and HICP 
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(R=0.32) at monthly interval-resolution (see Figure 3). VAR (vector auto-regression) and 
multivariate regression analysis (Sims 1980) confess that the dependency of HICP on M3 is 
highly significant (p<10-6) c.p. if GDP’s effect is omitted, and GDP depends on both M3 and 
HICP. Importantly, a new sub-division of inflation could hereby be arithmetically found in 
the function of the respective regression models, probably for the first time in MP research: 
(I) Monetarist inflation via the quantity of money (27%) and (II) ‘EMU background inflation’ 
(ca. 63%; ca. 1.3% + 0.1M3,growth): inflation independent of M3 money and GDP growth, and 
(III) Keynesian inflation via output and velocity and other effects (only ca. 10% in net).  
The results are highly relevant as they unveil that Monetarism’s 1:1 effect of (legal) money 
on prices is not the case in the EMU - uncovering ‘fractional reserve banking inflation’ (FRI): 
‘money and leverage that is illegitimately and constantly recycled and created by MFIs’ 
driven inflation. The p-values of FRI background inflation are outermost significant (Formula 
34). Although the regression cannot explain much of the monthly volatility, it is accurate 
about the FRI constant and gives a rough picture of the role of M0, M3 and (chain-linked) 
GDP: contrary to all Economics textbooks, Monetarism, and Keynesianism, the role of M0 is 
clearly and definitely ‘not significant’ in several regression models (but still highly significant 
in its background inflation constant). This is because of the more technical role of ECB legal 
tender in comparison to the much higher volumes of multiplied non-legal money (here e.g. 
M3 consists of only 15% M0). M3 is more relevant for inflation, has a highly significant back-
ground FRI inflation constant, and on average explains only 27% of inflation. Thus, most 
inflation must be FRI-caused, and is a result of liquidity re-leverage and re-cycling, not M3.   
 
 
Figure 3 Monthly Annual Growth Rate of HICP, M3, and of GDP (Moving Average)  
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Formula 34 Derivation of EMU Background Inflation (FRI) using Regression Analysis 
Entry: Red: constant background inflation (independent of M3, GDP, M0), p-values for variables 
(M0)=0.45, p(M3)=3.6*10
-9, p(GDP)=1.8*10-5 and p(M3)=4*10
-6; R low due to monthly-noise data 
EMU money grows faster than inflation as it does not represent the full amount of all real 
EMU money: in the last 16 years M1,2,3 grew approx. 5-7% p.a., while M0 8% or up to 15%. 
Only if the real money volume or velocity (resulting in a similar situation for MFIs in frac-
tional reserves) is higher, a growth percentage in M3 would in fact be a much lower growth 
rate of a higher and hidden money volume [7% would be in fact be 2% leading to 2% infla-
tion, which is exactly the inflation rate of the EMU]. This is incontrovertible evidence that 
huge amounts of additional money must exist or flow. This money is withdrawn from dy-
namic cash flows of MFIs, stored as private property, and escapes all M3-statistics of MFIs.    
Astoundingly, these basic results can be even claimed a world break-through of MP re-
search, as no other research has found this technically simple coherency. It requires more 
attention by the media, follow up research of the details, and monetary reform (see 5.2).   
The financial crisis (FC), in 2008/2009, and the Euro sovereign debt crisis (EC), which began 
in 2012, could in fact be a direct effect of such an uncontrolled way of private money crea-
tion. Until today, such a steady potential massive financial fraud is not known or prohibited. 
The US-EMU-FRI-driven global FC has had a deep impact on the apparent growth rate tur-
bulences (Figure 3) of GDP, M3 and HICP. The ECB had to manage price re-equilibration and 
economic and financial sector de-escalation, GDP, and a new risk: ‘banker’s bank-runs’.  
Nonetheless, pertinent monetary-economic shock waves still seem to persist - resulting in a 
‘deflationary scenario’ today in 2015. This is likely to be also a result of the FC and EC stabi-
lization policy, the new level of EU-wide austerity, global price referencing (‘global pricing’), 
normalizing energy (e.g. oil, gas), IT and ‘communication services’ prices (for all inflation 
sub-indexes see 6.1 Figure S1). Still, in comparison to past EU trends and historic inflation in 
economies world-wide (CIA 2015; WB 2015), the EMU indeed possesses robust price stabil-
ity even in difficult times of three crises (world inflation in 1995: 15%, 2000: 5.1%, 2005: 
3.8%, 2010: 3.7%, 2014: 4%, developed countries: 1.4%, developing countries 5.4%), and 
also admittedly, MP generally can’t optimally assure prices in the short-term (Ball 1998). 
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But the performance of the ECB’s ‘inflation targeting’ (see 2.4.3) of the ECB/Eurosystem can 
also be critically assessed regarding its target series definition (point 1) (Haldane 1998), 
besides the target level: e.g. when the Euro was introduced in 2002 the population of some 
stage III countries like Germany experienced a by far higher rate of inflation (up to 25%) 
than was recorded by the HICP: only 3% were officially admitted. The media termed the 
huge discrepancy unanimously the ‘German felt inflation’. At that time a new consumer 
price index was developed known as Brachinger’s IWI inflation index (Destatis 2015) that 
perceived almost 10% price increases from 5-2001 to 6-2002, and 7% on average, which is 
four-fold higher than the ECB’s official HICP rate of the same time (see Figure 3). Thus, an 
alternative and competitive price index is needed, and the mandate definition medium 
term needs to be specified. The lack of reliable or ‘optimal inflation indices’ and ‘segment-
ed sub-indices’ is still a global challenge for macroeconomics (Mankiw 2014). Only the HICP 
is accepted by the EU and compiled and controlled by Eurostat/Commission (EC 223/2009).  
Now, this monetary survey shall provide an overview of key facts and stats: starting with 
the nominal trends of all monetary aggregate (see 2.2.3) from 1999 till 2015 (see Figure 4). 
The monetary aggregates M1-M3 grew in an almost linear fashion from 1980 till 1999 when 
the Euro was introduced. From then on, nominal growth of the higher monetary aggregates 
became more non-linear. A slight exponential growth in the quantity of money was halted 
after the appearance of a M2,3 bubble in 2008 at the onset of the FC in Europe (Figure 4).    
 
Figure 4 Money Aggregates M1, M2, M3, and Monetary Base M0 in the Euro Area 
 
Noteworthy, in 2008 at the peak of the M2,3 money aggregate bump, HICP inflation had also 
soared before the FC swashed over to the EU, coinciding with a fall in all growth rates. The 
FC-data also confirms, analogous to a macroeconomic intervention experiment, all above 
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correlations of interdependent growth rates. Later they returned to a more natural rate like 
in a modeled shock-response curve. During the FC the growth of M2 and M3 stagnated until 
ca. 9-2011, while the natural trend of M1 was slightly less disturbed, and M0 shows peaks 
and many unconventional, artificial bursts that almost doubled its amount, e.g. in 2012 and 
late in 2015 (Figure 4): this reveals that the growth of legal tender is not normal, or natural. 
Only a system that is in reality not MT-conform could require an unnatural M0 growth rate. 
The bubble of M2+3 aggregates also represent an ‘ominous coincident’ to the FC timeline: 
this atypical growth of M2,3 speaks for a possible EMU MFI involvement in the FC, while li-
quidity preference for legal tender remains relatively low: ECB 15.2% vs. Fed: 22.7% of GDP 
(M0). During the FC+EC the growth and volatility of M0 was much altered by ECB operations. 
Although ‘Divisia analysis’ (Barnett 1980) indicate that the fluctuations of ‘money’s transac-
tion services’ are slightly less pronounced for M1-3 (Dravas 2014), they still represent the 
same curves and kinetics, also as simple-sum, and also if corrected for aggregate heteroge-
neities: thus monetary growth might have had a role in the FC, or economic down-turn. 
What explains the money bubble preceding the FC? The European economy was growing 
and 2008 forecasts of the European Commission and ECB all indicated future growth and 
stable prices (EC 2008): Both legitimated a more loosely ECB MP before the crisis ran ram-
pant. For instance, between 2007 and 2009 the euro area was expected to create 4.6 mil-
lion new jobs and even 7 million EU wide, due to a ‘growth momentum of 2007’. Growth 
was predicted to fall only from 2.5 to 1.5% (EC 2008): indicators allowed for growing base 
money but the ECB had already lost control over the higher monetary aggregates (M2-M3): 
an increase in the MRO rate to 4% in 2008 only barely had an effect on M3 (see Figure 4). 
Some month later, indicators (GDP, employment, consumption, investment, etc.) turned 
strictly negative and unemployment rose rapidly till 2013 in the world’s deep FC recession.  
M0 strongly fluctuated in 2008 and in 2012, when it almost doubled without causing any 
significant effect on the monetary aggregates M1-M3: again exemplifying that the ECB’s 
claimed regulatory power and influence to control M1-M3 via M0 has been lost very much. 
These strong fluctuations provide momentum for empirical MP research to study system 
dynamics: they already reveal that Phillip’s money creation multiplier (see 2.3.7) cannot be 
stable or stringent, as seen for the exogenous perturbance of M0. Moreover, after the ECB 
almost doubled M0 via programs like long term refinancing operations (LTROs), monetary 
aggregates even slightly decreased and the M0 peak in 2012 also had no distinct effect. This 
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is fully in accordance with the previous regression results of this study, but causes deep 
discords with all previous prevailing MTs and MTTs, and highly necessitates a new unbigot-
ed research based on this review to better our understanding of fractional reserve banking. 
A VAR analysis of GDP, HICP, and M3 growth rates (see Figure 3) can help to estimate future 
trends. A forecast for GDP growth, HICP growth, and M3 growth using 12 month p-lags until 
2016-3 is depicted in Figure 5: a slight recovery of HICP and GDP, 2% growth p.a., and the 
annual M3 growth rate lingering at 5-6% p.a.. A prediction using the intrinsic forces of past 
trends without information asymmetry VAR-adaption [for the ECB or MFIs] (Bernanke et al. 
2004) is employed here, as the natural behavior and trend of the system is to be elucidated. 
 
Figure 5 Vector Autoregression (VAR) Analysis of M3, GDP, and HICP Growth Rate 
A state of the art MP VAR analysis always depends on the timed resolution of the vectors 
used for autoregression, like in multivariate regressions. Monthly data are precise but may 
often exhibit autocorrelation features (for the statistical tests see chapter 3.2 and 6.3), as 
can be expected from unadjusted annualized monthly data. Especially GDP is influenced by 
the seasonal business cycle and reporting practices. Thus, a lower resolution - to even out 
economic business and reporting cycle dependent short-term fluctuations - and adjusted 
data, as well as moving averages are all helpful and covered here, and later (e.g. 4.3.4). 
The monetary aggregate M3 is still ‘believed’ to be an important indicator for EMU MP. To 
understand how it connects to output (n/rGDP) and prices (HICP) and for correlation stud-
ies, the growth patterns are shown in quarterly (Figure 6) and annual resolution (Figure 7). 
Instructively, during the onset of the FC in 2008 the growth kinetics succeeded as follows: 
(I) GDP, then M3 and then HICP sequentially peaked, and (II) dropped in the same order. 
Consumption fell in the fourth quarter of 2008 (not shown here). This was followed by a 
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decline in M3 in the first quarter of 2009, a troubled financial and inter-banking market, ECB 
MP crisis operations, GDP and HICP growth that recovered first, and M3 approximating its 
natural level again. While M3 growth picked up recently, HICP became slightly deflationary. 
 
Figure 6 Quarterly Growth Rates of HICP, GDP and M3 in the Eurosystem, 1995-2015 
 
 
Figure 7 Yearly Growth Rates of HICP, GDP and M3 in the Eurosystem, 1995-2015 
The drop in GDP growth rate was accompanied by a ‘negative press’ about economic pro-
spects, which intensified in 3Q-2008, on September 15th, 2008, when US Lehman Brothers 
filed chapter 11 bankruptcy and the Dow Jones has slumped -788 points, while the con-
sumer sentiment indices reached all time lows in the US and three month later also in the 
EU in January 2009 (consumer confidence index; EC, 2009). The following logic seems to 
apply: the entire economic prospects have led to more pessimistic broad-sense business 
expectations, which in turn affected prices to avoid a crash in quarterly sales figures, which 
diminished credit-worthiness and diminished M3 and hereby worsened the crisis.   
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In the three correlation studies (see Figure 3, Figure 6, Figure 7) the time resolution (data 
grouping, or arrangement) has always had a respective impact on the Pearson’s Correlation 
Coefficients (R), which are depicted in the self-explanatory figures. At lower time resolution 
R is higher due to less noisy data series with less business cycle dependent autocorrelation.  
MP today is still influenced by Monetarism and its priority of ‘inflation targeting’. In fact, 
the relationship of ‘money and prices’ had already changed, when the Monetarist Friedman 
obtained his Nobel Prize in 1976: money began to grow faster than inflation, and subse-
quently money (US$) grew also faster than inflation plus output combined. As mentioned, 
the same phenomenon of a ‘monetaristic discrepancy’ can also be seen in the euro area by 
simply comparing the growth rates of money, inflation, and output. This phenomenon is 
only explainable by fractional reserve credit methods that secretly re-use extrinsic liquidity. 
The assumption of a constant velocity - the view of Monetarists like Friedman does not op-
pose the view of the Monetarist Fisher, who claims a non-constancy of velocity, due to the 
following reason: technical the velocity of money should be almost stable for the majority 
of people and non-MFIs - if the right amount of money is known (and striking evidence was 
presented here that it must be much higher). However, when Fisher used his QTM he pre-
dicted that velocities must fall - as he was only using the reported money aggregates, or TA 
that never can be fully assessed (they could be only fully assessed in a full-reserve system). 
Hence, paradoxically, depending on what is meant with ‘money’ both Monetarists are in 
fact approximately right - although they have opposing positions. Fisher is again more pre-
cise, as velocity must decline ultimately, also in his TA-based QTM model, but the true total 
amount of money and TAs cannot be measured comprising all property and assets changing 
hands today. Today’s complexities of ‘financial intermediation’ make it almost impossible. A 
full-reserve system could easily solve this otherwise insolvable problem via IT. Hence, em-
pirical MP research has to use the reported fraction of money or TAs for QTM models of 
growth rates of GDP, HICP and monetary aggregates M0-3 (see Figure 8). And even here - so 
without using the total amount of money but only M0-3 - it still becomes immediately obvi-
ous that money still grows faster than QTM allows - explicable via ‘velocity identities’. The 
real-world reason is however a subdivision of money of (A) non-MFIs (B) MFIs, and (C) non-
MFIs that profit from unilateral MFI cash-flow, or privileged and selective debt relief, hid-
den or not. Only (A) non-MFI money is reported in the aggregates. All additional money 
flows and fully escapes a statistical assessment, once converted into a non-monetary asset.  
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Coherent, the velocity must be much higher like the total amount of money used for TAs.     
Refutation of the ‘constant velocity assumption’ of ‘income-QTM’ can be easily visualized 
using aggregated growth factors for QTM (see 2.3.2): by simply depicting monetary aggre-
gate, HICP, and GDP growth (see Figure 8) the ‘monetaristic discrepancy’ becomes appar-
ent. In the Eurozone, like in the US, starting from 1999, the quantity of money grew faster 
than HICP, real GDP (not shown), or nominal GDP. Legal tender and virtual credit also grew 
faster than the sum of the growth rates of output and inflation together (see Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8 Money (M0-M3) Grows Faster than Inflation plus rGDP in the EMU 
As a direct consequence and implication, a new understanding of QTM and velocity of 
money is to be found: (I) the real quantity of money, in fractional reserve banking, is not 
known, and either the velocity of money or money must be much higher than reported by 
the ECB and MFIs. (II) QTM has to be treated as identity formula, which is also an equation, 
but as long as the velocity (Morgan 2006) or real amount of money cannot be correctly 
measured it only provides identity-information for a sub-fraction of money; eminently, a 
mathematical peculiarity of QTM is indeed that it first becomes a true scientific equation 
when the total amount of money and TAs is found. (III) Velocities of money are a sum of (A) 
regular non-MFIs, (B) MFIs, and (C) non-MFIs profiting from MFI CFs or ‘debt release’.  
The simplified and dynamic version of neoclassical QTM states the following relationship:  
                                                   
                         
Formula 35 Income and Growth Rate QTM Identity Formula  
Entry: M: quantity of money, Y: output, P: price level, t: at time period t 
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According to QTM (Formula 5) any effect is counterbalance by one of the three other iden-
tities. As not all money is known velocities and monetary aggregates are only indicators, 
and the true velocity cannot be assessed (identity formula) - meaning also that all stock 
data are not fully informative as the power of money is its use in TAs: only found in CFs.  
In consideration of the income-QTM data the income velocity of non-MFI money must have 
changed considerably: here, money is not exogenous and the velocity of money is not con-
stant enough to be neglected. In fact, the velocities of money are ‘real-economy-indicative’. 
4.1.2 Velocity of Money in the Eurozone and its Impact on the Real Economy 
The income velocities of money (based on GDP-TAs) have changed considerably in the EMU 
from 1999 to 2015. This represents a break with Monetarist MTs and MP models that do 
not include these factors, and is going to be studied in more detail here, e.g. in 4.1.2. Mon-
etarist’s velocity of money mainly changes due to technical banking rules and alike. One 
day, Monetarist could turn out to be right, when the total quantity of money is found. But 
most likely I. Fisher is again right: as the storage function of money rises, velocity must fall.  
Exact velocity measures are difficult to find (Morgan 2006) and can only be determined if 
M, TA, or V is correctly measured that is totally infeasible in fractional reserve MSs (4.1.1).  
QTM states that MV=PY. Hence, in the EMU, the non-MFI real-economy velocity (identity) 
must have fallen to compensate for the disproportionate increase in ‘real economy money’ 
(not purely real economy money due to MFI-CF-non-MFI money that might be a relatively 
stable stock and flow). This diminishing ‘non-MFI’ income velocity of money is predicated 
on domestic income (or TAs) and represents an individual function of the specific monetary 
aggregate M1-3, respectively (see Figure 9). The optimal velocity is indeed economically of 
big importance owing to its relative effect of PP on output (GDP). Multiplying the velocity of 
all monetary aggregates (M1-3) with their respective money multiplier (m1-3) yields v0 
(Sperber & Sprink 1990), or real v0: how much output an amount of money yields (as ratio). 
                  
    
  
 
  
  
    
  
  
 
    
  
     
                            
    
  
 
  
   
         
 
  
 
    
  
          
Formula 36 Product of Velocity and Money Multiplier (v0, real v0) 
Entry: M: quantity of money, v: velocity, m: money multiplier, E: money efficiency product  
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Velocities represents a ’real economy indicative’ ratio of the economy’s output over MFI 
reported money stocks, or: an output index ratio a money stock ‘yields’ (see Figure 9).  
Nominal velocities v0-v3 are strikingly declining, an effect that is quantifiable and requires 
interpretation. This holds also true for real velocity of money depicted here as a newly in-
troduced price-adjusted real ratio for monetary macroeconomics (see Formula 36 and 37).  
The declining rates vary: velocity v0 is most volatile for the monetary base aggregate M0.  
Volatility of v1 is comparably low, like v2, and v3. The cave-ins of v0 reflect the MP action-
programs and rescue operations after the FC and the EC. Complementarily, those are re-
flected in the monetary base M0 volumes as its artificial post crises pikes (see Figure 8). All 
velocities are not constant: velocities have fallen by almost 40-50% in only 15-16 years. 
Such a glaring change of crucial parameters need to be in fact accounted for in MTs/MTTs. 
 
Figure 9 Income Velocities of Monetary Aggregates (M0-M3) and Real Income Velocities 
 
                   
    
 
 
  
 
 
  
 
 
Formula 37 Velocity of Money as a Function of Turnover 
                            
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Formula 38 Real Velocity of Money as a Function of Turnover 
Entry (37+38): V: (income or transactions) velocity of money, Vreal: real (income or transactions) 
velocity rGDP: real GDP, Y: output, T: transactions, P: price level, nGDP: nominal GDP  
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Declining income velocity identity-variables externalize how EMU GDP-relevant economic 
transactions volumes show systemic weakening since decades. In turn, the ‘output relevant 
transactions (TA) function’ of money, i.e. for real economy TAs of goods and services (and 
other property), has slightly fallen in relative terms (see Figure 9). Inevitably, the storage 
function of money must have inconspicuously aggregated disproportionately, cumulatively.  
The results in Figure 9 show for the EMU that the changes in velocity of money are too 
strong to be fully explainable with Friedman’s technical reasons as all technical changes in 
the banking sector in the euro area should have had an opposite effect on velocity (e.g. 
improved settlement procedure, less costs, etc.). Therefore velocities reveal an important 
unexpected other function linked to the transactional power efficiency of money, output, 
and GDP. The quantification using the change equation of income velocity (1999-2015) 
finds striking differences, as follows:  v(M0): -44%, v(M1): -53%, v(M2): -37%, v(M3): -33%. 
The determinant variables of the income velocity of money should have changed equally in 
15 years. They consist of (1) technical, (2) behavioral, and (3) systemic features of the MS.  
Per definition, money’s ‘transactional function’ is higher in the lower monetary aggregates 
(see Figure 1), i.e. M0,1 vs. M2,3, as this money changes hands more frequently (in this QTM 
form of calculation). This is ‘semi-reflected’ in the sequential order of velocities in Figure 9. 
In fact those ‘lower’ income velocities v0,1 also decline faster (ca. -50%), compensated by a 
rising ‘storage function’, that is also especially found in monetary aggregates M2-4. In line, 
velocity of M2-4 has also declined to a lesser extent (ca. only -35%). The transactional capaci-
ty decreases in higher money aggregates, as the storage function increases. GDP irrelevant 
transactions increase (property, trading, portfolio, MFI deprivation TAs). The loss in capaci-
ty of the transactional function must coincide with a gain in its capacity as storage function. 
This ‘semi-trend’ is corroborated by recent portfolio investment and rising stock markets. 
The storage function of money is on the rise whenever the time between transactions is 
extended. This finding should be also reflected in a second key type of velocity: the transac-
tions (TAs) velocity of money comprising all economic transactions (see introduction 2.3.2). 
As the time interval of portfolio investments is naturally longer than in real economy TAs, 
one has to expect a similar but less strong decline in the TA velocity of money. This sub-
hypotheses is testable by simply employing an hybrid transactional composition of TA vol-
ume of the EMU (ECB 2015b). As expected, the TA velocities of money also declined from 
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2000 onward till 2015, but to a lesser extent (Figure 10): vTA(M0): -30%, vTA(M1): -39%, 
vTA(M2): -21%, vTA(M3): -15%. This validates previous hypotheses - but total TAs are missing.  
If the changes of both types of velocities (vTA-vincome) are compared we find a new indicative 
difference: Δv(M0): -14%, Δv(M1): -14%, Δv(M2): -16%, Δv(M3): -18%. Expectedly, for M0-3, 
the GDP-relevant income velocity has declined much stronger from 1999 to 2014. This co-
herency is not an intrinsic necessity. Velocities are shrinking sub-optimally, which could be 
impedimental to future GDP growth rates and related increases in income. This provides 
the first indication and evidence that velocities are more important for the real economy 
than previously anticipated. They diminish not only due to technical reason, but due to 1-3.   
The averages of all monetary velocities analyzed in the time of the EMU have declined by 
almost 34% (SEM 4%). This represents an annual rate of a -2.3% of reduction in velocity. 
The precise and specific annual rates of all velocities derived for the last 15 years are as 
follows: vTA,I(M0): -2%, 2.9%, vTA,I(M1): -2.6%, 3.5%, vTA,I(M2): -1.4%, 2.5%, vTA,I(M3): -1%, 
2.2%. All velocities slightly seep away and the ‘real velocities’ (Formula 36-38), showing the 
effect in real terms, do so even stronger. Real velocities are 15-20% more shortened in only 
15 years: an effect of up to -70%, which founds the big picture of the EMU’s velocity trends.   
 
Figure 10 Transactions Velocity of Monetary Aggregates in the EMU 
 
These trends are ambivalent: ‘promising and alarming’ as an ongoing decline in the velocity 
of all relevant monetary aggregates means that more wealth is stored in money in the 
EMU. On the other hand the transactional effectiveness of money declines, which is a sign 
of economic inefficiency and could be detrimental to future growth of real GDP, in theory: 
if velocity drops the relation of money and economic performance is rendered towards 
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more inefficiency and ineffective usage of resources and more principal agent (Ross 1973) 
and social-economic disparity problems, and the EMU economic circuit could be hampered. 
Moreover, steadily falling velocities increases also risks of a deflation, as a relatively lesser 
amount of the money hunts goods and services. While the international money leverage 
might benefit CFs of huge EMU businesses, MNCs, banks and global investors, the domestic 
market and SMEs might face more negative consequences: distortion of incentives, ineffi-
ciency, and deflationary potential, and thus more indebtedness in the future. Indeed, a few 
structural deflationary features are reported for the EMU since 2014-2015 (ECB 2015b). 
Figure 11 co-depicts the relative growth of monetary aggregates together with their income 
velocity. A growth of monetary aggregates was accompanied by a respective fall in velocity. 
The positive economic developments in the EMU before the crisis (EC 2008) have not had  
an equally positive effect on the kinetics of velocities. The symmetrical volatility of mone-
tary aggregate on velocities indicates an ‘unnatural inefficiency’ of the MS, post FC and EC. 
 
Figure 11 Co-development of Income Velocity and Quantity of Monetary Aggregate 
Figure 12 provides a trend map overview of HICP and moving averages of real v0 and v1. As 
expected, the real economy’s velocity only hardly affects inflation (HICP). Thus the natural 
recycling of money by real non-MFIs - i.e. money changing hands for economic actions - 
only has marginal role on inflation. Thus, it is mainly caused by MFI-related velocity (=FRI).  
From 1-1999 till 06-2002 the income velocity of base money has initially increased due to a 
stepwise expansion of the euro as the legal currency also for daily businesses of all Europe-
ans in the EMU (see Figure 13), a process that started in 1999. This also coincides with the 
pre-dot-com bubble that temporarily elevated transactions. 
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Figure 12 Velocity of the Monetary Base and Inflation (HICP index) 
 
From then on velocity steadily and slowly declined every quarter by 2% on average (SEM: 
0.3%) due to the immediate effect of faster growing money supply that real value of all 
transactions, until the fourth quarter (Q4) of 2008 when it sharply dropped by 23% in just 
one quarter (Q). Velocity of the monetary base drops slightly before the FC hit the real 
economy of the EMU: velocity already falls significantly in Q4 of 2008 and GDP drops 
stronger in Q1 of 2009 (see Figure 13). These co-developments further support the hypoth-
esis that the velocity of money is positively related with income, output and all major GDP-
related indicators, previously found in my vast correlation network study (paper available 
at HfWU or from the author: Intrapreneurialism 2.0, 2014, see 6.1 Fig. S17). The slavery 
elements of fractional reserve banking could inhibit innovation and GDP (6.1 Fig. S17). Di-
rectly comparing GDP growth rates with changes in velocity (v0) provides a ‘new view’ of 
the monetary-economic mechanics: they can partially explain key dynamics, e.g. of the FC:  
 
Figure 13 Growth Rate of the Velocity of the Monetary Base and Adjusted GDP 
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The drop in the velocity v0 in Q4-2008 corresponds with an aggravation of the crisis and its 
transduction into the real economy. Subsequently, real GDP has drop sharply and the in-
crease in velocity corresponds with a stop of a further decline of GDP growth in the next 
quarter (speaking for a stronger anti-cyclic fiscal and monetary policy). These are only two 
snap shots that reveal a positive impact of v0 and GDP growth rates. This dependency can 
also be seen throughout the entire 15 years, if looked at the ‘natural trends’. E.g. till Q1-
2011 the velocity has a slight positive average trend and seems to benefit GDP. And also, 
after Q1-2011 v0’s moving average and GDP suddenly breaks down again, coincidentally. 
Although GDP is a part of the QTM identity and as such also velocity, it is important to note 
that the ratio of GDP over money volume is more important than previously thought. The 
growth rate volatility of v0 is much higher than v1-v3 but the mean average of the velocity of 
the higher monetary aggregates describes the same effect on GDP as v0 (Figure 14). A 
smaller change in % of higher aggregate has a bigger effect than v0 due to volume.  
 
Figure 14 Quarterly Growth of the Velocity of Money in the Euro Area, 1999-2015 
 
In summary, the growth rates of all monetary aggregates illustrate a related growth pattern 
(Figure 14) mainly due to their composition (see 2.2.3). The growth rate volatility increases 
from huge to small monetary aggregates (from M3 to M0) with similar natural trends. A new 
hypothesis is empirically deduced: velocity can be used as indicator - for a 1-2Q tow-range 
effect - and bears some causation on economic growth. If v0 rises it further lifts the trend of 
v1-3 upwards for as long as its ‘natural rate trend’ (roughly moving average) is improving 
(Figure 14). At same, natural velocity trends positively affect output and high debt repress-
es velocities and thus also output, and prices and may be deflationary. This newly discov-
ered role recommends, to MP-decision-makers, to optimizing ‘velocity ratios’ for real GDP 
and a better real economy with a higher employment level (a result of 4.3.6, see also 4.3.7). 
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4.1.3 The Money Multiplier and the ECB’s Control over the Money Supply  
The ‘Money Multiplier’ is another huge scientific affair of a long ‘banking tradition and his-
tory’ with far reaching implications for everybody and every business in the real economy 
(see introduction, 2.3.7). The main regulative power of the ECB is exerted by controlling the 
money supply and key rates for MFIs. Owning to both facts, the MS has to be seen as a de-
signed dilemma or MFI-profiting trap: the more liquidity the MS supplies the less regulative 
power remains, the less limitation to MFI money creation and deprivation, and the less 
competitive the financial lending market behaves. The PTs can of course only a ‘very weak 
indicator’ due to the principal repayment and multiplier effect - a fact that is deliberately 
ignored by science e.g. Blot 2013; Paries et al. 2014). The alternative, signalizing a profound 
dilemma, is tight money that would raise interest rates and lower investment and GDP.      
Due to this, much critique about fractional reserve banking and the money multiplier exists 
since a very long time (Douglas et al. 1939; Kumhof & Benes 2012; IMMR 2015). Recently, 
even some BIS research (Bank of International Settlement), and IMF (International Mone-
tary Fund), and a Federal Reserve Board, among the most powerful and well-heard institu-
tions of the financial world, have criticized fractional reserve banking and money multipliers 
and its overwhelming debt creating mechanisms, and the financial crises it causes. Even the 
BIS, the ‘HQ of fractional reserve central banking’ has found that the FC was caused by MFIs 
of many countries that have built up ‘unbacked’ fractional reserve banking ‘on- and off-
balance sheet leverage’ (BIS 2011) and debt (Kumhof & Benes 2012), urging for MS reform.  
All issues center on the money multiplier that is ‘managerially flawed’ and ‘partially unin-
formative’ in terms of what really happens in the real world of banking. It takes away the 
most important role of the ECB’s control of the money supply and MTCs: to also efficiently 
and sustainably stimulate economic growth at steady prices (Carpenter & Demiralp 2012; 
BIS 2011; Kumhof & Benes 2012; Cecchetti & Kharroubi 2013). 
Despite its devastating flaws - it is to be topically covered without scientific bias here: First, 
the trends of the money multiplier are going to be reviewed and analyzed. The definition of 
the money multiplier is also given in the introduction (Formula 14, 17): it is the ratio of the 
monetary aggregate over the monetary base, or simplified to:  m = M1,2,3/M0. It is also 
known to be decomposable into the contribution of the currency-to-deposit (C/D) ratio and 
reserve-to-deposit ratio (R/D) (ECB 2011b): it indicates how much money stock is created in 
the respective categories of monetary aggregates by MFIs on top of the legal tender money 
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(M0). [Noteworthy, MFI money deprivation cannot be measured as stocks, but in capacities 
of CFs and TAs, as MFI monetary assets are steadily transferred into non-MFI assets, etc.]. 
The growth rates of the monetary aggregates are reviewed in Figure 4: from linear to dis-
proportionate semi-quadratic growth to weakening post-crises trends. Post FC, strong fluc-
tuations of the monetary base (M0) occurred that did not much impact the growth of the 
higher monetary aggregates - a typical lack of control of most MPs: this effect is also repre-
sented by the changing money multipliers of the aggregates depicted as m1-m3 in Figure 15.  
The money multiplier chart of the EMU reveals the following progression: m1,2,3 all grew 
from 1999-2002, from when on a deceleration begins - this much corresponds to the veloci-
ty effects reported in Figure 11 - the launch of the physical legal tender across the EMU - 
the increasing demand of the Euro-vehicle and holding of monetary assets, a more efficient 
payment and settlement system, and the ECB’s more adjusted MPs for MFI competition.   
 
Figure 15 Chart of EMU Money Multiplier m1, m2, m3 (M1-3/M0), from 1999-2015 
After the internet bubble crisis in 2003 money multipliers had fallen until 2008, when m2 
and m3 eventually recovered, but only for a few quarters until the FC. ECB’s ‘rescue packag-
es’ dropped them to all-time lows: Figure 15 shows ‘lose and unnatural trends of m0-3‘, 
which must be interpreted as non-tight and too flexible as a result of MS inefficiency and a 
defective bank lending channel. After multipliers had recovered, the EC again broke all-
time-low multiplier records owing to excessive reserves and explosive growth of M0. Multi-
pliers again recovered until today but do not seem to reach their original ‘natural pre-crises 
level’ despite all much better legal and business terms for MFIs. The stringency of money 
multipliers with respect to MFI credit extension potential is the only way the ECB could im-
prove the efficiency, theoretically - but this has become fully infeasible in practical terms.  
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The minimum reserve requirements were shifted from 2% to 1% post crises, more precisely 
on January 18, 2012. Although, this might have helped to push terms out of the slump, the 
multipliers overall performance did not improve with respect to pre-crises levels (- in fact it 
must have increased overall ‘fraud’ of fractional reserve banking due to a higher leverage). 
The monthly growth rate of the monetary base (M0) is not significantly correlated with the 
monthly growth rate of any higher monetary aggregate, M1, M2, nor M3 (-0.05<R<0.085). 
Using annualized or quarterly data leads to the same result and the same conclusion. A dy-
namic correlation over 12 month also reveals the same result for a one-year lag tolerance:  
RM0:M1=0.01, RM0:M2=0.03, RM0:M3=0.01. Also within 2 years there is no dependency to M0. 
This is an important point as the ECB still claims that its MP regulates money growth via M0.      
This means if the monetary base is increased by the central bank it doesn’t have any imme-
diate effect on any monetary aggregates: the ECB has fully lost its control over total money.  
This is also revealed by comparing a theoretical-mathematical capacity of the multipliers 
with the real-world multipliers. The changed EMU minimal reserve requirements in 2012 
are of course included in the calculation. The conventional capacity for Fisher’s ‘money 
multiplication’ of MFIs and CBs (Formula 17) has been specified as a relation, as follows: 
 
           
   
   
              
        
  
 
Entry: : reserve coefficient (reserve deposit ratio), : currency coefficient (currency ratio, the affin-
ity for real legal tender or cash) 
 
If the capacity of the monetary aggregates were constrained by the money multiplier, ac-
cording of the above formula, traditionally used by conventional MP research and also by 
the ECB (Görgens et al. 2014; ECB 2011b), then it would reveal the multipliers potential (see 
Figure 16): but the formula is only true for stock data and thus also flawed. Another simpli-
fied formula for capacity can be derived: in a 1% reserve system the capacity of a money 
multiplier is 100 fold. Simplified, the money multiplier turns 50-fold if 50% of money is de-
manded by MFIs and is thus ‘in circulation’ (due to liquidity preference of holding money, 
and interbank TAs). Thus, in a perfect financial market the maximal book-money would be: 
         
            
  
  
    
          
 
Formula 39 Simplified Money Multiplier’s Capacity Formula  
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Entry: mmax: capacity of multiplier, C: currency in ‘demanded circulation’, R: minimum reserve re-
quirements in %, non-MFI: non-banks (firms, people), MFI: banks (monetary financial institutions) 
Predicated on the formulas the mean leeway of the money multipliers can be reckoned as 
the % difference of the real world multiplier (of m1-3) compared to a full-reserve employ-
ment, and a maximal capacity without a real reserves but a theoretical 100-fold limit to 
book money creation. First order inefficiency is found as a lack of resource usage for the 
money multiplier, as follows:  m1: ca.30%, m2: ca. 20%, m3: ca. 20%, or leveraged (Formula 
39): m1: ca. 40%, m2: ca. 35%, m3: ca. 35%. Higher order inefficiency must be much higher.  
 
Figure 16 Capacities of the Traditional Money Multipliers and their Utilization  
 
It can be also interpreted as margin of risk awareness, or margin of safeguarding measures. 
The global risk aversion on part of investors and MFIs has heightened since the FC and EC. 
The individual reasons of why MFIs and CBs don’t make use of their full potential, however, 
might be very diverse, follow strategic plans of consortia, or might be a result of other con-
straints to these banks: e.g. very different MFIs constraints exist in the EU. The latest MP of 
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the ECB are a game changer to monetary financial sector: if we assume that the ECB ‘re-
mains responsive’ to MFIs liquidity demand (own estimation based on ECB announcements 
e.g. QEs), as in the past and much more after the FC and EC, the future total leeway would 
be even higher: ca. m1 60%, m2 52%, m3: 51% (at a MP elasticity assumption of only 1.5). 
The remaining leeway is only a traditional capacity - not the full capacity to create money 
that is by far higher (owing to CF cycles). Still, these capacities - that are lower than the real 
ones - already reveal a high level of first order inefficiency, of money that escapes MTCs, 
and the potential to create high volumes of money and show a lacking basis for price com-
petition. Moreover, this leeway allows more ‘frauds’ by MFIs to dynamically deprive money 
and cash out of the legal system via hidden reuse, principal repayments, and depreciations.  
The strongest crisis to the MS and money multiplier was probably the EC in 2012: in this 
time the multipliers fell sharply by 30-40%. Historically, this much resembles the sharp drop 
of the money multiplier that coincided and caused the Great Depression in 1929-33 in the 
US, when money supply fell by 28% (Friedman & Schwartz 1963; Mathews et al. 2013). 
At that time, the historic ‘lesson learned’ in the US allowed for the establishment of the 
Federal Deposit Insurance (LOLR) to dam up the risk of bank runs for the economy. Also the 
ECB acts as ‘lender of last resort’ resulting in principal agent problems (Ross 1973). And, the 
real-world lesson wasn’t learned: ‘that the reserve is no reserve’ making crises inevitable. 
The ECB and the Commission responded to the EC by lowering the legal requirement and 
system constraints in the Euro banking system to achieve a pre-EC crisis situation. Although 
partially successful, the low utilization money multiplier might have had different reasons: 
it might resemble a similar condition that is found in the UK where ‘credit worthiness’ is the 
main driving factor for ‘credit extension’ and monetary growth (Ryan-Collins et al. 2014) or 
the US (Friedman & Schwartz 1963). EMU credit risks seem to play a more important role in 
this context but are a different topic and hence researched in another chapter (see 4.3.8.5).  
In summary, MFI money creation is only based upon stock not flow data, which remains 
hidden, and escapes all constraint of money multiplier, reserve requirements, or Basel I-III.  
All money multipliers became less stringent after the FC and can’t constrain MFI money 
creation effectively. They all have the high powered money M0 as their base, which also 
develops unnaturally since the FC and EC. Hence, it is interesting to reveal specific features 
of money multiplication with respect to the monetary base. Figure 17 illustrates (1) the 
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fraction of excess reserves the MFIs have with their NCB. ‘Legal tender resource wasting’ 
started in 2012 and has continued till today (shown as % of M0, pink line). Since then the 
real capacity of the money multiplier has much increased (blue line: total potential of M0 
including all legal reserve requirement, and green line: minimum reserve based potential). 
The minimum reserve is managed by the MFIs ex post and not ex ante as the green line 
(minimum reserve capacity) adjusts to the legal requirements - corresponding to the MFI 
monthly reporting requirements (SNA 2008/ESA 95-based ‘end-of-month’ ECB/2008/32).  
The ECB is of course aware of some of these inefficiencies and has also taken first CM ac-
tion e.g. with respect to the recent excess of MFIs excess reserves (ECB 2015b). As the first 
central bank in the world it has lowered its key interest rate on reserve deposits (deposit 
facility) from 0% to -0.1% on 11.6.2012, and as MFIs still poorly reacted even to -0.2% on 
10.9.2012 (ECB 2015b). MFIs seem idiosyncratic in that they still don’t react to pay negative 
interest rates, nor do they adapt to better use m because it is totally irrelevant for them. In 
comparison to the money that can be repeatedly deprived interest rates are fully negligible. 
If there were any efficiency left in these MTCs a 5-fold higher capacity would have to better 
its utilization to drive investment, jobs and GDP in the EU economy. This is clearly not the 
case, like interbank competition. Moreover, the opposite seems to be true: the PT indubi-
tably soars (see 4.3.2): showing a trend towards inefficiency in most Credit View MTCs.   
 
Figure 17 Capacity of Money Multiplication as M0 in the Euro Area 
 
Another way of describing the monetary developments of money multipliers is to analyze 
additional properties like constancy, residuals or deviations from main trends, or aggregate 
growth patterns. These are important to complete the ‘big picture’ for money multipliers.  
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Constancy: the analyze permanency of the money multipliers they can be represented as 
share of the respective nominal monetary aggregates over time. Therefore, all monetary 
aggregates are transformed into a percentage contribution of aggregate money (see Figure 
18). This visualizes the contribution of each and their natural factors can be derived by in-
tegrating over time. If high powered money (M0) is set 1 (or 100%), (see Figure 18): 
 
Figure 18 Constancy of Mean Share of Money Aggregates (+SEM) from 1999-2015 
 
From 1999 till today (2015) the ratios of monetary aggregates to M0 are highly constant and 
reveal relative statistical robustness of the money multiplication in the non-MFI-only real 
economy: M0=1, M1=4.3, M2=8.1, M3=9.3. SEM analysis is included to indicate robustness in 
graspable standardized means: SEM error bars are small in relative terms (Figure 18, right).  
However, mild reduction of M3 is seen since the FC and EC. To quantify these observations, 
obtained at first glance, in more mathematical-scientific and visual terms, the variation was 
calculated as residual from the integrated mean share of all aggregates (see Figure 19). 
 
 
 
Figure 19 Trends of Money Aggregate Shares as % Deviation from Mean, 1999-2015 
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The following slight trends are seen on top of the background of the monetary constancy of 
multipliers: M1 share trend: +4% in 16 years; M2 share trend: -1%, M3 share trend: -4%. 
Aggregate Monetary Growth: next to the ‘constancy of multipliers (above)’ it is also illus-
trative and revealing to represent and review the data as aggregated growth volumes since 
the introduction of the Euro (see Figure 20), starting with zero, to have the full focus on the 
proportionality of monetary Euro growth (the exchanged and cycling money is not includ-
ed). As a result, there is less constancy than in the monetary share perspective with impli-
cations to interpret the ‘monetary aggregate growth multiplication pattern’. Linear regres-
sion analysis was carried out to reveal the real-world ‘monetary aggregation multipliers’ - 
given in Figure 20 M0: 1, M1:4, M2: 6.2, M3: 6.2, R
2 coefficients are very high except for M3. 
These results clarify that the money multiplication is stable for M1 (ca. 4 fold in both: share 
and aggregate view). M2 and M3 empirical factors differ in that they are lower in the aggre-
gate growth representation (see Figure 20). This indicates a lower trend of M2+3 post crises.  
The low (reported) utilization of MFI book money capacity requires more interpretation: 
Market imperfections cannot fully explain it as a much higher utilization was possible be-
fore, from 1999-2008. The interbank market is an important hub measured in EURIBOR. 
Low transaction volumes in the interbank market have contributed to the worsening of the 
crisis, caused a MP dilemma, but don’t explain the ‘post crisis syndrome’ of the Eurozone.  
 
Figure 20 Aggregate Growth of Monetary Aggregates Derived Money Multipliers 
Also, the legal situation cannot fully explain the lagging: e.g. the Basel accords don’t much 
constrain the money supply via a 4.5% equity rate; minimum reserve requirements have 
also fallen from 2% to 1%. Both should outweigh all possible other negative impacts. In fact, 
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much excess reserves are available (see Figure 17). The balance sheet adjustment (Basel III) 
requires a higher Tier 1 capital level, and relatively less assets and risk; maybe more precau-
tion of MFIs has happened due to the ECB’s ‘Comprehensive Assessment’ in 2014; smaller 
ROE (return on invest) have contributed to the effect - due to higher equity requirement 
and lower international investor’s expectations (bank shares, etc.), or technical-structurally: 
the financing market slightly shifted from MFIs to non-bank financing by investors (-9% 
CB/MFI share, ECB 2015). In fact, there seems to be a new risk awareness in banking and in 
businesses that plays a key role, e.g. capital buffers are increasing and less debt-related risk 
became the new slogan in corporate risk management (EY & IIF 2012). MFI ‘profitability’ -
that, very importantly, is definitely not comparable with firms or corporations financial ac-
counting, and its related profits, margins or retained earnings, etc. - still depends on ‘inter-
ests earned’ and thus PTs to improve the ‘officially published account margins’. PTs etc. are 
thus furthered by lower Basel III ROEs - since the main ‘income’ from MFIs is not financially 
accounted - astoundingly and alarmingly not even the real money of the principal repay-
ment, an true income CF (ECB 2015b) cannot be found in any MFI income statement. The 
expected low real GDP growth rates impact, as culminated degrees of difficulty and risk, the 
leveraged profitably ROI calculations on behalf of the industry and the lending market. 
E.g. imagine the example of the two big CB networks in one country, each covering 50% of 
the population’s customers. If CB A buys (e.g. millions of houses and thousands of firms) 
from their own customers these customers get paid with their own money that ends up in 
the same CB’s accounts - and can be relend or reused to buy. CB A doesn’t bear any real 
costs - it only has to deposit 1% of the cost as reserve with the NCB (a 99% discount) - and 
only temporarily. If CB A buys from customers of CB B and vice versa the same situation 
appears: due to a process known as ‘clearing’ by (interbank funds transfer systems; e.g. 
SEPA clearance, RTGS, TARGET II in the EU, Fx clearance or CHIPS in the US, SIPS) both 
banks end up paying again nothing and only minimum reserves have very slightly increased, 
but only temporarily (due to the system’s intrinsic inescapable-arithmetic debt pressure). 
The property might be resold or not - the MFIs have gained its full value for absolutely 
nothing. Claims might have increased on the balance sheets of CBs but reserves are up to 
100 times less (1% liquidity ratio) and almost freely available to big CB (liquidity is steadily 
soaked out of the real economy and ECB MP fulfills all of the demand of MFIs due the di-
lemma that the real economy requires low interest rates and liquidity). As a result excessive 
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excess reserves (see 4.2.2.3) do not limit CB book money creation any longer (an early pre-
condition of Voltaire’s Fiat money effect) and minimum reserves do not count any more, as 
they don’t limit or demark ‘credit extension’ any longer for the financial sector (CB A+B).  
The sell-off of anything precious in the real economy has long begun, via non-MFIs that use 
a hidden MFI leverage, which is not only a scientific conspiracy theory, but the most plausi-
ble explanation of all (who would not use this totally free extra money leverage?).   
And in the long run new debt is arithmetically re-created also assured by the ‘architecture’ 
of the MS and MP: E.g. all of the ECB’s standard procedures (see 2.1.5) supply new money 
to MFI in the form of debt obligations to non-MFIs plus interest to be paid back (that was 
never supplied to the euro area and cannot be earned in the aggregated view). The coun-
terparts of all monetary aggregates and debt reveal that credit and money is also inter-
twined, shrinking velocity and keeping a high debt level as inherent MFI-wanted feature of 
the Eurosystem. Although debt is a normal monetary tool that is always needed it is mis-
used to extend the purchase leverage of EMU MFIs and a positive money supply is missing. 
This causes lower CFs for firms and FRI-costs. Credit Extension Theory only covers a part of 
the ‘fraud’ (2.2.3) - the scenario thus supports the Deprivation Theory (DT) view (see 2.2.3). 
4.1.4 Real Money Balances in the Euro Area 
Real money balances - money divided by the ‘index of prices’ - represent another basic but 
important factor and indicator for MP. It represents the value and purchasing power (PP) of 
the money stock and is a measure of the quantity of goods services and property it can buy:  
          
        
 
 
        
    
    
 
 
 
 
                                  
Formula 40 Real Money Balance Formula 
Entry: M: money aggregate, P: price Level, D: demand, Y: output, k: money preference per income 
(= v-1, v: income velocity of money; proportionality factor for the income dependency) 
Traditional Monetarism papers or theories assume that real money balances are relatively 
constant in the short run, and not highly important indicators for MP (Karnosky 1974). 
However, even Milton Friedman (a ‘father of Monetarism’) had actually used this concept 
in his modern QTM approach (Friedman 1956)(see 2.3.4). He also argues that the demand 
for real money balances is a function of income and return. It is a tool of the Keynesian 
Framework models that are based on ISLM and ADAS (see 2.3.5). They convey a major im-
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pact of real money balances level on the interest rate - a very important node of the entire 
model (Walsh 2010; Friedman & Woodford 2010; Mankiw 2014). Other models, like the 
‘Standard New Keynesian Models’ assume that the central bank, here the ECB, already ef-
fectively regulates the interest rate via ‘other means’ (e.g. the MRO). Hence the real money 
balance wouldn’t have a strong role in this context (Woodford 2003; Ireland 2001), due to 
‘non-stringent credit-extension practices’ and influential ‘short-term ECB rates’. 
Figure 21 depicts the real money balances of the euro area from 1999-2015. It immediately 
reveals that the real money balances are not very constant over time. Thus, the purchasing 
power (PP) of the money stock in the economy is changing over the time series and steadily 
hikes for the ever-expanding real money balances of all monetary aggregates (solid line).  
 
Figure 21 Money Balances in the Euro Area  
From 1999 to 2015 they gained M0/P: +133% M1/P: +157%, M2/P: +86%, M3/P: +75%. Thus, 
the real money balances change significantly in the short run: M0/P: +8.3% p.a. M1/P: +9.8% 
p.a., M2/P: +5.4% p.a., M3/P: +4.7% - the annualized average for the 16 years. This much 
corresponds with but exceeds the continuously falling income velocities (see 4.1.2). 
If we enter these figures into the QTM formula (see 2.3.2) M/P=Y/V, we obtain for M0: 
1.33=Y/0.54  Y=0.74 a negative relation for output. For M1: 1.57=Y/0.47  0.74, also a 
negative effect for output. For M2: 1.86=Y/0.63  1.17 a positive relation for output. And 
for M3: 1.75=Y/0.67  1.17 again a positive relation for output. These output relations for 
M0 and M1 behave identical (ΔY0,1=0.74), as much as M2 and M3, which also show exactly 
the same relation (ΔY2,3=1.17). A further relatively declining M2 and M3 in the future, de-
rived from Figure 19 and Figure 20, or a loss of its endogenous homogeneity and distribu-
tion, could represents a risk for the EMU, if M2+3 trends steadily persist in the future.     
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Furthermore, this calculation reveals another drawback in the QTM equation. A major dis-
crepancy arises from the annual accounting of money (stock value) and output (annual flow 
value) in QTM, while velocity and prices actually serve as proportionality coefficients, at 
least to some degree a comparison of ‘apples with pears’. Thus, a new QTM formula needs 
to be derived. Maybe only a first ‘preliminary encouragement’ is given in Formula 41: 
                       
Formula 41 A New Modern QTM Formula Comprising all Depreciating Property  
Entry: M: quantity of money (stock), V: velocity of money (proportionality parameter), Yt: output 
(stock value) at time t, Yt-1: output (stock value) at time t-1, δ: depreciation of output components 
As purchasing power needs to be defined by comparing parametric stock with stock or flow 
with flow values, and because money’s purchasing power is dependent on the real econo-
mies ‘counter value’, a stock value of ‘what money can buy’, and because the stock value is 
depreciated over time affecting all durable and non-durable goods, property and services, 
the new formula represents a fine-tuned correction of the neoclassical QTM (Formula 41).  
Hence, it is possible that the money supply for real-non-MFIs has been calculated slightly 
too tight in the past: all economic actors are to be adequately supplied with debt-free 
money, not only MFIs: and a ‘countervalue’ of what money can buy should be a reference. 
Unexpectedly, if M2 and M3 is more important for future GDP growth (at constant homoge-
neity) than the growth rates of M2 and M3 seem more important than M0, M1, and M2 for 
MTCs. Figure 19 and Figure 20 have demonstrated that expectations tend towards a lower 
relative share of future M2 and M3, which could slightly decrement economic growth rates. 
To further underline this coherency the mean monthly growth rates of all real money bal-
ances and aggregates (in %) is shown in Figure 22, which allows for a direct comparison. 
In line with the previous results, the real money balances of M2 and M3 only grow at ca. 
60% of the speed of M1 and M0, which is around 0.3% per month. Regression analysis show 
that this difference is even more pronounced for real money balances’ purchasing power.  
Demand for real money balances in the euro area seem to be constant in the first decade of 
the new millennium as M3 growth coincides with net portfolio inflows (Santis et al. 2013) - 
the remaining PP until 2015 represents demand based on the stock of all values, including 
all other investment, inflowing FDI, persistent and depreciated values. 
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Figure 22 Mean of Monthly Growth Rates of Real Money and its Aggregates  
4.1.5 Debt Generation in the Eurosystem 
Figure 23 gives the ‘big picture’ of the European public and private debt generation over 
time. Aggregated public and private debt (only domestic, international debt not included 
here) developed from approximately €10tn (Trillion) when the Euro was introduced in 1999 
to above €20tn trillion today, in 2015 (Figure 23). Equity is included as a secondary econom-
ic financing of investment: in the EMU equity is still much underrepresented compared to 
the total amount of debt, which might reveal a potential EMU investment bottle neck.  
Overall debt trends can be compared to the money stock: The sum of all European money 
today cannot repay its debt (at once), which is always about twice as high, and this ratio 
only changes mildly (see Figure 24). The same holds true for the US Dollar and most other 
currencies of fractional reserve systems. It has to be considered that the real, hidden (out 
of balance sheet), global debt is even higher. Since 2003 gross external debt and interest 
payments have increased by over 40% in the EMU due to higher national debt outpacing 
GDP growth, including major economies (Dias 2010). The EMU’s debt position vis-à-vis the 
rest of the world (ROW) is another €13.5 trillion. Adding this to domestic debt (Figure 23) 
would make $35 trillion in debt for the EMU 2Q-2015 but it is one side of a multilateral fig-
ure. Still it is three times the amount of all liquid assets available in the EMU. Considering 
the lowering velocities - there simply is not enough money to be earned to repay all debts 
with respect to maturities - a game-theoretical issue that causes defaults and bankruptcies.  
The implications again are far reaching: too high levels of inherent debt diminish V and 
economic and business growth and profit potentials, due to polarized constraints to ex-
penditures. Moreover, debt-based growth of the financial sector is shown to empoisons the 
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real economy, ‘value creation’, and GDP (Cecchetti & Kharroubi 2013) - via MFI crowding 
out - even found by BIS research, probably one of the most pro-bank organization globally.  
 
Figure 23 Credit Debt to Euro Area Residents is not Covered by M3 
 
 
Figure 24 Total Credit to Money (M3) Ratio as Macroeconomic and Crisis Indicator 
A prevalent way to illustrate a country’s debt is to present it as a share of GDP volume. This 
depiction also serves as an indicator of an economy’s ability of future debt redemption - 
how high the debt burden is with respect to economic strength. Nevertheless, benchmark-
ing thresholds are ever-increasing, even globally for most countries, and the EMU. This data 
is available on World Bank, the UN, IMF and ECB web-pages (WB 2015; ECB 2015b).  
Figure 25 illustrates Eurozone debt as loans to non-MFIs, short-term government debt, 
long-term government debt, and their respective interest rates as % of GDP.  
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Figure 25 Increasing Private and Public Indebtedness (as % of GDP), ESA95-based 
Indebtedness was already high in 1999, when the Euro was launched, at 180% of GDP. Debt 
has reached an all time high during the European debt crisis in 2012 (240%) and has only 
slightly fallen, or recovered, till today in 2015 (230%). This assures MFI extension of DT-PP.  
Of note, in many publications, newspapers, and the media, only the public debt is repre-
sented as % of GDP (and without interest), which doesn’t tell the full story. To close the 
gap, this review must report about both forms of European debt (see Figure 26). It must be 
also noted, that the common use of debt as % of GDP can be misleading as new govern-
ment debt always increases GDP too, although it doesn’t necessarily represent an equiva-
lent output power added, that repays: thus 60% of GDP was set as a limit. Government 
debt issues would be minimal (Kumhof & Benes 2012) if money creation were not private. 
This threshold level is widely used and forms a core of the third European Maastricht crite-
ria, 60% of GDP, and if slightly above the limit it must be ‘sufficiently diminished and ap-
proaching the reference value’. The truth is, it approaches 100% not 60%, which cannot be 
considered Treaty-conform, nor does it comprise the even higher private debt, somehow. 
The debt problem in the euro area has reached a new dimension putting EU core values at 
risk: political values of integrity, integration and sustainability, financial and economic val-
ues, even its legal values such as the mentioned Maastricht criteria (Criteria 2 and 3) (ex-Art 
121 of the EC treaty; now Art. 140) (see 2.1.1) and MPs are only partially responsible for it.    
The strong indebtedness in the euro area, using its ‘official ESA95 definition of debt’ (EC 
2002), is a sign of a blended fiscal, political, economic, MP and MS ‘system design’ problem.  
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Figure 26 Public and Private Debt (as % of GDP) by Euro Area Countries 
To keep a stable debt-to-output ratio, if the interest rate of nominal debt exceeds the nom-
inal growth rate of GDP (which is usually the case - also in the EMU) then New Keynesian 
econometric models predict (Friedman & Woodford 2010) that the government ‘must run a 
budget surplus’. This however virtually never happens in real-world scenarios: e.g. when 
GDP slows down they clearly must indebt: causing inherent never ending EMU system debt.  
The highest public debt (% of GDP) is inherited by Greece, and the highest private debt (% 
of GDP) is found for Luxembourg (Figure 26). Hence, it makes some sense to analyze these 
two extremes of the effective spectrum in more detail to see the range (4.1.1.1, 4.1.1.2).  
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4.1.1.1 The Case of the Greek Government Debt Crisis 
The Hellenic Republic, Greece, is a central case to study the Euro Sovereign debt crisis (EC) 
and prejudicial effects of a liquidity shortage in an economy, over time: (1) the Greek deficit 
soared to 177% of GDP in 2015 (ESA-95 Maastricht definition of debt), (2) investment fell by 
15-20%, (3) a sudden dramatic rise in official unemployment rates from 7.5% in 2008 to 
27.7%, in 2015, (4) at the same time wages started to fall again by 20%, (5) GDP fell 25% 
from 2008 till 2015, and consumption declined strongly: e.g. new car registrations dropped 
by 70%. Today, interests paid as % of GDP recently (temporarily?) declined and loans and 
deposits received by investment funds climbed again above €300 million but are still low 
(ECB 2015b). Greece faces liquidity shortage and is at risk to default on payments in 2015. 
In 2009, the Greek government revealed its true indebtedness by announcing a 12.7% 
budget deficit and public debt soaring to 121% of GDP in its 2010 drafted budget. Singly, 
the level of net external debt reached the 60% reference value without comprising any 
domestic debt (Dias 2010). In the wake of Fitch and S&P ratings that downgraded Greece 
from A- to BBB- with negative outlook, because the austerity plans announced by Papan-
dreou wouldn’t provide a sustainable long-term solution with growth, it had to pay a higher 
price for its debt and entered the economic viscous cycle of a debt driven downward spiral.   
After Moody’s also downgraded Greece’s debtor position it had to apply for EU and IMF 
financial aid packages. The first economic adjustment program (EC 2015, 5th review October 
2011) retrospectively granted international assistance loans of €65 billion Euros (€47.1bn 
by EMU member states, €17.9bn by the IMF). This sum was extended to €77.3bn under the 
GLF (Greek Loan Facility). The Second Economic Adjustment Program was approved in 
March 2012 committing the disbursement of the first and another €130bn for the years 
2012-2014 (EC 2015b). The second program foresaw €164.5bn until the end of 2014 
(€144.7bn; an additional €14.7bn) provided via the EFSF (European Financial Stability Facili-
ty) and €19.8bn by the IMF (EC 2015b). The Greek Debt restructuring sticks out in the EU 
and world, also again in 2012/13 when the majority of private holders of Greek G-Bonds 
had to swap their bonds for new long-term ones with less than 50% of the original face val-
ue - another ca. half debt relieve for Greek G-bonds of ca. €125bn (ECB 2015b; ECB 2015c).      
The first Greece bailout programs I+II sum up to approximately €294bn - not fully disbursed 
yet but the highest EU ‘bailout sum’ so far and a Third Economic Adjustment Program is 
‘under way’ and was temporarily on hold since summer 2015. An EU summit in July 2015 
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helped mobilize another €35bn to bridge the time gap (SN4070/15). EU Commission Presi-
dent Jean-Claude Junker (EC 2015c) commented that Greece has received more interna-
tional financial aid than all of Europe did by the US Marshal Plan after WWII ($127bn in cur-
rent value). It received more than all other countries and is a relatively small economy: Key 
stats of Greece are summarized in Figure 27. Greece adopted the Euro in 2001 and since 
then debt - from central government and domestic credit - has by far overshot GDP growth. 
The gap between expenses and revenues widened and was further aggravated by the FC 
and EC. The net international investment position (NIIP) fell from €-100bn in 2012 to €-
121bn in 2013 and 2014, and house prices and nominal labor cost fell ca. 10% (ECB 2015b; 
MIP scoreboard). When government debt reached 177% in 2014 unemployment rates have 
skyrocketed to 26%, as the current account balance turned neutral again after years.  
Greece already serves as a paradigm and country case showing that hyper-indebtedness 
and lack of liquidity for businesses inhibits industry value added, and market capitalization.   
The Greek debt crisis is a symptom and sign of a European challenge that has to be mas-
tered without putting its own values and future growth and vitality at risk: integrity and 
integration, financial and economic stability and prosperity for all members and people are 
questioned like the Maastricht values, i.e. criteria (Criteria 2 and 3) (ex-Art 121 of the EC 
treaty; now Art. 140) (2.1.1). The strong indebtedness of EU countries like Greece, in ESA95 
terms of debt’ (EC 2002), is a clear sign of a blended fiscal, political, and monetary systems 
problem. A better coordinated, sustainable, fiscal, political and new MS is clearly needed. 
 
Figure 27 Main Economic Indicators Time Series Analysis for Greece 
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4.1.1.2 The Case of the Luxembourg Private Debt Location 
The Grand Duchy Luxembourg - on the other hand - is a very small country in the middle of 
Europe, harboring one of its two capitals and an economy of only 0.54m people producing 
an annual GDP of about €45.5bn. Since the launch of the Euro and due to its antecedents it 
has evolved into a prime location for private debt in Europe. Luxembourg has become the 
front-runner in private non-MFI indebtedness summing up to a magnitude of about 400% 
of its yearly GDP (see Figure 26). It has the world’s highest external gross debt (ca. 4000% 
of GDP in 2014) but this position is much balanced by an even higher external volume of 
assets - mainly equity of the investment industry - leading to net assets of ca. -3000% of 
GDP in 2009, yielding a net creditor position (Dias 2010). Luxembourg’s large financial sec-
tor ranks as a financial hub in the EU, e.g. international investment fonds residing in Lux-
embourg manage more than three trillion in equity assets (Bieber et al. 2011). It receives by 
far the highest net interest payments in the euro currency block of a magnitude of nearly 
100% of its GDP (since 2003 till today, only few exceptions). These private dividend and 
interest based cash flows are considered as ‘transfer payments’ and are thus not accounted 
in GDP calculations (Mankiw 2014; IMF 2003), nevertheless they are true income. If they 
were included, Luxembourg’s GDP per capita, already the second highest in the world, 
would even outperform Qatar, an only city-sized country that harbors the third largest nat-
ural gas and oil reserves in the world. Recently, it also became a leading offshore foreign 
currency hub, e.g. 50bn Renminbi were granted by the Bank of China’s RQFII (BoC 2015). 
Only MFI transfer payment are accounted in GDP, such as interests but not the principal 
repaid (=real money), first of which contributes to 36% of its GDP (WB 2015; EC 2015a). The 
financial and service sector amounts to 80% of GDP (EC 2015a). Other EMU member na-
tions have to pay interests or only receive much lower and maximal single digit interest 
percentage magnitudes of their GDP (Dias 2010). These cash inflows help Luxembourg to 
inherit and manage the lowest government debt depicted as % of GDP in the euro currency 
block. Most of the private debt belongs to non-financial (non-MFIs) and multinational cor-
porations (MNCs), that oversee the above mentioned €3 trillion in equity assets, inter alia.   
The ‘Luxembourg financial sector’ is spatially concentrated and has features of an interac-
tive financial cluster (Porter 1998), that seems to be non-publicly managed and coordinated 
by IFCs (institutes for collaboration) and also spans a public-private governmental network 
throughout its economy: e.g. until 2015 it had offered ‘intensive and extensive’ tax incen-
4 Analytical Research Review / 4.1 / 4.1.5 
Page | 100 
 
tives and provided for premium levels of ‘banking secrecy’ in Europe, to attract incognito 
investors and MFIs; only recently it has complied some EU and OECD standards (CIA 2015). 
Luxembourg also hosts the political EU: namely the ESM (the Treaty clearly states that the 
seat of the ESM ‘must be’ in Luxembourg), the Secretariat of the European Parliament, the 
Council of the European Union (in April, June, and October; causing transactional costs). 
Also, e.g. it’s previous prime Minister Jean-Claude Junker is now the President of the Euro-
pean Commission, and it hosts ‘key translation/information services’, the European Invest-
ment Bank (EIB), and many other organizations, making it the financial-political center and 
a money-capital of the EU (EC 2012; CIA 2015; EU 2015) located in a big EU financial cluster.    
Another reason for its top private debt position is its ‘pro-finance and pro-business’ legisla-
tion, and more than that: also its jurisdiction. Many financial and legal ‘gifts’ have been 
made e.g. for private equity (PE) transactional corporations (Bieber et al. 2011). This is the 
main reason why many MNCs and PE firms source in Luxembourg to harvest all of these 
legal and tax-related benefits and because of legal risk avoidance in comparison to other EU 
countries with a stricter legislation and jurisdiction for PE firms (Bieber et al. 2011). Thus, 
other EU country’s debt and PE is preferably sourced in Luxembourg’s private debt cluster. 
Figure 28 depicts the main economic indicators of the Grand Duchy Luxembourg that can 
be compared with that of the Republic of Greece at the other end of the spectra, Figure 27.  
Both domestic credits soar since 2002, but Luxembourg has better recovered from the FC. 
Public debt of Greece limits, and private debt/assets of Luxembourg guarantees, its future.     
 
Figure 28 Main Economic Indicators Time Series for Luxembourg (LOG)  
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4.2 The ECB and Instruments of the Eurosystem 
4.2.1 The Balance Sheet of the Euro-System from 1999-2015 
Unlike any other non-MFI balance sheet in the ‘real economy’, the ECB, like most other 
central banks (like the Fed, the Bank of England, the Bank of China, the Bank of Canada, the 
Swiss National Bank, and many more), can expand it by simply creating more money, both 
virtual and real legal tender (ECB 2015b; ECB 2004; ECB 2013b). Legally and officially, it is 
only indirectly bound by its objective to maintain purchasing power or price stability (see 
2.1.3). The ECB compiles, consolidates and publishes updates of its ESCB consolidated bal-
ance sheet on a weekly-yearly basis, with all respective ECB accounting items (ECB 2013b).  
 
Figure 29 Balance Sheet Assets and Liabilities of the Euro-System  
 
Figure 39 depicts a time series co-presentation visualization to make these bigger amounts 
of data and trends more graspable, analyzable, and interpretable. Whenever the ECB ‘pur-
chases’ something with its legal tender the object becomes one of its assets and an equiva-
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lent amount of money is supplied to counterparties of the economy. However, in reality 
this is mainly MFI money (irrespective of being borrowed or earned) and doesn’t directly 
enter the real economy, only subsequently as debt [which is one of the key problems of the 
overall monetary transmission procedures (covered in chapter 4.3)]. For instance, if the ECB 
purchases gold its reserve assets rise in conjunction with its liabilities that were taken (ECB 
2013b). Weekly liabilities and assets make up the dynamic ECB’s balance sheet (Figure 29).  
 
The three main drivers of the Eurosystem’s balance sheet are: (1) financial market devel-
opments and portfolio management decisions, or changes in the value of the foreign re-
serve and own funds portfolios (ECB 2010). (2) Liquidity demand, banknotes in circulation, 
making a €100-600m seigniorage income in the profit and loss account p.a. (ECB 2010). (3) 
Liquidity-providing operations and lines in foreign currency since the FC in 2007 (ECB 2010).  
Basically, there are different types of liabilities roughly categorized in ‘to whom’, and types 
of assets, claims, securities, debt and CDs (certificates of deposit) that show ‘with whom’.  
The example of the ECB’s assets of gold deposits continuously increase and have only fallen 
during the EC due to a mild gold price shock. Although, it is officially not a task of a central 
bank to hoard gold reserves in fiat money systems, it is still very typical for most central 
banks, e.g. the Fed, etc., only Norway has sold its gold reserves in 2004 (WGC 2015) except 
seven bars for exhibition purposes. Reserves give value to savings and ‘credibility’ and must 
be ‘sufficiently liquid’ to supply ‘three month of international trade obligations’ (IMF 2008).  
At a glance, the ECB’s total assets skyrocketed in 2008 and 2012/13 as a reaction to the FC 
and EC. Liabilities and many other types of liabilities to euro area MFIs boosted backed only 
by respective assets from lending to euro area MFIs and securities of these MFIs. Monetary 
relaxing took also place in the US Fed’s balance sheet accounts, which is even more pro-
nounced and also shows strong augmentations in mortgage backed securities (MBS) and US 
treasury securities in the FC. Assets and liabilities are analyzed to provide the big picture: 
ECB’s Assets Side: During the crises a very strong accretion of ‘lending to euro area MFI (in 
Euro)’ has occurred by means taken to maintain and support ‘struggling CBs’. How well did 
the ECB, CBs and MFIs manage the crisis with the new liquidity injection? Although the cri-
sis could be ended, a huge inefficiency gap arose and has not been closed until today: The 
balance sheet items reveal four consecutive flurry liquidity injections to MFIs, three after 
the FC and one big one after the EC, in the shape of three plus one tips in Figure 29. The 
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pattern resembles M0 because the ECB is only lending legal tender and because of the ex-
treme disproportional magnitude of injections (reaching up to two-fold of the natural M0 
mean). This hectic post-crises lending in addition to the backing of euro area MFIs using tax 
payer’s money to bail-out too-big-to-fail MFIs, the ECB asset side correspond with spike in 
liabilities to euro area MFIs. Interbank lending was troubled, but most of the amplitude and 
area of the liquidity spikes can in fact be found to have ended up again in the deposit facili-
ty and/or reserves (see 4.2.2) at the same time. This reveals a high level of inefficiency and 
strategic games played behind the scene, or alternatively miscalculation of the CBs and 
ECB. It could be picturesquely viewed as the tip of an iceberg awaiting the titanic of mone-
tary transmission to the euro area. Basically, the money simply did not pass into the real 
economy where it was needed, but it was only ‘lazily sitting at the ECB’ - and still does so 
today. This way it creates costs for the EMU until today, and earns a negative interest while 
doing so, while the real economy is not supplied (functional inefficiency) (ECB 2015b). It 
takes away leverage and liquidity constraints of major MFIs that allows money deprivation.  
A significant quantity of securities - public and private bonds - have also been purchased 
after the FC in turn of the Securities Markets Programme (SMP), which was conducted as 
generally sterilized outright monetary transactions (OMTs) (ECB 2015b) totaling €218bn. 
This led to a broadening in the asset side since 2008 (pale blue, Figure 29). A closer look 
reveals that they consist of ‘troubled’ sovereign bonds from Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, 
and Ireland (ECB 2013c) of that time, as the EC had much increased the risk of sovereign 
defaults and the ECB had to ‘step-in’ and thus lost a bit in financial strength and credibility.  
Furthermore, the recent PSPP (Public Sector Purchase Program) with an announced €60bn 
per month since 2015 ending in 2016 shows its first signs. A forecast - based on ECB press 
releases - would yield total assets and liabilities of €3.55tn by the end of 2016 (ECB 2015a, 
Press Releases 4Q-2014, 1Q-2015). They could bear an unpredictable medium-term risk of 
inflation and disadvantages all EMU small savers. These non-sterilized QE actions already 
bear effect on major economic indicators in 1Q-2015: depreciation of the Euro, increasing 
European stock indexes, declining Euro benchmark bond yields, on so on with this pattern 
of stylized facts (OECD 2015). The aforementioned inefficiency in monetary transmission is 
corroborated by negative changes in the PMITM (Purchasing Managers Index) index, which 
dropped when the ECB announced its plans and then showed a recovery after 4-6 month. 
The expected economic stimulus has remained obsolete clearly demonstrating MTC ineffi-
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ciency, at least in the short-term. Remarkable, with several hundred billion Euros since 
2015 no direct economic benefit can be measured so far of these MP actions. This again 
highlights the tremendous importance of monetary transmission research, like in this study.  
ECB’s Liabilities Side: The liabilities side of the ECB’s statement of financial position, of 
course, matches at any given time, at a weekly ‘snapshot’ or ‘stock’ resolution, its respec-
tive asset side (it represents more than 800 balance sheets of the entire Euro System in 
sequential steady-chronological order)(based on ECB items, ECB 2015b). The liabilities lay 
open with whom ‘how’, and in which form obligations were taken. A major accrual was 
seen for euro area MFIs - though much of them stayed unused, as noted. Banknotes in cir-
culation represent a ‘quasi liability’ of the central bank that has steadily increased over the 
years, from €400 to €1000bn. The FC and EC had almost no effect on its growth, again indi-
cating MFI inefficiency, post-deprivation and risk aversion effects of MFIs as only little esca-
lation of non-MFI liquidity preference occurred, only a fear-driven decline in consumption. 
A shift also occurred in the revaluation accounts that bear the recent ‘value corrections of 
ECB’s equity’ as required by the ECB/ESCB accounting rules (ECB 2010): this essentially 
dates from changes in the value of e.g. US$ holding reserves (but not the SWAP lines which 
are at a fixed repo Fx rate at the time of transaction) and gold (ECB 2010). The liquidity 
measures in foreign currency after the FC had a smaller impact on the total of liabilities.  
In summary, after the FC, the ECB has provided domestic and foreign ‘liquidity lines’ to sta-
bilize the euro area’s and global banking funds markets that had at times broken down. This 
led to excess reserves and a more uncontrollable money creation potential of MFIs. To pro-
vide foreign liquidity the ECB has taken some temporary reciprocal currency arrangements 
(SWAP lines; with the Fed’s FOMC, BoE, BoC, among others) since 2008 when the global 
bank funding exchange market had at times broken down or became periodically weak. 
These means were initially temporary and were planned to be terminated in 2010. Today 
they still exist because they were inwardly converted into ‘standing swap arrangements’ 
(ECB 2015c; ECB 2013a) with major central banks (Fed, BoE, BoJ, SNB, etc.). Eventually they 
were extended as needed, indefinitely (e.g. ECB Fed SWAP lines)(Fed 2015). Interestingly, 
already since December 2007 (FRBSL 2015b), before ‘the official FC’, they have increased 
the position ‘claims on non-euro residents in foreign currency’ and helped safeguarding 
these markets (ECB 2015a, Press release 25.7.2009) from MFI inefficiency heralding the FC. 
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ECB operations: The balance sheet basically reveals all of the quantitative means taken by 
the ECB from 1999-2015. It can be used to track repurchase agreements and QE programs 
(other liabilities to euro area MFIs, and Non-Euro liabilities of euro residents) but all key 
details about the deals are not provided (with who, how, TA specifications, price, quantity). 
This might seem a trivia, but in only one of the latest QE APP program €1tn are intended to 
change hands and the public is not told any details where the money will end up. Moreo-
ver, all TAs between the ECB and the EMUs resident commercial banks (CBs) are 100% con-
fidential and can also not be checked by the public or journalism, even not by most politi-
cians. Furthermore, only ‘big’ MFIs are eligible for such operations and may create up to a 
100-fold of book money on its top. This allows for an extreme leverage allowing MFIs ‘theo-
retically’ to buy extreme amounts of precious assets plus new recycled liquidity of the MFI 
meshwork. Admittedly, this is not in accordance with a ‘free market economy’ or ‘democ-
racy’, as most of these ECB operations only benefits MFIs at the cost and sellout of the real 
economy. The ECB, cynically, still has no real alternative to recent QEs to fulfill its mandate. 
4.2.2 The ECB’s Instruments: Open Market Operations and Standing Facilities 
The ECB provides collateralized credit-liquidity in open market transactions and standing 
facilities. Additional liquidity is infused into the system in outright transactions (see 2.1.5).  
 
4.2.2.1 Open Market Operation 
Open market operations for eligible counterparties (mainly big MFIs, e.g. small CBs might 
be discriminated, like non-MFIs) consist of (1) weekly main refinancing operations (MROs) 
and (2) monthly longer-term refinancing operations (LTROs, mainly 3-month) (see 2.1.5).  
The sum of these open market operations (MRO, blue; plus LTRO, red) are depicted in Fig-
ure 30 (MRO+LTRO, green)(ECB 2015c). They mainly reflect the ECB’s assets of, and liabili-
ties to, euro area MFIs (Figure 29). Since 2008/2009 there has been a strong shift away 
from MRO (duration: 7 days) to LTROs (duration: 91-1463 days). These long-term agree-
ments, LTROs, are a technical reason for the inefficiency observed in excess reserve and 
overnight deposit facilities since the FC (ECB 2012; ECB 2015b). They were intended as ‘cri-
sis management tools’ to provide ‘more comfortable liquidity’ also in the longer-term at a 
comparably low interest rate (recently 0.05-0.15% marginal rate, in 2015; related to the 
MRO rate of 0.05%). Several asset purchase programs were already launched with outright 
operations of €0.44tn in 2015. Non-Euro operations amount to €0.14bn (USD, 9-2015). On 
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June 2014 the ECB announced targeted longer-term refinancing operations (TLTROs) as 
non-standard MP measure with a goal other than regulating the structural liquidity position 
vis-à-vis MFIs of regular outright transactions: TLTROs are officially (3-4 years maturity plus 
earlier repay options) a credit easing strategy (MTC1,5-9) for lending to non-MFIs, firms and 
households (excluding house purchases): 128 MFIs borrowed €73.8bn in the fourth tranche 
(6-2015), the peaked occurred in 12-2014 (€129.8bn), expected to total €0.5tn. 
 
Figure 30 Open-Market Operations: MRO and LTRO and Outright Operations 
4.2.2.2 Standing Facilities 
The ECB provides its two domestic Standing Facilities only to eligible MFIs: (1) Marginal 
Lending Facility (0.3%, 2Q-2015), (2) Deposit Facility (-0.2%, 2Q-2015), and now also (3) 
International SWAP lines that were also converted into standing facilities to provide major 
foreign currencies to NCBs and local MFIs. Marginal lending is an ECB service of overnight 
credits to CBs and other MFIs. Figure 31 gives an overview of the two volume trends. Most 
of the called-for-liquidity (4.2.2) was subsequently found in the deposit facility, also due to 
the ‘MFI comfortable’ LTROs (see Figure 30) which can be criticized for a lack of stringency. 
 
Figure 31 Standing Facilities: Marginal Lending and Deposit Facility 
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The marginal lending facility is a late resort for MFIs to borrow at a higher interest rate, 
over what is the current interbank lending rate. This affluence of liquidity for MFIs indicates 
a salvaged interbank lending market - at a high MTC cost - which was troubled following the 
FC+EC, which can be also seen in interbank volumes and rates (see Figure 33). 
4.2.2.3 Minimum and Excess Reserves of Credit Institution Current Accounts 
Minimum and Excess Reserves trended from €100bn to €200bn until 2012 when the re-
serve requirement drop from 2% to 1% (ECB 2015a; Governing Council 18-1-2012). MFI 
current accounts then started to soar mostly due to their aggrandized excess reserves. The 
nonrecurring negative deposit facility rate of -0.2% (ECB 2015c) since June 2014 did not 
solve the problem. Even though there is plenty of MFI liquidity, in fact more extra-cash than 
ever before, the ECB extends its QE programs in a Wicksell/Taylor-MP-manner, as inflation 
is still below target. €30bn EONIA volumes coincide with a current account and deposit fa-
cility (liabilities of the Eurosystem to EMU MFIs, see Figure 29) adding up to €200bn in 
2014, but now soar again in 2015. Previously, these liabilities were tightly managed due to 
a good reason: financial stability. Since 2013, they were decoupled from minimum reserves.   
  
Figure 32 The Eurosystem’s Current Account Covers Required and Excess Reserves 
 
4.2.3 The ECB’s Crisis Management and its Strategic Dilemma 
Since the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers (September 2009) and the unfolding of the FC 
(FRBSL 2015b; Beblavý et al. 2011) the ECB is dragooned to act as a safeguard of the finan-
cial sector - which is not its legal nor functional mandate: which is in fact to enable a fair 
MFI competition that drives down PT and interest rates and benefits financial service and 
supply across member countries. The ECB might have reacted to slow during the crises 
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(Figure 35) and might have contributed to its depth indirectly: e.g. the very slight accretion 
in MRO in 2011 and related rate expectations could have contributed to ignite the Greece 
EC. The previous chapters have revealed a deep and unsolvable dilemma between fostering 
the financial sector and an efficient and fair market competition. Hence, crisis management 
and all normal daily operations can no longer be cost-effective (due to this dilemma). The 
quandary has fatal consequences: to achieve its primary goal of 1-2% inflation, currently at 
the ZNLB-complex-of-problems (Eggerston & Woodford 2003), MP must be even more lax 
despite of the overwhelming issues of excess reserves, inefficiency, and risks of extreme 
MFI leverages that arise in fraction reserve banking - widely believed to pose new risks to 
‘financial stability’ and could cause crises and deep economic disincentives for economic 
performance. Basically, it all comes down to this: the monetary transmission is inefficient 
and too much money is required to make it effective - while the real economy is held hos-
tage by MFIs that are the only ones that still benefit from this dilemma. Vast amounts of 
new money have not much bettered the real interest rates that are key to economic stimu-
lus and investment (Mankiw 2014; Friedman & Woodford 2010).  The ‘FC bailouts’ of more 
than €4 trillion of guarantees and cash injections have not helped much the real economy. 
4.3 Monetary Transmission in the Euro Area 
4.3.1 Interest Rates in the Euro Area 
The key interest rates in the euro area, the EMU, are set by the ECB’s Governing Council 
(ECB 2004) that meets twice a month and publishes a schedule of planed meetings in which 
decisions about the key European rates are made: (1) main refinancing operations (MRO) 
including LTROs, (2) deposit facility, (3) marginal lending facility, and (4) others (TLTRO, etc). 
Decisions are made in accordance to these meetings and can be spontaneously scheduled.  
These Key European Rates, especially MROs and the new LTROs and T-LTROs, are regulating 
the direct MFI rates, and money market interest rates, interbank rates. A chart analysis in 
Figure 33 directly detects a more ‘stringent’ effect on the very short-term interest rates, 
such as EONIA overnight deposits (Euro OverNight Index Average, 1 TARGET day, ACT/360, 
p.a.), or EURIBOR (e.g. Euro Interbank Offered Rate, e.g. one month). This is because MFIs 
only lend and borrow legal tender money on the interbank lending market from each other 
and no virtual book money is in play (Görgens et al. 2014; ECB 2015b; Eonia, Euribor rates). 
Of note, the real capacity of MFIs to generate returns on this money is not reflected as val-
4 Analytical Research Review / 4.3 / 4.3.1 
Page | 109 
 
ue in any of these rates - meaning that liquidity has not to be (much) competed for. EONIA 
and EURIBOR are virtually only redundant rates of intermittent market that act like money 
basins were banks further manage their liquidity: but falsely imply efficiency of MP. 
 
Figure 33 Interest Rates of the Short-term Money Market: Eonia and Euribor 
 
All future returns on that money show no impact on the interbank lending market. Liquidity 
restoration of the ‘interbanking market’ came at a high cost and a loss of MFI competition. 
The trend of a tight interbank pass-through (PT) spans only few exceptions in the FC and EC, 
when the EONIA and 1M-Euribor dropped below the MRO rate for approximately a year 
(see Figure 33). Till today the overnight deposit rates still tightly resemble the MRO and 
became slightly negative with the deposit facility rate (-0.2%). MFIs recently pay money for 
short-term lending: e.g. 1-Week-EURIBOR (6-2015): -0.129%, EONIA (6-2015): -0.12%. Many 
economists believe that these negative interest rates indicate ‘a big flaw’ in the financial 
market and in the MS architecture of the Eurosystem (Reuters 2014; Friedman & Woodford 
2010), as the ECB faces a dilemma that there is no real alternative to its MP.  In the com-
munity it might also cause discrimination against smaller banks, and weaker economies, in 
the periphery (Reuters 2014): ‘negative interest rates show cracks in the banking system’.  
The overall economic and idiosyncratic behavior of MFIs/CBs indicates a deficient monetary 
transmission at its very origin - directly after the money is passed over to credit institutions. 
An overview of all ECB’s ‘Key Rate’ decisions is given in Figure 34: an overlay with the 
EURIBOR and 10-Y-G-Bonds is given to readout market effectiveness. The EURIBOR is a daily 
reference rate for many financial products (Sperber 2015), comprising forward rate agree-
ments, interest rate future contracts, interest rate SWAPs, among others (Görgens et al. 
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2014). The 1-year EURIBOR and the 10-year G-bonds still follow the ECB MRO rate, but the 
longer the term or maturity date the less tightly correlated with the MRO rate, and also the 
PT increases with the duration or term and G-bond specifications (ECB 2015b; ECB 2015c). 
Besides the key interest rates the Governing Council has also announces several relevant 
non-standard monetary policy measures post-FC: (1) enhanced credit support, (2) securities 
markets program, (3) outright monetary transactions, or (4) modalities of the early repay-
ment of funds raised through the three-year refinancing operations (ECB 2015b).  
The prospect of the introduction of the Euro in 1999 has led to declining interest rates (1-
year EURIBOR, 10-year G-bonds) in the euro area for five consecutive years (see Figure 34). 
Later, the 1-year EURIBOR has fallen from 8% in 1995 to 3% in 1999. The 10-year G-bonds 
behaved in a similar way but 1-2 points higher. They always responded to the ECB’s key 
interest rate with some latitude. The 1-year EURIBOR also follows the MRO rate in a tighter 
and much more responsive manner, while the 10-year government bonds (G-bonds) also 
react in the same direction but more loosely due to maturity dates and speculations. The 
interest rates also play a pivot role in the international financial markets. In concurrence 
with other international key interest rates and financial variables they determine the Fx 
rates, influence the interest and SWAP rates, and the global financial streams and flows. 
Figure 35 depicts the concert of four key central bank rates: the Fed, ECB, BoE and the BoC.  
 
Figure 34 Key Central Interest Rates in the Euro Area, 1Y-Euribor and 10Y-G-Bonds 
The overlay of key central bank rates of the ECB (EMU), BoE (UK), BoC (China), and Fed (US) 
in Figure 35 illustrates how interdependent the international financial sectors are - already 
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at the central bank harmonization is built-in and also downstream financial markets react. 
The Fed’s FFR seems to have reacted faster during the FC, and more appropriate (see job 
creation post crisis), and has influenced the ECB reaction that affected the BoE. All three 
might have affected the BoC that sets its key interest rate at a higher corridor of 5-7.5%. 
 
Figure 35 Key Interest Rates of the Fed, ECB, BoE and BoC 
4.3.2 Pass-Through and Interest Heterogeneity in the Euro Area 
The ‘pass-trough’ (PT) is used as an indicator (Paries et al. 2014; Blot 2013; Sorensen & 
Werner 2006; Sander & Kleimeier 2004; and refs herein) not as absolute measure for the 
effectiveness of the monetary transmission (due to a fractional reserve banking multiplica-
tion). Defined as the difference of nominal, or real, interest yield over the ECB’s MRO rate it 
provides a statistical indication of how well the ECB’s MP can regulate the market interest 
rate, and the relative effect on how efficient and effective the monetary transmission oper-
ates in Euroland’s economy. Note, a PT of zero can still indicate a highly inefficient system 
(in the lending market, whenever MFI book money is involved) if new money is released by 
the ECB - as it represents an entire positive CF for MFIs: it means up to 100-fold of princi-
pals repaid and up to 100-fold interests for only 1% temporary minimum reserve deposits 
for MFIs - and equal amount of debt for non-MFIs and the real economy: ‘the biggest eco-
nomic scandal ever for any democracy or free market economy’, could be the headlines of 
the media coming up soon. If the EMU’s financial sector would converge towards more effi-
ciency and homogeneity the PT of 1-Year Euribor and 10-Y-G-Bonds would progressively 
decline, however even the most efficient financial products have PTs (see Figure 36). The 
following rule or ‘fractional reserve related financial product PT law’ can be derived from 
extensive PT studies (only key results are shown): the more direct a financial product is 
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traded only between MFIs - the more real ECB money is in play per purchase - hence the 
lower and more efficient the PT (1-Y-EURIBOR, see Figure 33). Vice versa, the more book 
money, fractional reserve banking, of MFI is in play, the more a financial product is paid 
from a normal banking account or depot, the less real ECB money is in play, the more credit 
extension is involved by MFIs, and the less efficient is the PT (e.g. 10Y-G-Bonds) and MTC.  
 
Figure 36 Pass-Through Trend Development of 1Y-Euribor and 10Y-G-Bonds 
(1) Fractional Pass-Through in the Euro Area 
The development of the PT (Figure 36) shows a lot of fluctuation over time especially for 
the 10Y-G-Bonds. The net interest margin (an US equivalent of PT but broader and account-
ing/tax based) of US banks falls more consistently and steadily by 1% since years until 2Q-
2015 (FRBSL 2015a). Importantly, one should not forget that the PT must be multiplied by 
mtotal as MFIs can rent out much more per 1€: PTtotal≈[(100%+i)*mtotal (100%+i as the princi-
pal is fully paid back to MFIs in real legal tender[exception: default]; only a set of differen-
tial equations could better and dynamically describe what really happens). The total money 
multiplication (mtotal) must be higher than m1-3 and is extended by cycles, estimated: 10-40.  
Despite of lacking this multiplication in the real world (1% PT can be a 1010-4040% gain for 
MFIs; mtotal and not the PT determines MFI ‘real profitability’ - PT only explains financial P+L 
account profitability that is more meaningless for MFIs and only meaningful for firms/non-
MFIs) the PT must be still used as a standard to reveal the major trends - as mtotal cannot be 
calculated due to a lack the comprehensive MFI CF data over time - even the ECB cannot.  
Hence the PT (difference between market rate and MRO) still has to be used as global indi-
cator to reveal the trends of interest-PTs, MTC-efficiency, and ECB rate market-penetrance.  
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PTs of various market interest rates can be tracked. This analysis hampered by (1.1) euro 
area cross-country heterogeneity, and (1.2) and overall heterogeneity of financial products. 
Previous research has found a sluggish loose heterogeneous interest-rate PT across finan-
cial products and across euro area boarders (Sorensen & Werner 2006; Paries et al. 2014): 
For 2006 a ‘persistent fragmentation’ and ‘lack a integration’ was diagnosed in the EMU 
retail banking sector, mainly due to a lack of local generic competition. Rates on corporate 
loans appeared to react ‘more efficiently’, followed by mortgage loans, time deposits, con-
sumer loans and rates of account deposits (Sorensen & Werner 2006; Paries et al. 2014): 
          
           
                
                 
                   
  
 
Formula 42 Efficiency of Pass-Through of Interest Rates (EMU, 2006) 
 
New PT research can now be based on the steady-state-approach ECB/2001/18 (ECB 2003) 
to elucidate the trends and emerging big picture that requires updating empirical research. 
The MFI’s PT to non-MFIs (both residents) is to be seen as key monetary transmission ele-
ment that is relevant for assessing and evaluating the performance of the ECBs MPs. 
The architecture of interest rates is more complex, difficult to systematically assess, and a 
precise weighting is hard to handle due to customized lending. Nominal interest rates often 
represent only standardized products. Debtor’s financial characteristics often have to be 
fully disclosed to MFIs that can be used for ‘MFI network actions’ and interest rate settings.  
On account of this monetary and financial research makes use of ‘normalized, standardized 
and annualized’ APRC (annual percentage rate of change) and NDER (narrowly defined ef-
fective rate) rates. APRC (APRC, Council Directive 87/102/EEC) includes the total of all 
charges, a risk premium or discount, and hereby is to be seen as the ‘effective rate’, as op-
posed to the ‘announced rate’ (ECB 2003). Generally, all annualized MFI interest rates used 
in this study refer to ‘agreed rates’ between reporting MFIs and the non-reporting non-
MFIs. These agreed rates are ‘closed-door’ negotiated and charges are generally excluded if 
not noted otherwise (Formula 43), and are represented as APRC or NDER, according to: 
                      
 
 
 
 
         
Formula 43 The APRC and NDER Formula (Council Directive Definition) 
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Entry: i: agreed interest rate p.a. reported by the MFI, n: number of interest capitalization periods 
for the deposit and loan per year (1: yearly, 4: quarterly, 12, monthly); if the interest payments are 
made  at a higher frequency (n) then APRC increases slightly; aim: higher interest rate comparability  
The NDER refers to an annual basis and is defined as the interest rate that equalizes as the 
present value (PV) of all commitments other than charges (that may apply) (ECB 2003). The 
NDER is equivalent to the interest rate component of the APRC, but the APRC shall take all 
additional costs (cost of administration, enquiries, guarantees, insurances, preparation 
costs) into the i component (ECB 2003); but it is not known how well this is done by MFIs.  
In fact 43 out of 48 (89%) MFI interest rate statistics don’t include all charges or fees. Only 
for consumer credit and loans for houses the APRC is required by regulations. The annual-
ized agreed rate (AAR) used is the percentage of standardized interests on a yearly basis.  
 
(1.1) The Heterogeneity of Interest Rates in the EMU 
Using the moving ‘weighted average - AAR based NDER method’ for financial products per 
country, heterogeneity can simply be shown by visualizing all country’s NDERs over time. 
The NDER trends for households and industry are depicted in Figure 37 and Figure 38. 
The spread in between countries (indicating PT variance) can be illustrated as the standard 
deviation (that is the square root of the variance, see 3.2.1) of the mean (see Figure 39). 
The unweighted form of country-heterogeneity is to be used as it is more indicative for the 
convergence and functioning of the EMU’s retail banking sector as the effects of the na-
tional banking compartments need to be analyzed and not a representative average. Nev-
ertheless, the unweighted average cost of borrowing in this case is in fact very similar to 
the weighted one and a main difference is only the variance or deviation (see Figure 27). 
The convergence was previously tested and evaluated as highly heterogeneous and a lack 
of competition was found in retail banking, implicated in 2006 (Sorensen & Werner 2006). 
Still, it is time to revisit such assays with new data. The analysis reveals that recent interest 
convergence still remains a challenge but has slightly improved (10%, disregarding the cri-
ses). But it still reveals a too high level of market inefficiency, as it did before. But the con-
clusion differs: due to fractional reserve banking the inefficiency must be multiplied by 
mtotal which is a tremendously higher inefficiency of monetary transmission as was previ-
ously reported, or concluded. Concomitantly, the effect of the FC+EC (Greece, Cyprus, Por-
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tugal, etc.) have clearly exacerbate the convergence of NDER interest rates (Figure 39), 
which is also statistically significant (p<0.05). Furthermore, the variance, standard deviation 
and the SEM are significantly heightened after the FC and EC (p<0.005) for both the NDER 
of corporations and households. The joining of the new stage III EMU member countries 
with it inherent structural and economical differences, also including differing constrains in 
retail banking sectors and MFIs, has only partially contributed to the generic effect. Mainly 
the developments in seven EMU Countries explain the phenomenon, as expected.      
 
Figure 37 NDER for Households and Moving Weighted Average 
 
Figure 38 NDER for Corporations Moving Weighted Average 
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The mean of the corporation NDER is slightly higher than for households, likely, due to het-
erogeneity and a lower effective contribution of additional fees and charges to it. It is also 
possible that huge amounts of ‘selective betterments’ are not fully reported by MFIs.   
 
Figure 39 Unweighted Average of EMU Member NDER for Households and Corporations  
 
Another interest indicator that is widely accepted to be highly important for measuring the 
financial heterogeneity of European countries is the meaningful ‘secondary market yields’ 
indicator e.g. of harmonized long-term interest rates on 10-year G-Bonds (see Figure 40).  
The overall trend is clearly decreasing from 1999 till today. This is also seen for other relat-
ed yields of G-bonds (see 6.1 Figure S15), comprising most relevant spot and forward rates.  
This is also an achievement of the ECB’s MP that was economically and fiscally required. 
Strong counter movements happened during the FC+EC (i.e. Greece, Cyprus, Italy, Spain, 
and Portugal). High GDP countries converge, low GDP members diverge. Financially trou-
bled nations further disband - social gaps continue to grow (e.g. GINI index). Heterogenei-
ties and very different MFI constrains persist throughout Europe. A lag or delay of political 
reforms (fiscal, monetary, political, economic reforms; compared with the US monetary 
entity) is the reason in a steadily transforming EMU market.  
A low level of such long-term interest rates - with a 2% tolerance to the three best rates - is 
relevant for the fourth article of the Maastricht Criteria (see 2.1.1). They are annually as-
sessed by the ECB and reported to the European Commission (Art 121 of the Treaty).  
The broadening of the bond yield spread, mainly from Euro Crisis countries, represents also 
a crisis of confidence into the ability of countries like Greece to repay its debt obligations in 
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the future, which was also reflected in the time charts of Greek Credit Default Swaps (CDS). 
Aside, related ‘naked CDS’ speculation was prohibited in several European countries includ-
ing Germany after the FC to prevent speculation misuses (Sperber 2015; ECB 2015b).  
 
Figure 40 Harmonized Interest Rates on 10-Year Government Bonds 
 
The distance (difference) between the average NDER’s and the ECB’s MRO depicts the PT. It 
reveals that the EMU NDER-PT is on the rise again due to a widening lack of competition.  
 
Figure 41 Further Increasing Pass-Through Inefficiency and MFI’s ‘Profits’ in the EMU 
 
Figure 41 shows that the financial markets become less efficient and more profitable for 
the banking sector in total. There is an ongoing upward trend of the margin from 1.5% to 
3% in only 12 years (from 2003-2015). Meaning: the MFI sector’s transmission into the real 
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economy is almost twice as inefficient as it was before: this is the reason of rising real in-
terest rates despite of a lower MRO (see 4.3.8.1). Although this effect was partly already 
found and described in 2003 (Sander & Kleimeier 2004; Sorensen & Werner 2006), this 
study has its starting point in 2003 and provides important new results and a more correct 
and better interpretation. Furthermore, the PT margin is just ‘trend-indicative’ - meaning 
that the true inefficiency-increase could be even much higher than just two-fold, in reality, 
due to mtotal. Potential ‘profits’ of MFIs are on the rise due to the new legal and MP setting. 
 
(1.2) The Heterogeneity of Financial Products (Speed and Extent to Adjust) 
The second of the two questions deals with the heterogeneity of financial segments and 
products. Time course analysis must reveal examples of the various interest rates of (A) 
households and (B) corporations in the euro area. These are further to be unmerged with 
regard to principal amount and grouped by time of lending (maturity) for a direct compari-
son. Figure 42 and Figure 43 summarize interest rates for loans and deposits of corpora-
tions and consumers and MRO and the (fractional) PT (see Figure 44).  
While the PT of interests-receivables of the real economy has much declined the PT to-be-
paid by the real economy (non-MFIs) has grown. Especially since the FC and more for 
households that have less negotiation power than for corporations, which borrow higher 
volumes per contract. The term ‘Fractional PT’ is introduced to remind the reader of mtotal. 
 
Figure 42 Interest Rate Diversity for Corporations and Consumers in the Euro Area 
Although EMU MFIs should have more liquidity and leverage available and a higher mtotal 
they still increased their interest returns and diminished competitive market forces. For all 
that the ROE is still lower than before due to Basel III (BIS 2011), which is a bit misleading.  
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Figure 43 Important Corporate Interest Rates and Mean (Fractional) Pass-Through 
 
Figure 44 Fractional Pass-Through Trends of Financial Products in the Euro Area 
Figure 45 further analyzes these data to find the PT deviation and extend order of PTs for a 
further comparison with previous scientific studies (Sorensen & Werner 2006; Blot 2013).   
The pass-through deviation is a measure of the stringency of the market interest rates for 
specific financial products, and how they follow the central bank rate (e.g. MRO). As before: 
the higher the pass-through-deviation the less stringent the interrelation. Hence, a sequen-
tial order of the individual stringencies for financial products can be derived (see Figure 45).  
The highest standard deviation is found for household’s overnight deposits (NDER). They 
are also the most fractionated population of all private customers with the least amount of 
negotiation power (per deal). They are also only very poorly organized and there is not a 
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strong political representation. The same holds true for the second highest amount of devi-
ation (= the second least stringently following the ECB rate): the APRC for consumption of 
households. The APRC of household’s mortgage-backed house loans has only a PT stringen-
cy comparable with firm’s overnight deposits (NDER), reflecting a poor negotiation power, 
in a ‘Financial Sector Structure’ model - in the style of Porter’s five forces (Porter 2008). 
 
 
Figure 45 Deviation and Extent Order of Pass-Through Rates  
The highest stringency of fractional PT trends is found for corporation’s lending and depos-
its (NDER, >2 years), again, due to higher negotiation power and potential ‘bank-firm col-
laborations’, probably also unreported contracts could theoretically exist. Figure 43 shows 
that the PT is lower for firms borrowing a higher sum, again a result of negotiation power.  
The highest PT and thus the lowest retail banking market efficiency can be found for the 
consumer’s APRC of household consumption, in this set of financial products. But customer 
credit card (revaluation) accounts probably have the highest and most extreme PT: The 
consumer’s credit card credits (ECB 2015b) are unique in the way that they are the only 
rates that are ‘completely non-responsive’ to the ECB rates in the euro area. In fact some of 
them are even inversely correlated, meaning the ECB’s rate strongly fall and they move up. 
With respect to the ‘extent of PTs’ they equilibrate almost at double the level of the already 
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high rates for consumer’s revolving loans and overdrafts. Market forces are less strong 
here, and a lack of competition might be found under the disguise of fierce competition. 
Additionally, consumers are willing to use several credit card systems that do not differ 
much in terms and conditions, because they only want ‘to be able to pay everywhere’. Pay-
ing with credit card is creating a short-term debt that is converted into cash flows for MFIs.  
In summary, these results reveal the ‘fractional pass-through’ and its features and dynamics 
in the markets of financial products. The previous understanding (Sorensen & Werner 2006; 
Blot 2013)(see Formula 42) could also be advanced in several other aspects: (a) time (in-
cluding recent years), (b) comparability of data sets (full uniformity, harmonized data), (c) 
extent and (d) stringency of the pass through, which is summarized in Formula 44 vs. 43. 
     
                  
       
          
                   
        
              
                   
             
 
Formula 44 New Order of (Fractional) Pass-Through Stringency (based on Figure 45) 
Entry: E: Stringency denoted as PT efficiency of interest rates in relation to the ECB’s monthly MRO 
rate, i: nominal interest rate, cons.: consumer, corp: corporation  
4.3.3 The Forex-Effect of the ECB’s Monetary Policy 
The public money supply by the ECB and the private money multiplication by MFI, not only 
affects the prices in the euro area it also affects the purchasing power (PP) of the EMU’s 
currency in the world, found in exchange rates. According to recent macro-economical the-
ory, there are two effects: (1) an increase in the money supply proportionally lowers the 
exchange rate (in indirect quotation) and decreases the PP per unit of currency, and causes 
(2) effects associated with a lowering of the interest rates, e.g. shift in portfolio investment. 
This plays a key role in monetary transmission (MTC2, MTC16), while the international sys-
tem generally converges towards purchasing power parity (PPP), due to the ‘law of one 
price’ and short to medium-term ‘arbitrage equilibria’, and since exchange rates (Fx) also 
have an impact on domestic prices, inflation, imports/exports, investment, and GDP. 
(1) Effect of MP on the Foreign Exchange Market in the EMU 
Empirically matching the real world data with the theoretical textbook ‘monetary Fx model’ 
(Formula 19) uncovers more noisy, less stringent, and more complex trends that is, howev-
er, generally still much in line with the theory, also if diverse time delays and ‘major shifts’ 
are incorporated (not shown here): Figure 46 pinpoints the development of the three key 
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important Fx rates/indexes for the EMU: the quarterly US$/€ spot rate, the EER-19 spot 
index, which reflects the euro area’s total exchange rate changes with selected major trad-
ing partner in the world, and the Chinese Renminbi, also shown here as a CNY/€ index.  
 
Figure 46 Major Euro Exchange Rate Developments from 1999 till 2015 
Upon the Euro’s launch in 1999 a slight depreciation period occurred (due to the fixed intra 
EU rates, economical circumstances and expectations) until it became the common curren-
cy in spring 2002. Since then, and until 2010, it was strongly gaining up to 40% (max. 66%, a 
ca. 6-year-long 2003-2009 high) against the US dollar and the Chinese Renminbi (ca. 40%). 
The EER-19, a weighted average of all main trading partners of the EMU-19, had a lower 
amplitude, and was influenced by the CNY and US Dollar (ca. 15% increase), at that time.    
This increase in PP of the Euro, from 2002 to 2010 reflects the heightened demand for Euro 
with respect to the other currencies, since the Euro became the second most traded cur-
rency in the world (ca. 40%) in 2010 (BIS 2013). It then started to fall back to 33% ‘on one 
side’ of all global daily shares in 2012 (BIS 2013). At the same time the exchange rate of the 
Euro lost its previous gains. This also stems from global demand for Euro as monetary vehi-
cle (BIS 2013)(ca. 40%, o.c.). The velocities with non euro area residents grew temporarily.  
In 2010 Euro dwindling was further globally evoked by the first news releases of an upcom-
ing sovereign debt crisis, which must have shifted also the demand stemming from using 
the Euro as payment vehicle back towards the older currencies like the US dollar (BIS 2013; 
Economist 2010). Exporting firms benefited, especially in Germany (place 1, 29% of ex-
ports), the Netherlands (2., 9.3%), France (3., 7.9%), as exports became more affordable.  
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(2) The MP Effects on International Portfolio Investment 
A second effect of MP induces shifts in exchange rates that drive interest rates and prefer-
ences in portfolio investment. The exchange rate is the co-action of many effects (Giddy 
1994; Sperber 2015). Among them: (1) the intermediation of different price levels, domes-
tic and foreign (Fx strives for a general PPP). (2) This also includes financial products as 
shown in John Maynard Keynes ‘Interest Rate Parity Theory’, when arbitrage on interest 
rates mediates Fx market changes (whenever the interest spread > SWAP rate). In general, 
the higher the interest rate (and its future expectations) the stronger the Fx rate, as the 
demand for the currency increases, including its usage as monetary vehicle. Both effects, 
(1) price level (PPP) and (2) interest parity, are thus to be addressed by comparing the euro 
area with other countries, e.g. the US, which offers the advantage that both economies are 
of comparable size and interdependency making a comparison more meaningful. 
The price levels (CPI, 1998=100, World Bank) in the US and euro area (19 countries), from 
1999 until today (2015), have both developed in a very similar fashion: mainly, US inflation 
is only marginally higher (ΔπEMU,US=0.27%). In theory, the MTC-effect of this difference 
should slightly affect the Fx-rate equilibrium (Giddy 1976; Sperber 2015) (i.e. a very slight 
depreciation of the dollar) in periods of a higher inflation in the US as compared to the 
EMU (see 2.4.2). The spread of the CPI index has had a partial effect in 2002-2007, when 
inflation was higher in the US (with a minor exception in 2003). This seems to have added 
to depreciation of the Fx rate. When the gap was closed the Fx rate began to return, and 
after the FC+EC it librated in the Dollar-appreciating direction in 2015 - back to its initial 
course of 1.10 $/€. Reasons are a stronger economic recovery in the US as compared to 
Europe and the ongoing bad news about the EC. Since 2010, the US has created more jobs 
than Europe, Japan, and the top advanced 36 economies of the world in sum: over 13 mil-
lion people (backed by IMF data, and the White House, still a 0.17m/month) many via new 
businesses less than five years old, while the labor participation rate has only slightly fallen 
(according to (WB 2015), ca. -1.4%,- due to aging, learning, and more disabilities).  
It is known from several previous studies that the employment level is an indicator for real 
future GDP growth and can appreciate the Fx rate: announcements of the payroll employ-
ment rate have impact on the Fx rate: abbreviated to ‘employment stabilizes the US dollar’ 
and also the Euro, and also evokes investment (Harris & Zabka 1995). Previous economic 
theories saw two main reasons: (1) a higher employment raises expected inflation, and (2) 
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causes a tightening of the credit market and the probability of a future restrictive MP 
(Harris & Zabka 1995). Based on the data in this study here, both theories don’t fully ex-
plain the effect, as expected inflation and expected MP did not always react this way. 
Hence, a new theory needs to update the old theory: (1) the Fx rate is affected more on the 
basis of real GDP natural trends and the job market, (2) market data and expectation about 
money, inflation and financial markets, and (3) global financial yields and rates.  
The overlay of US/EMU real GDP-ratio and p.a. Fx-ratio trends are shown in Figure 47: an 
upward trend of US real GDP (faster than in the EMU) appreciates the Fx rate [drops the 
$/€]. This correlation becomes stronger over time: after 1 month R=0.38, after 1-2 years 
R=0.55. Other effects were in play in 2002-2005, and blurring and delaying happens.   
 
Figure 47 The Fx Rate ($/€) depends on Real GDP but not on M2 (% of GDP) [US/EMU] 
Figure 47 also shows that the money supply, M2 (money and quasi money), does not seem 
to pull the Fx-trigger even if the ratio of M2 as % of GDP between the US and EMU is taken. 
Comparing this normalized level of M2 between the US and the EMU seems to break with 
the monetaristic assumption ‘that (mainly) money drives inflation and the Fx market’: Even 
the opposite could be indicated in this figure: the reason for this is FRI (see chapter 4.1.1). 
The second effect of the ECB’s MPs on the Fx market is portfolio related and return pro-
voked. Figure 48 delineates the margin of 10-year G-Bonds between the US and the EU.  
As is claimed by Keynes’ Interest Parity Theory (2.3.8) the country-difference in yield corre-
lates with the Fx rate. A higher interest rate in the EMU (green area) coincides with a lower 
Fx rate [€/$, direct quotation], or with a higher indirect quotation [$/€] (see Figure 48). 
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Figure 48 Long-term Interest Rates and Fx Rates in the Euro Zone and the US 
 
Around 2000, the margin turned negative (yellow area) as US bonds became more attrac-
tive, and the directly quoted Fx rate [€/$] also surged indicating appreciation of the US Dol-
lar, by the interest rate settings at a regular transmission level (see MTC2). This margin still 
seems to be predictive and causally relevant for global Fx rates, with only infrequently oc-
curring historic exceptions and shifts. Comparing the EU/US 10-Y-G-Bond interest ratio with 
the Fx ratio [€/$] highlights this dynamic dependency and the margin of the two is in fact 
mathematically explicatory for the Fx trend rate (right) (R=0.7, data stationary normalized). 
Interestingly, both margins (demarcated at horizontal axis) much resemble each other (see 
left+right), based on which they become predictive for future Fx trends: e.g. the yellow area 
predicts that the US$ will appreciate to the Euro in 2015, which in also seems to happen. 
4.3.4 Timing of the Money Effect - Implications for Monetary Policy 
In order to assess, understand and optimize MP, one has to derive the parameters and ki-
netics of its MTC effects in monetary transmission processes and mechanism. This is essen-
tially important to feed new or the existing predictive MP models with the correctly deter-
mined variables, and time or timing plays of course a pivot role here. As anticipated in di-
verse MP models (see 3.2.3) timing refers to the fact that a MP decision is made at any time 
along the time scale and each decision point in time has overlapping effect along the time 
line with all of the effects of the other decision point - leading to a huge overlap of causes 
and effects over time - that transmit into the real economy via MTCs (see 4.3.8).  
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Among all model approaches to estimate the impact and timed influence of a change in 
money supply (Δ%M0) on the real economy a correlation model of price stability (Δ%HICP) 
and economic growth (Δ%GDP) was performed to roughly model the key dynamical trends. 
Today there is only little knowledge about the precise timing of these complex effects. To 
solve this complex problem with a new approach - as the VAR analysis models (see 3.2.3) 
that are widely used by monetary experts and scientists have some draw-backs - an alter-
native approach was chosen here: ‘a Time-Matrix Pearson Correlation Time Lag Test’. This 
tests, seemingly previously also already known as ‘dynamic correlation studies (DC)’ (Walsh 
2010 and references herein) was performed with the new consolidated ECB data to carve 
out the respective time windows of effects to a series of MP change-steps. The weighted 
overlay of all serial effects yields a prediction or description model of MTC effects, here 
focusing on prices and GDP growth due to a requirement to simplify. Figure 49 provides the 
result of a 16-year DC study conducted on %ΔM3 on %Δ HICP, real and nominal %ΔGDP.  
 
Figure 49 DC Test for EMU M3, Inflation, real and nominal GDP (1999-2015) 
For real GDP (red line), in a 15 year projection, a ‘π/4-cosine sinusoidal reminiscent har-
monic oscillation effect of R for M3 on economic growth becomes apparent and is more 
distinct than the effect of M0, because M3 is further downstream of the monetary transmis-
sion channel and represents the real economy’s ‘available liquid assets’ for investment and 
consumption. To some extent this also hold true for nominal GDP (blue line) but the net 
effect is reduced due to the price channel effects. The timed effect of HICP shows also a 
sinusoidal reminiscent harmonic oscillation but at a 1.5-fold lower frequency (green line).    
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Put simply, a punctual monetary stimulus has on average a slight positive impact on GDP 
and inflation in the very short run, followed by a slight negative in year one and two. After 
three years it has again a positive effect and the effects decompose later on due to a differ-
ent frequency see Figure 49. The strongest correlation on prices was seen after four to five 
years. Signal-to-noise-tests (t-test) reveal that a higher DC correlation also indicates a prob-
able stronger effect: a forecast or impulse response function (IRF) is the sum of all effects.    
An increase of M3 has a direct and immediate effect on GDP, real GDP and nominal GDP, 
while prices are more rigid until year three after a quantity stimulus (the media MP channel 
is not included here, only the quantity changes of M3 - other effects could be modeled in).  
The strength of the predictability geometrically declines with the forecasted number of 
future years and thus also the error based on the correlation and probable strength of the 
effect. Nevertheless, the model clearly predicts that an inflationary period is followed by a 
deflationary phase at a high confidence interval (p<0.05), e.g. at seven to eight years post-
M-stimulus. Simply due to the oscillatory behavior the overall averaged effect cancels out 
to almost 0: the classical notion that money is neutral in the long-run. However, the effect 
declines with time geometrically, meaning if MP finds the right ‘time windows’ to stimulate 
the economy with new money and then - and only then - it can turn positive and drive GDP. 
Compared to a VAR analysis prediction it is likely to be more robust to shocks. VAR analysis 
are more affected by shocks like the FC+EC, and other runaway values. As a result well-
adjusted p-VAR more pessimistically predicts GDP growth in the long-run at steady prices (6 
Figure S3), due to the periodic occurrence of shocks [real GDP and price VAR prediction 
both turn relatively optimistic without the crises, which leads to ambiguous interpreta-
tions]. Although it yields too pessimistic prospect for future real GDP it still relinquishes a 
periodic and oscillatory ‘sinusoidal nature’ in the future time-line. This was also divulged as 
a common feature of the DC method, further corroborating that MP decisions (per time 
intervals) cause sinusoidal aggregate MTC waves of (1) different frequency and (2) ampli-
tude, and (3) depending on output a different shift of the oscillatory behavior.     
Thus, MP stimulates the amplitudes of MTC waves and timing is the key to its net benefits.   
The Dynamic Time Matrix Pearson Correlation Forecast is probably new: it is less prone to 
errors and runaway values and based on multiple VAR-chain extensions of R values. It is 
also more flexible and adaptive. A DC-forecast for the EMU is given in (6 Figure S4). If the 
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growth of money were knowable, it could provide an even more powerful forecasting tool. 
It can be also used to extract diverse DC-forecast-coefficient matrixes of MP effects on out-
put variables - also by comparing historic periods: for instance the effect of M3 on HICP in 
the Pre-Euro time (1991-2003) has had a significantly different R-matrix (see 6 Figure S5). 
With regard to recent ECB €1tnQE program (60bn/m) the new DC results advise a more 
careful raising of EMU base money due to the four to five year delayed effect on prices.   
4.3.5 Decomposition and Quantification of ECB’s Monetary Policy 
Using multivariate regression models it is also possible to quantify these individual effects 
of a money supply on GDP and inflation: Growth of n+rGDP (in %) and M0-3 (in %) yields re-
gression at a confidence interval of up to R=0.82 (adjusted R=0.8): in very short summary 
and only very roughly MP should homogenously disperse more money in 2015 (Figure 50 
3D Graph Indicating a ‘Recommendable Direction’ for the ECB’s MPs in 2015). 
 
Figure 50 3D Graph Indicating a ‘Recommendable Direction’ for the ECB’s MPs in 2015 
 
Using the existing dataset it is also possible to find the multivariate regression using most 
indicative and significant parameters only. This enables the derivation of a new GDP growth 
formula, with the proviso that all variables used are significant (p<0.05) for a more accurate 
and quantitative prediction of GDP is given as result in Formula 45.  
 
                                         
                                
Formula 45 GDP Predictive Regression Function Based on Monetary Variables  
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Entry GDP: gross domestic product (bn, quarterly, EMU19, chain-linked 2010, Eurostat), M0: mone-
tary base (bn), M2,3: monetary aggregates (bn), π: inflation (7-2005=100), v1,3: real velocity of money 
(rGDP/M1,3) (ECB, 2015) 
Significance (p, t-test): intersection: p<3.5E-11, M0:2E-4, M2: 1E-27, M3: 2.3E-24, π: 2.4E-10, v1:6.4E-
14, v3: 1.4E-21; R confidence: 0.9763, Adjusted R: 0.9738 
Unexpectedly, M0 and M3 show a positive function, while M2 is negative. This shows that M3 
might have a more beneficial effect on output compared to M2, in line with other results of 
this study, evidenced earlier (e.g. chapter 4.1): hence this has uncovered that ‘marketable 
instruments’ of M3 (representing the difference of M3-M2) have a special key role for short-
term real GDP growth, that was previously unknown, that were further analyzed here:  
The growth rate of three exclusive M3 components, known as ‘marketable instruments’, is 
indeed strongly correlated with real GDP growth (chain-linked, rebased) in the EMU 
(R=0.43). A analytical examination of its components provides evidence that the exclusive 
M3 component ‘debt securities issued (up to 2 year maturity)’ strongly correlate with real 
GDP growth in the EMU (R=0.61), but volumes are only around €100bn. The MTC-efficiency 
seems to be higher than in most M2 components. A second exclusive M3 component ‘MMF 
fund shares’ and repurchase agreements are only poorly correlated (R<0.15).  
Additionally, velocity of v1 has a negative impact, while v3 is positive indicating that the 
transactional efficiency of M3 is indeed more important for GDP and output. It is thus bet-
ter if v3 is higher in relative terms to improve GDP - theoretically (while v1 has a counter 
effect)). Inflation (π), has a very slight positive but relatively fully negligible impact.  
Multivariate Formula 45 was tested for its capability to predict the first quarter of 2015:  
Formula Entry (rational expectations model): M0=1275, M2=9850, M3=10500, v1=0.41, v3=0.23, 
π(HICP)=117.7 (note: this test was conducted at the end of Q1 2015) 
Formula Output: 2413.4€ bn real GDP (not adjusted, chain-linked 2010) = 1% growth of the 1Q (first 
quarter) of 2015 compared to the 1Q of 2014 
This result validates the formula and corresponds to ca. 1% real GDP growth in the EMU or 
a rate of 0.3 seasonally adjusted real GDP growth in the euro area (Eurostat measure).  
Although the formula is very precise it requires highly accurate estimates of the monetary 
aggregates and all other variables, which is often not feasible in advance - only for the ECB.  
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In summary, multivariate regression analysis can be used to decompose the variables that 
affect GDP growth, and a predictive formula can be derived that requires precise data sets 
for accurate predictions, and helps identifying GDP-profiting monetary factor components.  
4.3.6 The Labor Effect of the ECB’s Monetary Policy 
Previous chapters gave a new overview that also further substantiate a direct role for MP 
on output (GDP growth) in the euro area (4.1.1, 4.1.2, 4.3.4): monetary growth, velocity, 
low interest rates, and the right timing and amplitude of MP seem to be crucial, as well as 
the efficiency of the total monetary transmission that cannot be altered much by the ECB. 
The modified, the modern, and the standard Phillips Curves do not show a very striking de-
pendency as a rule of the employment level and inflation in the EMU from 1999-2015 (e.g. 
6 Figure S16). Only if only non-crisis years are considered (e.g. 2003-2007) it shows such a 
Fisher-Phillips dependency (6 Figure S16). Having established a link between monetary ag-
gregate growth and GDP, and having uncovered an effect of velocities on output that oc-
curs in approximately a ‘one-quarter-tow-bar’ (see 4.1.2) the research can now ask the 
question if the overall employment level (job creation) depends on the velocity too.  
The employment rate is one of the most important political and economic factors and indi-
cators and serves as a suitable read-out of high relevance for MP, fiscal and economic poli-
cy, and indicates both ‘health and stability of an economy’ and economic growth potential.  
Figure 51 co-depicts and correlates for the first time (in 7-2015) the growth rate of the in-
come velocity of real money (v0) and the growth of the unemployment rate (in %) in an 
overlay chart analysis, for the EMU. An inverse correlation between both growth rates can 
be shown (R=-0.22) even in the noisy, quarterly unadjusted, raw data set. This further con-
firms that the velocity of money is indicative for job creation as well as output (4.1.2). It lays 
down a new inverse coherency of the velocity of money and the short-term employment 
and economic growth trends in their respective ‘mirror-inverted natural mean function’. 
This finding can be used by MP strategists to prevent unnecessary ‘frictional’ unemploy-
ment by better adjusting the velocity’s growth rate in real-time to stay within an optimal 
corridor, and for short-term employment forecasts (related research was still missing). 
In summary, a rising velocity benefits the economy, job creation and acts anti-deflationary. 
The rising debt level (see 4.1.5) depresses natural velocities, the economy, jobs, and prices. 
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Figure 51 Reciprocity between the Growth Rate of the Velocity of the Monetary Base (v0) 
and the Seasonal Adjusted Unemployment Rate in the EMU from 1999-2015 
 
Until 2009-Q1 wages were growing in accordance of domestic growth policies that could 
have led to much more future growth and millions of new jobs (EU calculations) (EC 2008).  
 
Figure 52 Unit Labor Costs and its Deviation from Wages and Labor Productivity 
After the FC, indicators and velocities dropped sharply, and employment and wages begun 
to slow down. Labor productivity growth rates started falling and unit labor cost (ULC) were 
soaring, like local factor competitiveness. Labor productivity and wages, ULC, and so on, 
trended more suitably before the FC in 2009. The ULC trend resembles the quarterly devia-
tion of wages (as moving average) and labor productivity from 2001-2015 (see Formula 46). 
                                                   
Formula 46 Unit Labor Cost Dependence on Wages and Labor Productivity in the EMU 
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Entry: ULC: unit labor costs, based on quarterly ECB data (in line with economic theory) 
M1 and thus v1 has a relevant role with high monetary dimensions effective for the labor 
market: thus, the effect of a second grade velocity v1 shall be tested with respect to its de-
pendency (Pearson’s correlation) on labor market stats: including the employment growth 
rate (in % p.a.), the labor productivity growth rate (in % p.a.), the unit labor cost growth 
rate (in % p.a.), and the wage growth rate (also in % rate p.a.). Table 7 shows the results:  
 
Table 7 Correlation of Velocity, Employment, Labor Productivity and Wages Growth  
The highest correlation is an inverse relationship between labor productivity and unit labor 
costs (see Figure 52), also due to the relationship given in Formula 46. The second highest 
dependency was found for the labor productivity rate and the employment rate. The corre-
lation is strongly positive as it is leveraged by capital and technology. A negative shock to 
consumer demand and investment contributed to the negative effect in the FC. The third 
highest correlation level is found between unit labor costs growth rate (in %) and the em-
ployment rate (% reduction of unemployment) - a quantitative measure of how much the 
unit labor costs influence the employment function in the euro area. This correlation of -
0.68 indicates a strong inverse dependency also due to the relatively high costs of living in 
the EMU. The fourth highest correlation, still R=0.64, is a positive dependency of v1 (real 
velocity of M1, see 4.1.2) and labor productivity: the velocity of M1, v1, grows with labor 
productivity. There is also a dependency (R=-0.52) between v1 and unit labor cost, and v1 
and employment (R=0.42). If v1 increases (it doesn’t in the long run) then labor productivity 
increase too, labor costs would fall - same as unemployment. However, all predictions of 
today convey that v1 is still about to slightly fall throughout the next decades (see Figure 9).    
This might cast a cloud over future labor productivity trends as the ECB’s MP is very con-
sistently planning, or can’t circumvent, slightly lower v1 growth rates in the future. Veloci-
ties are declining due to a higher debt burden, lower marginal propensity to consume mul-
tiplier effect for output, less job growth, and lower wages and ULC. This strongly urges po-
litical decision makers to withstand the trends: basically with less debt and MS reform. 
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The fifths highest dependency (R=0.63) could be revealed for wages and unit labor costs. 
This only indicates that wages significantly contribute to production and factor costs. Wag-
es are only slightly negatively correlated with employment and labor productivity (R=-0.3), 
due to the effect of outsourcing of mass production into cheap labor countries. Finally it is 
also important to have a brief look at the price-wage ratio. This indicator tells something 
about the real purchasing power (PP) of the working population: this ratio is slightly declin-
ing at -0.61% per annum, meaning: PP of wages is marginally accretive. Firms that optimize 
their profits hire until the MPL (marginal product of labor) equals the real wage (Mankiw 
2014). This means the real wage must fall or the MPL must rise in the EMU. High debt levels 
cause deflation that drives the real wage (via P) and lowers the MPL.   
 
Figure 53 Correlation of v1, labor Productivity and Employment Rate 
 
 
Figure 54 Price-to-Wage Ratios and the Velocity of Money 
The trend of prices correlates with wages resembling a referencing of price and wage poli-
cy. Price/wages ratio also correlates with the velocity of money (v1, v2, v3, v0) but the in-
come velocities of money fade faster, e.g. v2: 2.58% p.a. (Figure 54). Even though the popu-
lation benefits from these economic trends effectively by ca. 10% higher purchasing power 
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per 15 years, homogeneity of purchasing power dispersion falls, and a growing pool of 
money is not used real TA purposes and GDP, as income velocities keeps falling: slightly but 
continuously lowering some strength of the potentially starching domestic markets. 
4.3.7 Main Output Trends of the Eurosystem: the EMU’s Economy 
‘The Big Ratios’ are the chain-linked ratios of GDP components over GDP that establish the 
main story of monetary transmission output in the EMU at a glance (see Figure 55). GDP fell 
during the FC across-the-board and across all euro area countries, EU countries like Poland 
and Malta being the only exception, in Q1-2009, and EMU growth rates have not recovered 
yet to its pre-crisis levels, almost six years later. This does also apply for the investment-to-
output ratio that has also dropped in the FC and has not recovered yet, and can also be 
seen in export and import volumes and ratios.  
 
Figure 55 Chain-linked Development of Output Components and ‘The Big Ratios’ 
Consumption and government spending compensated for the ditch in productivity and re-
lated trends - in relative but not in real terms (excepting the growth of government ex-
penditure; which also slows now). Major real growth rates are found for exports and im-
ports - also in relative terms (from 23% to >40% of GDP in two decades): this illustrates the 
soaring importance of international trade and international management for Europe’s Euro 
currency block - and worldwide. Among huge economies Europe has become a prime loca-
tion and the most open for international trade (as measured by the ratio of combined ex-
ports and imports divided by GDP, in 2012). The Nx balance turned back into the black after 
the FC and today has reached €100bn of goods and services in the first quarter of 2015. 
This is mainly the result of a recent Euro Fx rate depreciation, which made exports more 
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affordable on the world’s markets. Finally, inventory investment only makes a very small 
part of GDP (annual changes of only ca. 1%). Correlation studies performed reveal that it 
serves as an interesting early indicator of output that is responsive to MP and M2,3 (see 6 
Figure S6) again exemplifying that monetary transmission is of high relevance.     
4.3.8 The Eurosystem’s Monetary Transmission Channels 
Monetary transmission must be dissected into a categorical list of monetary transmission 
channels (MTCs) in order to be researched and understood (see Table 5). Main analytical 
findings of empirical MTC research of this study and others is review subsequently. 
4.3.8.1 MTC1: Real Interest Rate Channel (Traditional Effect) 
MTC1 transmits the real interest rates (r) and money effectiveness (e.g. PT, 1/mtotal). The 
ECB’s MP effects on interest rates were dealt with in chapter 4.3.1., the PT was dealt with 
in chapter 4.3.2, both integrate in MTC1 - which is in the primary focus MP as it directly af-
fects the ROI, ROE, NPB, WACC, and so on bearing calculations of investment decisions. 
Other EMU reviews also came to a wrong conclusion about this important MTC (Görgens et 
al. 2014): the real interest rate in fact drives investment decisions as the aggregate private 
sector passes on Fisher’s (relative) nominal interest inflation component to consumers. This 
has led to confusions of today’s macroeconomics understanding and of MTC1: comprising 
important effects of r on investment, residential housing and durable expenditure. 
The idea behind the focus on the real interest rate is in fact that industries and entities that 
invest can pass on core inflation premiums to the charges for their products and services. 
Also, the prices of housing and durable goods will not lose much of their value because in-
flation is part of their market prices and usually only depreciation reduces their value. 
Hence, the more endurable they are the more the play a role in MTC1 (see 4.3.8). 
The real interest rate has to be calculated separately for each individual financial product, 
or a weighted annualized average needs to be found. In Fisher’s Equation the yield beyond 
expected inflation is approximately the real interest rate (Formula 12). The outcome of this 
formula varies with investor’s expectations of future inflation (Levinson 2005). 
The nominal PT rates, i.e. AAR, NDER or the consumers APRC were used for weighted calcu-
lations (see 4.3.2Pass-Through and Interest Heterogeneity in the Euro Area). However, for 
MTC1 the real interest rate PT is to be found. The analysis uses the ‘country-unweighted’-
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‘financial product weighted’ annualized NDER (see Figure 39) and subtracts the annualized 
monthly HIPC rate for EMU’s households and corporation. This transforms Fisher’s ex ante 
real interest rate into an annualized ex post real rate: the results are depicted in Figure 56. 
Inflation rates have been included until June 2015.  
 
Figure 56 Real Interest Rate and Pass-Through of all EMU Countries  
 
The MRO and the respective ‘real PT is shown (as average real interest rate of corporations 
[corp.] and households [hh]) to illustrate the main MP effects on r and MTC1, which differ 
from the nominal PT. The ‘real PT’ is a trigger for industry investment and how much MFIs 
charge in real terms, multiplied by mtotal for the effect on the entire real economy. The real 
PT, a highly important indicator-factor, has significantly increased again back to FC levels.   
Figure 56 for the first time unravels a new correlation between the real-PT and the GDP 
growth rate: an inverse dependency (Pearson’s test) was found (R=0.51) for the real-NDER-
PT and GDP growth rate that needs a low real-PT. This is also often much confused by 
economists today maybe because of the above reason. The higher the real PT, the lower 
the efficiency (E=1/mtotal) of MTC1, the more money is ‘lost in transmission’ in the EMU. The 
lower the short-term spending stimulus, the lower the growth rate of GDP. These coheren-
cies help explain the malaise of the EMU economic recovery and stagflations in the world: 
E.g. the same coherency and indebtedness (US$ 10tn) hold Japan down in a deflation.  
 
4 Analytical Research Review / 4.3 / 4.3.8 
Page | 137 
 
 
Figure 57 The Effect Real Pass Through on GDP and Inflation 
 
4.3.8.2 MTC2: International Account, Fx-Trade-Capital Effects  
In theory, both, demand and supply for a currency determine its exchange rate in ‘free-
market equilibria’. In the real world there is a multiplicity of factors that influence both. The 
demand for foreign currency is given by (a) the demand for foreign exports, (b) demand for 
foreign assets, (c) domestic price level in relation to foreign price level, (d) future expecta-
tions (of prices, Fx rates, ROI, economic trends), world and media events, among others. 
The currency supply is regulated by the central bank and all money holders in the economy.  
The domestic real interest rate has a pivot role: it has profound effects on nominal interest 
rates of course, and on the Fx rate mediated by ‘covered interest arbitrage’ (Levinson 2005; 
Giddy 1994; Sperber 2015). International realization of covered interest arbitrage leads to 
covered interest arbitrage parity (see 2.4.2). There are net capital inflows into the economy 
if risk-free arbitrage is possible - also due to SWAP rates etc. - and changes the global de-
mand for the currency, and thus the exchange rate (Fx rate). The ECB’s MP effects on the Fx 
rates were already described in chapter 4.3.3, involving the core mechanisms of MTC2. 
Another important element of MTC2 is the ‘International Account’ that comprises: (I) the 
International Investment Position (IIP), (II) the Balance of Payments, (III) other changes in 
financial assets (IMF 1993; IMF 2009; ECB 2015a: ECB/2011/23&24, /2013/25, /2014/2). 
(I) The IIP records an economy’s financial assets (and ‘liquid’ gold reserves) and financial 
liabilities of non-MFIs, and represent a net claim or net liability to the rest of the world 
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(RoW). The IIP represents a subset of assets and liabilities in the national balance sheet 
that includes non-financial assets, and positions between residents (IMF 2009): its 
changes are explained by the financial account (BoP) plus (III) accumulation account.  
(II) The balance of payment (BOP) reflects a record of the forces of supply and demand 
that determines the Fx rate (Burton & Lombra 2000). It is the record of all transaction 
between a country and the rest of the world (not only payments as the name implies).  
The BOP is a double bookkeeping system and contains: (1) the ‘current account’ with 
all international gross transactions of currently produced goods and services, gross 
primary (income for providing temporary use: investment income, direct investment, 
portfolio investment, other investments, interests, dividends, rent, subsidies, etc.) and 
gross secondary income (redistribution of income: e.g. personal transfers, international 
assistance, current taxes, social contributions and benefits, current international coop-
eration, etc.). The current account’s difference between gross exports and gross in-
come equals the ‘investment-savings gap’ of the economy (IMF 2009, chapter 14): 
And (2) the (gross) capital account (narrow definition) that comprises (‘netted’) acquisi-
tions and disposals of non-financial/non-produced assets (sales of leases and licenses, 
land sold to embassies, unilateral capital transfers). (1+2) The sum of current and capi-
tal account makes the (net) total lending/borrowing to/from RoW (IMF 2009). As visu-
alized in Formula 47, the sum of current and capital account equals the financial ac-
count in the new BPM5/6 system of national accounts (SNA) definitions (IMF 2009), 
which is often heavily confused also in the scientific literature and most economics text 
book that still use the old definitions. This financial account (3) records the net (not 
gross like the current and capital account) acquisition and disposal of financial assets 
and liabilities. This account resembles the liabilities side of a balance sheet as it reveals 
how the net borrowing or net lending of an economy is financed. (Also: the financial 
account plus the ‘other changes’ accounts explain the change in the IIP between be-
ginning- and end-periods). A BoP has to hold the balance like a balance sheet and a 
central bank eventually has to manage the financing side (if required), for example via 
transfers of its reserve assets (e.g. currencies and ‘controllable’ and ‘liquid assets’ like 
gold reserves) (to see the Eurosystem’s balance sheet see 4.2.1: reserve assets are sta-
ble and increase slightly). The ECB’s balance sheet is only rarely affected by these 
changes. Roughly drafted, the reason for this is found in losses in portfolio investment 
and followed by gains in other investment until 2014 that became neutral in 2015 and 
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a medium increase in direct and portfolio investment in 2015 (ca. €100bn and €120bn 
in a 12-month aggregate of may 2015). In the EMU, TARGET2 serves as a quick BoP 
equilibrating mechanism in the EMU (Cecchetti et al. 2012), but bears some hidden 
dysfunctions, e.g. rising ‘unmatched’ or ‘non-netted’ claims, and a related hidden crisis 
of underlying fixed Fx rates (Mayer 2011). Unmatched claims could cost donor coun-
tries like Germany €0.5tn in a case of a default of the Eurosystem (Kaiser 2012).  
(III) Accumulation accounts: capital account, financial account, and other changes in finan-
cial assets and liabilities (IMF 2009): they record the accumulation of assets and liabili-
ties from ‘other flows’ (than transactions of the BoP), their financing and other changes 
that affect them (IMF 2009). E.g. unilateral cancelation of debt by creditor, holding 
gains and losses, reclassifications, only of external financial assets and liabilities. 
 
                                                                
Formula 47 Balance of Payments (BoP) Identity, BPM6 Codification 
The BOP is balanced but its components, mainly the current account, is known to directly 
effectuate the Fx rate and MTC2 over time - and is interdependently affected by the Fx rate 
over time too. This leads to a balanced equilibrium in theory - e.g. if export rise due to a 
depreciated Fx rate it stabilizes demand for the currency and the Fx rate again. Like many 
other markets the Fx market is not free of government or monopolistic intervention: cen-
tral banks may exert (sterilized and unsterilized) foreign exchange interventions to influ-
ence Fx rates in a ‘managed, or dirty float regime’ (Mishkin 2007), or via standing facilities 
(not planed, officially). If the ECB sells foreign assets for domestic currency it lowers M0. 
The actions and capacities are reflected in the ECB’s balance sheet (see 4.2.1). Figure 57 
depicts key items of the BoP account as trends: the current account, the capital as well as 
the financial account using the SNA compatible accounting method (IMF 1993; IMF 2009). 
EMU‘s net lending/borrowing from the RoW highly overlaps with the goods transaction 
balance (Figure 57). This reveals that the capital account roughly approximates the negative 
value of services, primary and secondary income, in a strict tendency since many years. 
Goods are still much more important than services for international accounts, and the BoP 
current account, which is technically offset by a deficit in secondary income (transfer pay-
ments without a quid pro quo). This negative flow has doubled since the launch of the Euro.   
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Figure 58 BOP Account Trends in the Euro Area (*estimation) 
                                                                    
                        
Formula 48 BOP Accounting of the EMU (New SNA - IMF Standard of 2009) 
 
The financial account equals the current and capital account and recent errors are omitted. 
Both have grown to over €200bn in 2015: derivatives and portfolio investment on the rise.  
Both, the ECB’s balance sheet (see 4.2.1) like the BoP financial accounts reveal only little 
changes in the ECB’s foreign currency reserves: Claims on non-euro area residents in for-
eign currency remain steady at around €200bn form 1999-2015, minor yearly changes in 
the reserve assets of the BoP’s financial account (ECB 2015b, Statistical Bulletin 7.1). The 
exchange rate, supply and demand for currency due to transactions has much balanced it. 
As a result the Euro currency in international circulation seems to be relatively free floating 
unaffected by central banks although the shape of a few shifts remind on the Plaza Accords. 
Figure 46 shows the EER-19 pool of spot index exchange rates [Fx/€] of the top 19 trading 
partners of the EU over time. Fx changes obviously had a major impact on the trade bal-
ance recent current account surplus. An oscillation pattern of Fx rates, as expectable from a 
feed-forward loop of Fx rate and exports: a depreciated Fx rate auto-regulates the ex-
port/import balance that has a stabilizing effect on the next future ‘Fx rate macro-wave’. 
The timing of this effect can be estimated using indexes: the EMU’s current account and 
goods transaction surplus starts in the first quarter of 2012 at the same time when the Fx 
ratio with the average of major trading partner fell below its ‘16-year natural-average’. This 
indicates an immediate effect when the tipping point of the EER-19 average (TPFx=0.95) is 
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surpassed triggering a boost in exports. Exports in turn directly feed into GDP and also ‘a 
less of imports’ - now more expensive - are deducted from it (IMF 2009; Mankiw 2014). 
 
Figure 59 The EER-19 Fx Index and the Trade Balance     
 
To get a better measure of this transmission channel coherency Pearson’s correlation was 
conducted using the traded goods account monthly moving average (13 month, current 
value +/- 6 month) from 2003 till 2015 (after the Euro was fully introduced) and the month-
ly moving average (7 month, current value +/- 3 month) of the relevant EER-19 Forex index 
(the CPI deflated rate) from the same period of time. The result illustrates the economic 
power behind MTC2: the current account’s trade balance strongly depends on the exchange 
rate of the EU’s main trading partners (R=-0.77): a depreciation of the Euro in the world 
increases trade balance, and current account, mainly via a higher export surplus. This is in 
fully in line with current theory, previous empirical findings, and all macroeconomic stylized 
facts. However, in early EMU years after 1999 a strong correlation could not and cannot be 
found. This strong correlation is measured today and was not published or reviewed earlier. 
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Multivariate regression analysis substantiates the result and unveils its key variables: the 
EMU’s capital account is lessened by -1.5 Billion Euros per Fx index point (EER) each month. 
This is €18bn per year per index point. The Nx-beneficial tipping point corridor of the index 
is at 12 points that correspond to €216bn (12 points x 12 month x €1.5bn). This variable 
corresponds with net lending/borrowing in 2015 at the lower end of the Forex EER-19 index 
(green). Thereby, a significant quantitative variable also for MTC2 could be derived.   
 
Figure 60 Net Lending/Borrowing of Households, Government, MFIs, and Non-MFIs  
 
Once a monetary stimulus is transmitted via MTC2 it profits the current account through a 
higher export surplus. It has a positive consequence for the euro zone’s current account 
(Figure 59), GDP and employment. This scenario happened in Q4 of 2011: when the net 
lending of the Eurozone turned positive and only the Government sector remained with a 
net debt, while the sum of households and firms were ‘self-financing’. Although Keynes 
savings are not ‘savings’ (Booncharoenpol 2005), domestically, the world bank reveals: 
EMU Debt>Saving>Investment (D>S>I, ca.€22tn+x > €10tn > €2.3tn). Thus EMU real savings 
don’t equal real investment. But ‘savings’ still equal investment on the international level 
(Figure 59), due to global net lending and borrowing accounts (with errors and omissions). 
The international investment-savings gap is found in the current account’s €200bn, which is 
considered as theory-conform here as opposed to a ca. €10tn domestic ‘savings’ gap.  
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Formula 49 The International Savings-Investment Gap is the Current Account Balance 
Entry: S: gross savings, I: investment, P: private, G: government 
Finally, Figure 60 depicts how cumulative lending/borrowing (sum of capital and current 
account) affects the net external debt and net external assets at end of period. Since the 
current account started to turn positive in 2012 net external debt started to shrink while 
net eternal assets continued to pick up. In turn it affects the Fx rate, exports, jobs and GDP. 
This is complemented by Figure 61 that summarizes and reviews the net external debt and 
assets and the cumulative change of the net lending borrowing of the EMU BoP account. 
 
Figure 61 Cumulative Lending/Borrowing Affects Net External Debt and Assets 
 
4.3.8.3 MTC3: Keynes’ and Tobin’s Stock Market Channel 
MTC3 summarizes effects of MP on the real economy via revaluation of equity (stocks), de-
scribed by Tobin (Tobin 1969) and Keynes (Keynes 1936). Briefly, Tobin’s q ratio equals the 
asset market value divided by its replacement value (see MTC3). In practice, there are many 
subtypes of this formula in regular use: e.g. the market value of equity and liabilities to 
their book value, or the value of the stock market (market capitalization) divided by the 
corporate net worth, also in several different modalities of operating capital. In macroeco-
nomic terms these differences are less important and canceled out. Tobin’s q is found in 
the market capitalization of listed companies and gross fixed capital formation (in US$). 
Although, this is only an approximation, as not all companies are listed and not all market 
values of companies can be estimated, as well as not all replacement costs can be deter-
mined, it still is a suitable indicator of the global trends and can be derived from World 
Bank data (WB 2015). The results of relative Tobin’s q trends are given in Figure 62. 
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Figure 62 Tobin’s Q Market-Cap of Listed Companies to Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
Since several years a Tobin q indicator chart is rampant published only for the US economy. 
Other formula’s of Tobin’s q existed in the 80s and 90s but were ‘discontinued’ and their 
formulas are much less used. The US q calculation method also provides only a relative 
measure and no nominal values, because of the same reasons and is published on many 
platforms (Vectorgrader, YCharts, academic publications, etc.). It is reckoned from the Fed’ 
Flow of Funds release: the ratio is calculated by dividing line 39 ‘market value of equities 
outstanding’ by line 36 net worth market value of Z.1’s table B.102 (Balance Sheet of Non-
Financial Businesses) of Non-Farm Non-Financial Corporate Business [the line number dif-
fers in previous decades]. A comparison of the US q-value with the q-value of this study 
(based on World Bank data), finds the same relative effect on q: Tobin’s q has almost dou-
bled in the US from 2009 to 2013 (=1.75 fold), as is shown in Figure 62, as much as it has in 
the US version of Tobin’s q (also 1.75 fold). An advantageous of the new method is that it 
provides comparable results over time and is based on freely accessible country data. 
Q of high GDP OECD countries like the EMU, US and Japan can be grouped into a co-
developing cluster, and the BRICs nation’s development of q is also more coherent with its 
own group. The new q ratio also reveals that the US has the highest values because the 
capitalization rate is higher in this nation in comparison to all other nations shown here. 
The global shock of the FC has dramatically affected all nations’ q values, even in China. 
In the MTC3 channel expansionary MP lifts stock prices and q and thus investment and GDP. 
The question thus arises ‘how did investment develop with q’, answered in Figure 63.   
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Figure 63 Gross Fixed Capital Formation in Selected Countries 
 
 
Only investment in China is robust to the FC, growth aberrations of q can be seen for the 
US, EMU, Japan, and the Russian Federation (RF). This is also substantiated by correlation 
coefficients of GDP on investment (as gross capital formation), from 1989 till 2013: 
R(EMU)=0.987, R(US)=0.955, R(US, from 2006-2009)=-0.26, R(Japan)=0.52, R(China)=0.999, 
and RF=0.991. It seems that the EMU, Japan and US lag at the benefit of BRICs nations. 
EMU and US investment stays below or close to its pre-crisis level: a post-FC-syndrome. The 
ECB exerts some impact on MTC3’s Tobin’s q channel via the high powered quantity of 
money: i.e. in the EMU from 2002-2007 and after the crisis 2010-2015 (Figure 64, R=-0.54). 
Additionally, a reciprocal relationship of Tobin’s q (based on world bank data) and the ECB’s 
MRO rate (central European rate) can be found with a 1-year transmission (R=-0.3, 1a-lag). 
Looking at adjusted stationary data a higher correlation can be found (R=-0.43, right).  In 
summary, the ECB’s MP has had a strong impact on Tobin’s q and MTC3. A multivariate re-
gression analysis reveals that a 1% decrease in MRO increases q by 35% on average, but 
only at a low significance of p<0.16 (t-test). Chart analyses reveal generally the same result. 
Despite these relevant effects of MP on the real economy, one major scientific assumption 
of Tobin’s q MTC theory can be indeed questioned: as q is defined by corporations’ market 
value divided by its replacement value that represents the net worth of investment, it pro-
vides a clear inverse (reciprocal) relationship of q in relation to investment. Tobin argues 
that a higher q results in more investment via equity. This would immediately have an im-
pact on equity and market capitalization and q would thus not increase if counterbalanced. 
Q only increases if investment is less than equity value - forming a ‘short-term feedback‘.  
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Figure 64 Dependency of Q (WB derived) and MRO Central European Rate  
 
In fact a negative relationship in the EMU can be observed for net investment and q (R=-
0.32). This is because most stocks are traded on the secondary market and if prices of these 
stocks increase it does not much impact investment but more profits portfolios. 
 
Figure 65 Tobin’s Q Theory of Investment in the Eurozone 
 
Only if firms issue new equity, or equity investment, MTC3 has an effect, which is thus ‘less 
strong’. Figure 65 in fact divulges a clear negative dependency of q and net investment 
from 1999-2013 (R=-0.52), and only a very weak positive from 1990-2013 (R=0.26). If only 
the time period of the European monetary union is considered, we have to consider a falsi-
fication of Tobin’s q MTC theory for the euro area so far, due to the above mentioned ar-
gumentation. In summary, the ECB’s MP has a bug effect on Tobin’s q, but q’s effect on 
investment, and GDP, is only temporary (2002-2006). A feedback must to be considered. 
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4.3.8.4 MTC4: Financial Wealth Channel (Asset View) 
The effect of wealth (Modigliani’s ‘lifetime resources’) stems from beneficial changes in 
balance sheets, for instance due to a stock market boom (Modigliani 1971): affecting con-
sumers’ and businesses’ (included here) balance sheets (Mathews et al. 2013). 
If stock prices are stimulated by MP (as was shown in Figure 64), and the wealth on balance 
sheets bolsters consumption (for non-durable goods and services, including investment) 
investment and GDP growth are augmented, as MTC4 is at work. The chart in Figure 66 
quantifies final consumption expenditures (households and government) that resemble 
gross capital formation (net investment) and the externally assessed effect on the stock 
market (Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50). As was shown for q and investment (see Figure 62-64), 
again only in years of sound macroeconomic conditions (i.e. 2002-2006), a very high corre-
lation can be measured (R=0.94). However, if all years, containing sub-optimal macroeco-
nomic conditions and crisis are included the correlation turns even negative (R=-0.48).Thus, 
MTC3+4 are only active if sound macroeconomic conditions and such expectations are given. 
 
Figure 66 The Equity Effect (Euro Stoxx50) on Consumption Expenditure in the EMU 
 
4.3.8.5 MTC5-9: Traditional Credit View 
The five credit view channels (MTC5-9) comprise the bank lending channel (MTC5), the bal-
ance sheet moral hazard channel (MTC6), the cash flow and nominal interest rate channel 
(MTC7), the unanticipated price level channel (MTC8), and the household liquidity distress 
channel (MTC9). These five channels have a direct effect on investment, residential housing, 
and consumer durable expenditure and hereby feed into GDP, output, productivity and the 
standard of living. They all have in common to benefit the real economy by bettering (1) the 
lending activity and (2) cash flow and liquidity that also reduce risks and moral hazards.  
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(1) The Lending Activity Effects  
The lending activity is illustrated here by plotting the lending volume of relevant repre-
sentative financial product categories (see Figure 67): loans ranging from three month to 
one year, from a quarter of a million to one million and above (IRF, initial fixed rate).  
 
Figure 67 Lending Activity to Corporations and Consumers Across the Euro Area 
As before, the most typical development of MTC1-4 is solely found from 2002-2008, and 
ended with the FC. From 2003-2009 the lending of the loan volume for corporations has 
increased which coincides and correlates with net investment (see Figure 63). Post-FC in 
2009 investment has not recovered coinciding with subsiding lending activity (volume). At 
the same time the total debt of the euro area approaches heightened figures (Figure 23), of 
more than €20 trillion without accounted external, and externalized debt, and externalities: 
is summary indicating that debt is used less efficiently. Figure 68 uses world bank data to 
illustrate corporate, household and public debt (WB 2015). The ratio of corporate lending 
(driving investment) and government is declining, as much as the ratio of corporate lending 
to household lending. This is a new type of ‘crowding out’ that also includes household’s 
debt here. Importantly, MFIs also ‘crowd out’ EU GDP growth (Cecchetti & Kharroubi 2013). 
 
Figure 68 MFI Lending Activity with Corporations, Households, and Government 
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The cause of these MTC inefficiencies is mtotal (see 4.1.3) and domestic real savings to in-
vestment gap (see 4.3.8.2), the general trends of debt Figure 60 and MFI-B/S (Figure 75). 
More savings are used fiscally but affordable loans are generally available to businesses, 
since 2012 - corporate debt is on the fall but investment doesn’t soar - consumption is sta-
ble, but only slightly positive and still holds potential. The high level of indebtedness might 
block EMU investment and lower the effect of MTC5-9 and it lowers the velocity of money.   
(2) Cash Flow, Liquidity and Risk Effects 
One way to indirectly measure the cash flow and liquidity situation in the economy is to 
assess the default risk and moral hazards that is considered by MFIs/CBs on the lending 
market. This reflects the liquidity and cash situation of households, firms, and also the gov-
ernment, depending on the financial product that is investigated. In theory, if the risk is 
high then liquidity and cash flows are estimated by MFIs as less stable, less robust, or less 
enduring, and the MTC is less strong. The risk is calculated using market data that resemble 
the change of this risk in real time. This was done through the CAPM method (capital asset 
pricing model) where the risk premium of lending (credit view channel) is derived by sub-
tracting the (risk-free) government bond rate form the (risk-bearing) average lending rate. 
The percentage reveals the intrinsic market risk and serves as relative indicator.  
Figure 69 discloses the risk premium for firms and households across the euro area of 19 
countries. Once more, after 2007 a beneficial trend ended with the FC and the mean risk 
premium (NDER - 1YG-bond yield in %) snowballed from 1.5% to 3%. The nominal interest 
rates (see 4.3.1, 4.3.2) and stock market exposure pathways (4.3.8.3) network here too. In 
summary, the efficiency and effectiveness of MTC5-9 has been enervated: both the height-
ened level of indebtedness and risk premiums indicates a loss of ca. 50-65% since 2007.  
  
 
Figure 69 CAPM-derived Risk Premium in the EMU: NDER Yield Minus 1YG-Bond Rate 
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4.3.8.6 MTC10: Prospect View - Expectation Channel 
In the prospect view - the expectations channel MTC10 - several macroeconomic models 
are included such as the Fisher and Cagan model (see 2.3.6), and other models of rational 
and irrational expectation, behavioral economics, and asymmetric information. 
MTC10 includes all MP effects that are triggered by expectations and forecasts and comprise 
political, economical, business, and monetary developments. Announcements of the ECB 
and other major central banks have huge impact before any MP operation is taken, which 
has lead to a forward guidance media-strategy. Most MTC10 expectations in the EMU are 
most influenced by the ECB’s MP announcements and forecasts, and other economic condi-
tions. In line with the traditional models of Cagan and Fisher (see 2.3.6) the expectations of 
price levels play a fundamental role, for nominal interest rates and planning of future in-
vestment due to ROI, cost of capital employed, internal cash flow benchmarks, WACC 
(weighted average cost of capital), and other variables crucial for decisions and output.  
Economic sentiment indexes can be used to quantify MTC10 expectation changes in re-
sponse to MP. Figure 70 overlays major sentiment indicators for industrial, service, con-
sumption, retail, building, the economic sentiment indicator (ESI), as well as the monetary 
condition index (MCI) that allow for comparative combinations (Eurostat 2015). It shows a 
dependency of monetary conditions, and expectations, with nearly all sentiments (Table 8). 
R1999-2015 0.20 0.33 0.22 0.21 0.56 0.25 1.00 
RTIME INDU SERV CONS RETA BUIL ESI MCI 
R1999-2015-FC 0.43 0.64 0.49 0.19 0.76 0.59 1.00 
Table 8 Dependency of Sectoral Sentiments with the Monetary Conditions Index (MCI) 
 
Figure 70 Economic Sentiment (ESI) and Confidence Indicators in EMU Countries 
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Key to Figure 70: INDU: industrial confidence indicator (40%), SERV: service confidence indicator 
(30%), CONS: consumer confidence indicator (20%), RETA: retail trade confidence indicator (20%), 
BUIL: construction confidence indicator (5%), ESI: economic sentiment indicator, MCI: monetary 
condition index (based on a r-to-Fx, 6:1 weighted average ratio to 1999 base year values) 
  
The building sector’s construction sentiment index is slightly more correlated with the MP 
and monetary condition index (MCI) than other sectors - in both time series with or without 
the FC (an omitted span of 2 years of FC). High MCI values indicate monetary tightening, 
which became predominant before the FC and contributed to a drop in all economic senti-
ment indexes already before the FC unfolded (i.e. before 2008). Hence, the ECB might have 
reacted to slow with respect to the foretelling economic sentiments and economic condi-
tions: unexpectedly, money and MCI might have been too tight in 2008. In 2007, the MCI 
correlates with a massive decline in ESI and all sectoral sub-indexes (R=-0.77) in an inverse 
fashion: Astoundingly, the monetary aggregate grew at a high level of around 10%, so the 
ECB thought they were easing enough. But the MCI in fact tells another story: Sectors tem-
porarily dried out of money and plumbed in 2008 due to overall MP/financial conditions. 
Once the ECB realized this issue, it started to relax MP as the Fed did almost a year earlier 
(see Figure 35). In 1Q of 2009 almost all major central banks had flat key rates and were 
easing the money supply but again something unexpected happened that was not foreseen 
in the dynamic models: inflation halted at almost 0%, with an even slight deflation (-0.6%, 
2009-7) contrary to monetarism’s claims and contrary to an element of MTC10 that predicts 
a future higher inflation if the quantity of money is about to increase. This is explainable 
with the oscillatory behavior found in this study (see Figure 49): inflation is sticky and fol-
lows years later and not immediately (Mankiw 2014) not even to announcements: a 4-5 
year peak is proposed here in DC-tests. Thus, MTC10 also has a ‘delayed-wave-response’.      
Friedman’s modern QTM formula (see Formula 10) claims that durable goods (i.e. build-
ings) and assets may increasingly substitute for money in an expected inflation scenario: 
e.g. if expected return on buildings is higher than the expected return on money (πbuil-
rmoney). This balances the total demand for money, which falls, bearing a risk of inflation. 
Sectoral indexes were recovering, building and construction index at a lower level - but re-
sponsive to the MCI. Like all previous MTCs, also the ‘prospect view channel’ reveals good 
conditions for the time period between 2002 and 2008 (see Figure 70) - a time character-
ized by ‘sound macroeconomic and monetary conditions’: The optimum of the MCI could 
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be somewhere around 45-55 MCI index points. Thus, the Euro might have started with a 
too high MCI0 level. In summary, the MCI is a here gauged meaningful measure for MP.  
In line with most if not all MTC channels, key economic sentiments have not yet fully recov-
ered after the FC+EC, which is another characteristic condition of the ‘post-FC syndrome’. 
Due to the tremendous importance of future expectations of prices and power of MTC10 for 
MP, the ECB’s has to credibly predict the future price levels of the next month and years (1-
month, 1-year, 2-years) - some of them were slightly corrected. Figure 71 depicts this ECB 
predicated inflation forecast and reveals its deviations from the real figures. 
 
Figure 71 ECB’s Expected Inflation Announcements for the Euro Area 
 
Expectations can be subdivided into (1) overrating expectations, if the real inflation is lower 
than expected (positive deviation value), and (2) underrating expectations, if the inflation is 
higher than expected (negative deviation value). From 2000-2008, and from 2011-2012 the 
real inflation turned out to be higher than predicted by the ECB’s in its 1- and 2-year fore-
cast official statements. Envisioning the previous figure (see Figure 70) reveals a new and 
astounding coherency: economic sentiments (ESI) and its confidence components are fre-
quently higher in those years of an officially announced underrated expected inflation, and 
vice versa, lower in years of overrated inflation. Comparing the two types of expected infla-
tion periods (see Figure 71) with the annual GDP growth rates (see Figure 7) the same be-
comes apparent: in years of underrated expectation the real economy’s output grew better 
or stronger as compared to years of ECB-overrated expectations of its HICP inflation rate. 
This strong dependency is summarized in Pearson’s correlation coefficient of R=-0.61 (see 
Figure 72). A strong laterally inversed trend of GDP growth and deviation from ECBs fore-
cast can be demonstrated, also visually, and graphically as scatter plot (see Figure 72). 
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Figure 72 Correlation of Deviation from Price Expectation and GDP Growth 
 
 
The cause and explanation for this effect is of note: many or probably most financial prod-
ucts, relevant to the real economy, are fixed to a nominal interest rate at the time of offer-
ing (or are bound by an IRF). According to the Fisher Effect (Formula 12), consequentially, 
an ‘overrated inflation rate’ would lead to a higher nominal interest rate than the market 
‘could take’ as real interest rates grows that is relevant for the entire industry. Contrari-
wise, if the inflation rate was underrated by the ECB, all producers and consumers would 
make a slight aggregate surplus (as much as found in Figure 72 from which it can be calcu-
lated). In fact this slight surplus seems to be economically relevant (€40-50 billion) and 
most likely pulls the trigger in the real economy also via MPICS, due to its highly transaction-
al features and velocity, profiting employment, r, output, investment, and GDP - indeed a 
beneficial side effect of the ECB’s (deliberate?) miscalculation. But it is also true vice versa, 
if the ECB overrates the expected inflation it could have negative side effects on r and GDP.  
 
4.3.8.7 MTC11: Money Multiplier Pre-Transmission Channel 
The properties of the money multiplier (see 2.3.7) represent a ‘pre-transmission channel’ of 
CBs/MFIs because the legal frameworks strongly affect the ultimate money supply in the 
economy: MTC11 hyper-inefficiency is already ‘enough discussed’ in chapter 4.1.3, MTC11. 
 
4.3.8.8 MTC12: Monetarism Channel 
The Monetarism channel (MTC12) includes the Cambridge Effect decomposing into a short-
term effect on GDP and a long-term effect on prices: involving timing and amplitude of MP. 
Previous results of this research study (see Figure 49) suggest a Cambridge Effect on nomi-
nal and real GDP for approximately half a year and a second wave with about three years of 
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delay. This nominal positive effect turns into a real net positive effect only if the long-term 
‘inflation effect’ in year 4-5 is neutralized. The steady overlaying of trends - overshadowed 
by the FC/EC and its aftermath makes its study more complex but generally feasible. Mod-
els like the DC model, New-Keynesian models (Clarida et al. 1999), VAR analysis predictions, 
and many more models found in the literature (for references: 2.4.2) can help to improve 
the efficiency of MP by estimating the right time, measure, and amplitude of operations.  
4.3.8.9 MTC13: Governmental Channels 
The complex response of the real economy to MP operations also partly originates from 
interdependencies of all monetary (Friedman & Woodford 2010), economic and also fiscal 
parameters and their network effects (Mathews et al. 2013). The control over the fiscal and 
monetary parameters is legally and structurally divided, due to the relatively high autono-
my of central banks, like the ECB (see 2.1.5), or Fed. New and Post Keynesian models and 
theories send a reminder about the relevance of a concerted and coordinated co-action 
(Keynes 1936; Keynes 1923; Mathews et al. 2013; Mankiw 2014; Clarida et al. 1999) - that 
might be missing to some extent in the EMU. Additionally, MTC13 is an indirect and rela-
tively efficient and effective (compared to MTC10-12) money supply channel for the real 
economy, especially in the case of deficit spending when a positive net effect takes place. 
The use of this channel is recommendable if the economy doesn’t meet its potential, i.e. is 
below its full employment. It profits short-term and long-term output if deficit spending 
doesn’t lead to all kinds of ‘crowding out’ phenomena but stabilizes the economy via 
‘crowding in’ (as discussed in 2.4.8). EMU funding via government bond purchase programs 
is needed but only prolongs the inevitable: MS reform. A look at the US and EMU clarifies 
that since the introduction of ‘fractional reserve banking’ both major economies systemati-
cally ran into a vicious cycle of ‘systemic indebtedness’, the US in 90 or less years. Before 
1913’s leveraged fractional reserve banking the US was always able to pay back its debts in 
times of peace. The Federal Reserve Act from 1913 has seemingly diminished this ability; 
the EMU ran into this problem in 16 years by with a fractional reserve resuming head-start.  
Today, governments still find themselves in a wicked quandary: if they reduce the budget 
deficit their austerity harms the real economy in the short-run, and if they decide to keep 
up with the deficit spending they worsen the long-run perspective and indebtedness. Figure 
73 illustrates the systemic problem of euro area indebtedness that is exemplary in the 
world. This partially unnecessary dilemma is also faced by most countries in the world.  
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Figure 73 Government Revenue and Expenditures in the Euro Area 
Additionally, each Euro spend has a positive multiplier-effect on income, as it also stimulate 
consumption. The government purchase multiplier benefits the real economy by 1/(1-MPC) 
for each unit cash spent. Assuming that the MPC (marginal propensity to consume) is con-
stant a tax increase as high as a new expenditure has a 100% positive effect (Mankiw 2014): 
   
  
     
 
      
     
            
   
  
     
 
      
     
  
         
     
  
         
     
     
                                                        
                                                                      
  
 
 
Formula 50 The Fiscal Effect of Neutral Tax Spending 
Entry: NPV: net present value (see Net Present Value (NPV), ΔG/ΔT: change in government spend-
ing or taxes, top formula: based on (Mankiw 2014) and an exercise of HfWU Macroeconomics, 2015  
This disentangles the macro-economical logic behind MTC13’s quandary: although tax 
backed government spending would be 100% benefit GDP it inherits a downside that it 
could mainly stabilizes the aggregate demand side, lack economic incentive schemes, and 
active market forces, and could favor consumption over private investment. Still, govern-
mental programs are a very powerful and GDP-stimulating MTC. They are only as good as 
the extra total value they generate plus the amount of governmental spending minus ‘all 
local factor costs’ (including all additional costs and e.g. crowding out, resource usage, etc.).  
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The better (the more efficient and effective) the money is invested, and contributes to the 
local factor as productivity add-on (including everything that benefits the economy over 
time, e.g. attractiveness to invest, factor conditions, etc.) the more beneficial for GDP (now 
and in the future) - especially by optimizing multilateral cost benefit ratios. Economic incen-
tives and a fair private competition is the key to this pursuit. Due to the complexities and 
interdependencies it is not trivial to calculate the best government’s involvement level, but 
it is required to best estimate it. A simple analysis of the government spending multiplier 
basically comes to the same conclusion (Woodford 2011) and can help estimate. 
New money enters the economy in the form of debt, and principal and interest need to be 
paid back sooner or later. This constantly diminishes the liquidity of the economy and ac-
cumulates in the commercial banks and MFIs and their owners. This money tends to escape 
the monetary transmission channels MTC1-15 and the economy slows down. Hence, the 
government finds itself in the dilemma to use MTC13 to compensate for the detrimental 
effects. Based on Keynesian Theory (Walters 1998), marginal output dependency can be 
also given more general, as autonomous expenditures plus marginal propensity product: 
                                                      
                              
 
               
 
Formula 51 Marginal Propensity to Consume Triggers Fiscal Money Supply and Output 
Entry: MPC: marginal propensity to consume, MPI: MP to invest, MPS: MP to spend, Y; out-
put, C: consumptions, A: autonomous investment, G=expenditures-taxes-balance 
The higher MPC and A (investment, autonomous expenditure) the better the supply of 
‘transactional money’ and its velocity and the faster the economy can grow (Figure 74). It is 
thus recommendable for any government to provide legal frameworks that betters both: A 
and the MPC, e.g. via realizing sustainable business and monetary-economic circuits, or 
more fair-paid true-value-adding jobs that would profit both (A+MPC) at the same time. 
Arithmetically, there are different theoretical optima for MTC13: (1) the profit and loss op-
timum of a country is optimizes when the marginal propensity exactly equals the expendi-
ture revenue ratio (MTC13,max, P+L: when MPSCI=G/T); (2) the nominal GDP or output opti-
mum without a budget deficit is given when G/T=1 if Formula 50 is considered. (3) nominal 
GDP can be further increased at different rates with deficit spending, the higher the MP the 
higher the gains and the lower the saturation equilibrium level of debt, shown as % of GDP.  
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Figure 74 The Marginal Propensity (MPCIS: MPC+MPI+MPS) Determines Output 
Thus, a pure Reaganomics ‘profit maximization’ would lower short-run GDP and bears fac-
tor risks. A balanced budget and a circuit that drives MPCIS and A is recommendable, and 
deficit spending only if its gains cover the costs also of all secondary effects like crowding 
out. Also, too much public/private debt lowers the income velocities, which lowers MPSCI.  
4.3.8.10 MTC14: Behavioral View 
MTC14 comprises the behavioral view channels. It bears all psychological and socio-cultural 
components of economic decision-makers and studies their cognitive vectors as response 
to MP. Psychological and behavioral elements may significantly differ from all assumptions 
of efficient market hypothesis and may be at odds with the assumptions of standard eco-
nomic theory. MP and its economically grounded monetary effects are modeled in MTC14 in 
rational and irrational choice theory, in prospect theory (PT), bounded rationality theory, 
limited information, information-asymmetry and principal agent (PA) behavior models 
(Ross 1973), dual system theory (DST), using temporal, social dimensions, psychology of 
individuals, groups, and masses, using many different concepts and theories (Samson 
2014). There are various concepts about behavioral channels, heuristic, framing/cognitive 
mappings, and market inefficiencies. Empirical work exists about on the Phillips curve, be-
havioral asset pricing models, behavioral research about the elements of aggregate de-
mand (Yellen 2007) and liquidity preference, market volatility phenomena, behavior of risk 
aversion and resource allocation dynamics, speculation psychology, psycho-mechanics of 
shocks and scenarios modeling (e.g. bank runs). More than 1000 publications are available 
since the seminal work of Akerlof (Akerlof & Dickens 1982). The topic is also extensively 
reviewed (Favaretto & Masciandaro 2012; Foote et al. 2009; Hyde et al. 2007; Camerer et 
al. 2008). Empirical perceptions are covered in the expectation channels (MTC10). 
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4.3.8.11 MTC15: Commercial Bank’s Channel 
MTC15 integrates all commercial strategies of MFIs and institutions trading financial prod-
ucts, like equity firms, insurance companies that play role in monetary transmission and 
also includes idiosyncratic decisions or collective ‘market strategies’ that affect output.    
 
Figure 75 Balance Sheet of Euro Area MFIs: 30 Trillion in Assets and Liabilities 
 
Special cases of this channel may be the formation of ‘behind doors’ MFI-non-MFI collabo-
rations and cooperation, or ‘CF-seeking’ MFI hybrid deals within a ‘bank-industry networks 
or clusters’ with different legal economic entities to create profit and CF via mutual interac-
tion. Hereby MTC15 has can distort plain level competition, theoretically very much, but 
very difficult to prove. Monetary transmission has also traditionally excluded the banking 
sector’s resources, such as monetary assets, equity, debt, reserves, refilling liquidity, or any 
checkpoint and MFI vault cash. All of the bank’s cash, monetary assets and liquidity, or its 
potential leverage (it could exert any time), and discount to buy in the real economy 
(1/mtotal) is not researched or reported, and escapes the monetary aggregates (see 2.2.3). 
As a result traditional MT theory has also largely ignored the role of bank property, debt, its 
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leverage and methods to increase mtotal, or the role of capital/equity in the lending channel 
of monetary transmission (Van den Heuvel 2002). Oddly, the most important MP research 
is thus totally missing. In fact, MFI’s assets have shot up by seven trillion in less than a dec-
ade to €31 trillion in 2015. Today, total EMU investment (capital formation) is 60 times less 
than all of these assets (see Figure 75) - again revealing MTC1-16 inefficiency. Rising loans, 
liquidity, and reserves has endowed MFIs with more financial power at the expense of GDP.  
 
4.3.8.12 MTC16: Portfolio Channel 
MTC16 is the last of the new list of MTCs (advanced from Mathews et al. 2013) and is based 
on liquidity preference models of Monetarism (2.3.4) and Keynesianism (2.3.3) combined 
with CAPM-derived preference models and other models based on return on assets. It 
comprises all real economy effects that arise from portfolio changes. Mario Draghi, the cur-
rent ECB President, has recently termed the channel ‘broad portfolio balance channel’ 
(Draghi 2014), indicating that its relevance is in fact also much recognized by the ECB.  
The ‘broad portfolio balance channel’ can activate monetary transmission in many different 
ways while being guided by dynamic demand and supply of assets. MP plays a key role here 
by providing an initial nucleus and structure to asset market’s return expectations, again via 
modulations of the interest rate and quantity of money and the timing and amount of steri-
lized and non-sterilized, cash-effective and non-cash-effective, operations. For example, if 
‘low risk’ assets are purchased by the ECB from investors (e.g. OMO, non-sterilized QE) who 
subsequently substitute their portfolios with new financial products with a higher risk ac-
companied by a prospect of better returns (Draghi 2014) it can have significant impact on 
aggregate economic decision making. Operation of the ECB may shift demand for liquidity, 
holding money, and all financial products comprising equity in many ways. Lateral MTC 
branches are given: e.g. for MTC3,4,6,9 due to shared equity and stock market mechanisms.  
Major portfolio decisions comprise whether to engage in (1) monetary assets (lend-
ing/borrowing market) (2) equity (stocks, other shares), (3) bonds (corporate and govern-
ment), (4) derivatives, options, forwards, and other financial hedging instruments; these 
can be subdivided into (a) decisions to invest domestically in the EMU or (b) abroad. 
MTC16 research describes and models the influence of MP on all combinations of relative 
shifts of above portfolio items and their respective monetary transmission in the economy. 
Indicators for MTC16 are volumes and yield curves of MTC-effective financial instruments.  
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Yields of bonds, monetary assets, and debt securities tend to decline at a low MRO while 
equity is on the rise, empirically validated: EMU yields of bonds and money are falling at 
low MRO rates (6 Figure S15), equity prices (Figure 77) and volumes (Figure 76+78) soar. 
Equity funds balance sheets act as an economic-sensor of core trends (see Figure 76): e.g. 
the volumes of ‘shares and other equity’ reveal and predicted the trends of the stock mar-
kets. After the FC’s plunge of market capitalization (see Figure 78) stocks could regain and 
eventually reached all time highs in 2014-2015, expectable from funds balance sheets, also 
found in the OECD’s index quantification of main stock market trends (see Figure 77). 
 
Figure 76 Equity Funds Asset Portfolio Time-line  
Times of low interest yields on monetary assets (see Figure 34 and Figure 39) made stock 
prices climb (see Figure 77). Simultaneously, EMU resident equity funds had higher stock 
volumes in assets (see Figure 76), in line with current asset market theory and quantifiable.  
One can discern: (1) inter-product and (2) intra-product market forces. Inter-product mar-
ket forces seem to be high but not adjusting as quick as anticipated in the efficient market 
hypothesis. It has been a long matter of debate if stock prices reflect market value in real-
time or not. The slow adjustment of all MTC16 derived inter-product effects reveals: not 
fully. Intra-financial product market forces on the other side are obviously not so much af-
fected and equilibria form fast and in real-time, but are imperfect-information-hyper-
sensitive, and as a result may overshoot (see also 4.3.8.6).  
Taken together, stock prices do not only reflect a corporation’s market value but also in-
clude the relative market value of the ‘financial vehicle’ involved, affected by MP. How real-
istic these ‘doubled demand and supply’ derived stock prices are, remains questionable. 
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Figure 77 Euro Area Share Price Development as Portfolio Indicator 
 
Figure 77 provides empirical evidence that links a country’s finance to its stock prices. The 
dynamic trends reveal that the first step in the monetary transmission of MTC16 and 
MTC3,4,6,9 is efficient. How much of this upstream cascade necessarily results in a down-
stream effect on GDP and ‘jobs’ seems context-dependent. Previous research results mainly 
support a downstream-inefficiency view as investment was poorly responsive (4.3.8.3). In 
years of low interest rates, from 2003-2007 the stock prices had soared until the MOC rate 
upswinged unexpectedly by a total of two points until 2008 - weakening European stock 
markets. The recent ZNLB (2.4.5) has shifted the preference of portfolios much towards 
non-monetary assets, as MP actions mainly exalt here stock prices. The ECB’s 2013 an-
nouncement (flat MRO plus QE) made a 40% stock market growth predictable (via 2).These 
aggregated trends on the stock exchange markets originate from in equity invested ‘house-
holds’, pension and insurance corporations (€9tn) and investment funds (ca. €3tn). Only 
MFI’s equity is constant over time (see Figure 78), as if it were a ‘tacit consent’.  
 
 
Figure 78 Total Market Capitalization (TMC) Portfolio Trend 
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The sum is the EMU’s market capitalization; ca. 50% of shares held by residents are denom-
inated in Euro.   International Management has accelerated trade and a ‘Financial Globali-
zation’ that has changed many markets, also the EU’s real and financial markets (Caprio 
2013). Inter alia this has resulted in a stronger European corporate bond market in addition 
to the expanding G-bond market, known in the EU as ‘sovereign debt securities market’. 
Debt and bond securities have gained 266% since the introduction of the Euro in 1999 (see 
Figure 79) at the expense of cash securities that have lost in volume since the FC/EC. An 
inverse kinetic is found for shares and cash securities (green vs. blue, right). 
 
Figure 79 EMU Monetary versus Equity Portfolio Trends  
 
In consideration of Eonia, Euribor, and NDER developments for households and corpora-
tions (Figure 33 and Figure 39), the natural portfolio shifts should be predictable. MTC16(+3) 
is another channel with a normal upstream functionality and a low transmission down-
stream into the real economy due to legal system based downstream inefficiencies.  
All of these trends reviewed provide a more realistic and comprehensive big picture and 
utility to better predict future investment, consumption, MFIs and financial forces that sus-
tain directions of business evolution, private equity firms, overall financial stability, and 
future portfolio decision, which are all still the key to Corporate Finance and Management.  
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5 Conclusion and Discussion 
First and foremost this review reassures that a true understanding of the Euro area’s econ-
omy absolutely necessitates a comprehensive empirically founded knowledge of its MS. As 
money is the basic core of an economy the economics can be better understood from re-
search of its MS and MP. Sometimes it is even viewed negligible, but in fact it plays the 
most important macroeconomic role, also for all businesses. This research insight is not as 
prevalent as one might expect - due to the common preconception of an efficient MS that 
works in the background only to maintain prices, liquidity, cash supply, and lending. In fact, 
if the MS would be efficient, its role in the economy would be more regular and MP re-
search would be less important. Thus, all misconceptions usually start with a ‘misbelieve in 
an efficient MS’. It is effective not efficient, as it enables high volumes for a minimal output.  
The new hybrid strategy of this study thesis, to research and review the monetary devel-
opments and transmission in the euro area, has proven to be suitable, as it allows to pro-
vide an informative overview, all of a piece to unravel the big picture and what really mat-
ters. Gaps of missing or to be updated research findings (with new data until 7-2015) were 
begun to be closed - including the lack of efficiency of the MS whose details still much es-
capes our knowledge (Görgens et al. 2014; Lee & Crowley 2010; Haan & Berger 2010). For 
the first time in MP research a systematic assessment of all 16 MTC was given here in one 
review and new core routines for data integration and research are proposed. The hybrid 
strategy was successful in uncovering major coherencies that were clearly forgotten by MP 
research - maybe due to the rigid formats of scientific publishing - including today’s censor-
ship of peer-reviewing. Thus, the hybrid research strategy is recommendable for future 
review approaches also in other fields of research. Old research standards, including ‘scien-
tific journals’ need to be replaced by open science with free access (to publish and to access 
publications) and more flexible and transparent formats and structures (David 2004).  
Subtopic-specific conclusions were already given in the respective chapters about MP and 
MTC research results, to which is referred here for all specific interpretations (see Content).  
An integrated and summarizing overview of all 16 MTC channels is given with a clear-cut 
recommendation toward MS reform to benefit EMU businesses, investment, employment 
and GDP growth. Future MP research should follow the strategy of this research approach 
to relentlessly get to the bottom of the monetary transmission efficiency to better under-
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stand the game-theoretical dilemma of the current MS, which is naturally hampered by the 
complexity and MFI-CF-opacity to protect a true private money-creation business model. 
All published MP models of today are general and preliminary (2.4.2), and hence also very 
incomplete. A MTC1-16 based empirical, adjustable and extendable, model is provided here 
that also provides an overview of main findings of all chapters (6.1 Figure S18). It is a sum-
marizing and conclusive weighting chimera-model based on a VAR/DC/ISLM-ADAS derived 
parameters and standard probability Markov-Chain-Matrix models. This prototype model 
further substantiates ‘oscillatory transmission’ (amplitude and frequency effect on MTCs) 
of a MP decisions over time. It shall also serve as a final informative overview of this study. 
Although semi-quantification remains relative and preliminary as MP-efficiency models are 
still in unchartered waters it clearly corroborates a big lack of efficiency in the MS.  
Put simple: newly created money can be channeled out of the Eurosystem’s MTCs via MFI 
‘book keeping entry and accounting methods’ (Werner 2014). Money creation is not limited 
by the money multiplier as money can be recycled into PP by MFI while keeping the overall 
debt level (and their balance sheets) even beneficial for MFIs (=DT), which causes FRI. 
Albeit hard to quantify, due to the dynamical nature of cash flows, ‘there can be no scien-
tific doubt’ about this high level of MTC-inefficiency caused by fractional reserve banking. 
The related MTC-loss is the reason for lower investment, higher unemployment rates, less 
GDP growth rates, more debt, and deep disincentives for ‘economic evolution’: economical-
ly acting banks of firms are fundamentally disadvantaged against illegitimate leverages.     
Hence, first of all, the Eurosystem has to be evaluated to answer the questions: How well 
did the ECB strategy achieve a ‘monetary fit’ with the real economy? (see Table 3 (Sperber 
& Sprink 1990)), but also (I) how well were MP options taken with respect to the ECB’s 
scope, and (II) how well is the EMU’s MS functioning and permitting suitable MP options? 
 
5.1 Evaluation of the ECB’s MP: Towards a Stewardship of the Eurosystem 
5.1.1 Price and Economic Growth Stabilization Policy  
The ECB’s price policy has achieved to be on target in the medium term with inflation be-
low, but close to, 2%. Only temporary fluctuations of inflation were higher than 2% or be-
low 0% (Figure 3) and occurred momentarily during crises or shocks, and were generally 
avoided. But the definition of medium-term still has to be specified: e.g. four to five years. 
The interpretation of the ECB’s legal mandate to foster EMU and EU wide economic growth 
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could have received an earlier and higher level of emphasis and prioritization - in the ECBs 
scope. The general MP’s assessed were often found to be relatively appropriate given its 
legal scope. And that is exactly the problem: the ECB doesn’t have the scope to solve the 
dilemmas and MP problems - only a MS change could.  However, some empirically founded 
points of critique can generally be established (see Table 9). In summary, the EU Great 
Moderation, independence, Bundesbank-like MP ‘inflation targeting’ and Maastricht crite-
ria have stabilized prices, and today the ECB assumes its role for growth more than before. 
 
5.1.2 Empirically Founded Critique of the ECB’s Monetary Policy 
Table 9 Evaluation of the ECB’s MP: empirically founded critique  
(1) Crisis Management (CM) of the ECB’s MPs during shocks and crises:  
(1.1) A delay of CM in the FC: a too high MRO rate (Figure 35), early contractive MP 
(1.2) A delay of CM in the EC: a lack of bond stability (Figure 40); a fiscal-monetary 
framework could have prevented many secondary, and panic-driven, costs of 
the EC, the Councils technical decisions on the EFSF/ESM and the OMTs 
(Castells et al. 2014) of 8-2012 could have been more preventive, as well as 
cost-effective and just-in-time (e.g. GPIIS): MP was effective but not efficient. 
(1.3) Permeating liquidity and cumulative CFs were too low for job creation or GDP 
growth, especially during the FC and EC (e.g. Greece, 4.1.1.1) indicating ECB-
involvement, overall debt level is too high, non-absorbed penetrance of three 
crises on the job market (2002, 2008, 2012, Figure 51) and output (Figure 13). 
(2) Economic growth policy of the ECB: 
(2.1) Lack of a transparent systematic orderly open market purchase program: EMU 
wide Euro bonds or G-bond purchases program with automatic stability mechanism. 
(2.2) No solution developed for all MTC inefficiencies, first detected here (see 4.3.8). 
(2.3) Less supply of ‘transactional money’ circulating in the real economy (see 4.1.2). 
(2.4) Lack of effective monetary incentives driving investment (see Figure 63). 
(2.5) Sub-optimal fine-tuning of velocities for output (Figure 13, Figure 51). 
(2.6) Sub-optimal Keynesian anti-cyclic stabilization MP. 
(2.7) Lending Benchmark Calculations (e.g. for TLTROs, etc.) are the first step in the 
right direction but do not go far enough: Lending margins and deleveraging must be 
a pre-requisite for all MP operations. All ECB lending and allowances must be better 
coupled to MTC function. All MFI cash and lending margins must be ECB specified.   
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(3) Efficiency and Effectiveness of the ECB’s MP: 
(3.1) The effectiveness of the ECB’s MP can still be achieved, in full agreement with 
the ECB president Mario Draghi (Black & Speciale 2015), but at very high costs and 
low efficiency, owing to the MS: i.e. most of the new money doesn’t benefit MTCs.  
Effectiveness if only achievable at low efficiency represents a high risk for the EMU. 
(3.2) Efficiency is minimized by ‘MP dilemma’ causing excess reserves, high PTs, un-
coupled leverage, illegitimate money multiplication with no allowance demarcation.  
(3.3) Inefficiency prevails if MFIs may hoard, recycle and privatize liquidity/money.  
(3.4) Inefficiency from accommodative MP during expansion (Lee & Crowley 2010). 
(4) ECB’s Integration Policy for Heterogeneities in the Eurozone: 
(4.1) A better weighting that fully includes all country risks and benefits is needed: a 
single MP has to form a better compromise for the differing demands and condi-
tions of the economies of all members. The ECB/EU has not developed customized 
MP tools, which are required as countries face differing challenges. The degree of 
austerity imposed on debtor countries (Greece 4.1.1.1, etc.) controverts an inevita-
bly needed Keynesian stimulus (see 4.3.8.6) and monolithic normative fiscal-MP 
package; the reversed MRO rate and PT in 2011 were disadvantageous (4.3.1, 4.3.2). 
(4.2) EMU financial sector heterogeneity and lack of competition still persist (4.3.2 
and (Lee & Crowley 2010; Blot 2013; Peersman 2004)); also: financial heterogeneity. 
(5) The ECB’s Performance in Monetary Transmission (see 4.3): 
MTCs are effective not efficient and several lack down-stream responsiveness: For 
example, loss of transmission in MTC3,4 occurs post-stock market price increases - 
which is not the ‘ECB’s fault’ but an empirical factor that lowers MTC performance. 
By far too much new money is needed to stimulate new investment and GDP.    
(6) Ability to plan and control the money supply: M0: high, M1: medium M2-4: low (4.1.1) 
(7) Target accuracy: inflation: medium-high, output: low, employment rate: low 
(8) Decomposition of transmission on output and prices: low-medium   
(9) Liquidity supply for real economy: (4.1.1), ECB 15.2% vs. Fed: 22.7% of GDP (M0) 
(10) Wrong use of the Taylor model in 2007-2009, which might have worsened the FC. 
2008: the Taylor model recommended lowering the MRO rate but it was increased; 
it implies a bigger gap in output in 2009. During crisis, ZNLB, or steadily increasing 
market interest rates the Taylor model is partially disproved here: as the dependen-
cy of market rates on key rates is ‘not counterbalanced’ (6 Fig. S16): if market rates 
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stepwise grow with a MRO a feedback drops GDP and investment (e.g. pre-FC). 
Evaluation of MP via models (DSGE-VAR, Taylor, etc.) is hampered by a lack of integ-
rity (2.4.2), data, parameters, or output gap estimates (Orphanides & Norden 2002).  
(11) Democratic mandate: independence historically profited price stability due to less 
idiosyncratic MP, but lacks a democratic mandate for always effective economic MP.  
(12) Social Disparity Dilemma: Less liquidity is more efficient but less effective. Tight 
money provides less leeway for MFI to deprive money (ca. >€250bn p.a.), but effi-
cient MP harms the economy by causing high real interest rates. New money mainly 
profits MFIs and the wealthy, not the economy/customers, due to MTC inefficiency. 
MP diminishes the relative return for high savings volumes of the general public.  
Most of all MTCs assayed reveal a ‘better’ monetary fit to economic condition from 2002-
2007. This time was characterized by low interest rate expectations (see 4.3.1,  Figure 34), a 
heightened global usage and demand of Euro also as international currency vehicle (BIS 
2013), and inter-crisis economic growth and investment. Aligning the liquidity preference, 
money balances (Figure 21), and the BoP (see Figure 58) reveals a generally suitable ex-
change rate policy but the EC has unnecessarily damaged the Euros reputation and demand 
as vehicle: faster, concerted policy actions would have prevented a big loss.In spite of eve-
rything listed in Table 9, although with delay, the ECB’s CM helped stabilize prices, con-
sumption and GDP to some extent. But it lacks a mandate to shrink the debt EU debt over-
load. Today’s MP limitations fully hinder the ECB to solve most of the very important MTC 
‘inefficiency issues’. Through this, the ECB is ‘condemned to be effective’ although at the 
‘second highest costs’ for the economy (the highest cost would be ineffectiveness). Money 
is at the very core of all nations. It still escapes democratic control. Typified, the FC+EC are 
only forerunner tips of ‘fractional’ ice bergs to market economies. 
5.2 Evaluations of the MS: Towards a Digital Full-Reserve System 
5.2.1 The Requirement and Imperative of Monetary Reform 
Due to all empirical reasons found here and many others elsewhere, monetary reform is 
highly urged for, in this research review, and also since more than a century by a majority 
of experts, including top MP researcher all around the world to (1) overcome the fraud of 
fractional reserve banking, and (2) the crisis caused by the gold standard, until today.  
While fiat money has replaced the gold standard, fractional reserve banking has still not 
been removed, although there is scientifically ‘no need for it at all’ in fiat money based MS. 
5 Conclusion and Discussion / 5.2 / 5.2.1 
Page | 168 
 
For instance, producing legal tender or digital money can be done at almost zero, or very 
low, marginal costs - relative to money’s PP. Only in the past, when precious metal and gold 
was coupled to money fractional reserve banking helped to deal with its scarcity (e.g. gold). 
Today, fractional reserve banking is not required and poses high financial risks to the econ-
omy. This empirical EMU research further substantiates the need for MS reform (Table 10):  
Table 10 Ten Substantiations of the Imperative to Terminate Fractional Reserve Banking 
(I) DT could be further substantiated in several chapters. Also, credit and money 
are interfused by MFIs and cannot be fully separated leading to very strong PAP; 
risk of different types of ‘bank-runs’; MFI liquidity not assignable PAP: e.g. MFIs 
can freely benefit private non-MFIs with created money and leverage. As a re-
sult of fractional reserves kinetics of all velocities of money (see 4.1.2) and mon-
ey multipliers (see 4.1.3) negatively progress, notwithstanding the fact of a con-
stancy of Friedman’s technical and procedural velocity parameters. Delivering 
evidence that the real quantity and/or velocity of money must be much higher.  
(II) The strong shift from a ‘transactional to a storage function of money’ (see Table 
1) further maintains this view and DT (see 4.1.2; see 4.3.8.12): this is further cor-
roborated by comparing trends of income and TA velocity (as difference index). 
(III) Additionally, fractional reserve banking is detrimental to all procedures and evo-
lution of ‘good-bank competition’: liquidity recycling, deprivation, and multipli-
cation abolish a real and fair competition and a suitable evolution of the real 
economy and financial sector. This can be also seen in the ongoing development 
of an increased pass through (PT) in the Euro zone (see 4.3.2). The real interest 
rates even grew (4.3.8.1) in response to the ECB’s MP and a minimal MRO rate. 
(IV) The overall lack of efficiency indicates a CB/MFI market failure, monopolization 
and networking, and is based on illegitimate reuse of extrinsic MFI liquidity (DT). 
Concerted MFI-network actions might be also seen in equity markets (4.3.8.12). 
(V) Statistical analysis (multivariate regression functions, and VAR coefficient matri-
ces) reveals (a previously undescribed) ‘EMU background inflation’ (FRI) that is 
fully independent of GDP and money (M0) growth, and other macro-parameters. 
EMU background inflation contributes to more than half of aggregate inflation 
of normal other types of inflation (see 2.2.2). Positive supply or demand shocks 
cannot explain FRI, as global pricing has stabilized EMU prices. This new type of 
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inflation is termed ‘fractional reserve inflation’ (FRI) as it is based on MFI’s re-
peated reuse of extrinsic money and book money re-creation (DT). While the re-
al economy has to bear the full costs of FRI, MFIs benefit from it multiple times. 
FRI or ‘background inflation’ is not caused by the quantity of money released by 
the ECB (see 4.1.1) but stems from private money creation: A new interpretation 
of the Phillips Curve arises: in normal years FRI (‘stolen liquidity’) of MFIs drives 
jobs and prices as MTC-active money is created/spent, which is usually scarcer.  
In summary: EMU FRI or background inflation (see 4.1.1) endorses the recently 
upcoming ‘deprivation of money and property deprivation theory’ (see 2.2.3).  
(VI) Crowding out (Cecchetti & Kharroubi 2013) stems from money deprivation (DT). 
(VII) The money multipliers reveal that CBs and MFIs have gained a cryptic, tucked 
away, extra-leverage (see 4.1.3): a potential to secretly privatize created money.  
(VIII) Huge amounts of excess reserves evidence a lack of competition, a lending mar-
ket and MTC failure, but also MFI networks: a typified inefficiency of monetary 
transmission. Excess reserves accumulated post FC/EC, since 2013, and much 
overshoot again today (2015-7) despite all ECB’s operations including negative 
interest rates for all deposits held in its vault (since June 2014, see 4.2.2.3): an 
emergency measure that no other central bank in the world had to implement 
before to cope with the market inefficiency caused by MFIs (most ‘Economists’ 
said it could not happen). Banks are reluctant to pass negative interest rates to 
customers halting monetary transmission. In fractional reserve banking legal 
tender is hoarded by MFIs/CBs and overall debt is artificially increased. As a re-
sult, adequate MTC function is lacking necessitating ‘helicopter money’. 
(IX) Liquidity is systematically soaked out of the real economy of transactions by 
banks (MFIs). As liquidity (cash), always ends up at a bank again it can be reused 
multiple times per year precious property assets can be bought by banks for no 
real countervalue (for free). This not only hinders business evolution, and op-
poses good economic incentives - it also represents an element of a crime that 
sooner or later will be termed the ‘biggest financial crime in human history’ by a 
free press. The MFI extra leverage of also drives speculation and financial crises.  
(X) In fractional reserve banking the central bank, the ECB, lost and steadily loses its 
natural and legitimate control over the money supply and money creation see 
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(see 4.1). Even a perfect MP could not solve such issues of a monetary system, 
as much as Basel I-III and the ‘Single Supervisory Mechanism’ (4-11-2014) can’t.  
All of these urging arguments of Table 10 add to a very old hard-fought debate about the 
right MS - and straightforwardly, it takes much prowess of any job-depending scientist to 
take an independent stance on this obviously dangerous topic: since hundreds of years im-
portant opponents of fractional reserve banking have been endangered and attacked, or 
ignored: e.g. Abraham Lincoln (assassinated for fighting human but also financial slavery), 
Irving Fisher and the majority of US Economists were systematically ignored and muted for 
urging a full-reserve system (Douglas et al. 1939), US Senator Bronson M Cutting was po-
tentially assassinated in a plane crash, which then reversed the momentum of a US Federal 
Full-Reserve Bill in 1934 and changed the history of the US from then on), or the US Presi-
dent Woodrow Willson who was manipulated, who later admitted that he was fooled [in 
the complex details] to sign the Federal Reserve Act, saying a few years later: ‘I have unwit-
tingly ruined my country’, and ‘banking system is to be public not private, must be vested in 
the government itself so that the banks must be the instruments, not the masters, of the 
[money creation] business’, and many more, maybe discovering an old hidden network that 
uses crime and manipulation to enforce fractional reserve banking, to gain money for free. 
Scientific pressure to quit fractional reserve banking was advocated by the world’s top MP 
experts, including: Irving Fisher (Father of MP and Monetarism, key macroeconomist like 
Schumpeter called him ‘the Greatest Economist the US has ever produced’ [Schumpeter 
himself was ‘born’ in Moravia])(Fisher 1936), Post-Keynesian Economics that is build on full-
reserve only (and doesn’t apply to fractional reserve banking), Milton Friedman (Father of 
Monetarism, and modern central bank MPs) (Goodhart & Illing 2003; Friedman 1948), also 
‘the last evaluated majority of top US MP researchers’ (Douglas et al. 1939), F. Graham, 
Henry Simons, Frank Knight, and many more of the world’s very top MP researcher of the 
past and today. Nowadays, the list proceeds with top MP researchers like Laurence 
Kotlikoff (Kotlikoff 2009), Murray Rothbard (Rothbard 2010), John Cochrane (Cochrane 
2014), Jesús Huerta de Soto (Soto 1995), Martin Wolf (Wolf 2014), David Stockman (MI 
2015) and many more top-experts of the matter: Mervyn King (Bank of England Chief)(Reiss 
2015), James Tobin (world prominent macroeconomist professor, nobel laureate, Board of 
Governors of the Fed), Herman Daly (former Senior Economist of the World Bank), Murray 
Rothbart (economist, historian, political theorist, identified that fractional reserve banking 
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as fraud) (MI 2015), John Kay (Founder of Economics at London School of Economics, coun-
cil of economic advisors Scotland), Thorsten Pollite (Frankfurt School of  Finance and Man-
agement), the entire Austrian School of Economics (MI 2015), Jörg Guido Hülsman, Mathew 
C Klein (Bloomberg, Financial Times publisher) and many more (IMMR 2015; Kumhof & 
Benes 2012; Douglas et al. 1939; Keynes 1923; MM 2015; Goodhart & Illing 2003; MI 2015; 
and references within these publications and based on Washington'sBlog).  
Many international political grass root organizations with millions of followers still grow 
further and lobby a bill of debt-free ‘positive money’ to also enable a ‘democratic free mar-
ket economy’, and distinct proposals and draft laws exist to strictly prohibit any type of 
fractional reserve banking (PM 2014; MM 2015; IMMR 2015; MI 2015; Reiss 2015 and 
references of proposals herein), some are dealt with in government circles. Legislative pro-
posals exist, which only need to be signed. As Irving Fisher and others have also claimed: 
fractional reserve banking (1) worsens the business cycle, (2) boosts public/private debt, (3) 
leads to unhealthy accumulation of debt and wealth, harming the economy and its evolu-
tion, (4) allows banks to withdraw high volumes of purchasing power, of money, out of 
nothing, a full-reserve is highly urged for by a majority of true experts, and is even now 
supported and backed by a new IMF study (Kumhof & Benes 2012). To circumvent the inef-
ficiencies and ineffectiveness, accounting fraud, unfair competition, financial market failure 
and ‘business evolution’ failure due to free-money loopholes, MS reform is in fact absolute-
ly required (IMMR 2015; Kumhof & Benes 2012; Douglas et al. 1939; MI 2015; Soto 1995). 
 
5.2.2 Proposition of Key Core Elements for Monetary Reform 
When a fractional reserve is replaced by a full-reserve banking system, additional means 
are much needed: these have to compensate for the lack of private money recycled by MFI, 
which has a positive side effect: billions of liquidity are freed in an efficient MS that can be 
used to pay back debt balance budget, invest in the local factor (infrastructure, education, 
and to finance reforms and modernization, etc. or e.g. to provide better tax incentives), and 
also for the private sector investment (to profit investment and investing firms). New mon-
ey would stop being neutral, but could turn positive, for output. Positive in two ways: (1) 
Ending the classical neutrality of money, and (2) excess indebtedness, both drives GDP, by 
stabilizing velocities (see 4.1.2), the debt burden (4.1.5), firm evolution and investment. 
New secure information technologies (IT) make the prospect of a widely cash-less mone-
tary system (MS) and society based on a ‘digital full-reserve’ (for references see 5.2.1) al-
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ready feasible today. Today, most of all money (ca. 90%) is already digitalized (book-money 
and reserves). A digital full-reserve system is the next most logical step: it is a technological 
and monetary-economical progress. A fractional reserve is like a gold standard a regression.  
Digital countable money offers economic growth and a much better security at once: as 
money would be fully trackable (every unit is electronically registered), all money related 
crimes would become ‘entirely visible’ to authorities. This could be the end of nearly all 
financial crime, of any kind. A tax software add-on (both is already feasible to program to-
day) could also diminish most tax and accounting crimes and optimize and automatized all 
financial processes in the EMU, but new legislation would be also required. A new fairness 
of competition would prevail due to electronically assured neutrality of treatment, non-
discrimination, most-favored-entity treatment (MFE), closed MFI money-loopholes, in a 
most convenient, transparent and testable way. Fiscal-financial-economic crises would end.  
Besides technical-methodological, logical, ethical, economical, and population’s demand for 
MS reform, demand also arises due to a wanted comfort and convenience in payment: cus-
tomers increasingly prefer cash-less payments in many forms and new devices: Since the FC 
also the image of MFIs and CBs, and the MS, has ‘crashed’. In digital full-reserve banking 
MFIs would not need to have more cash in their vaults (the often heard but wrong counter-
argument), as legal tender is easily and comfortably transferred electronically to MFIs and 
everybody’s account. Higher elasticity of money found in fractional reserve banking is given 
via the central bank’s electronic (automated) money supply to MFIs, ending interbank lend-
ing. As money is created and supplied only by the ECB it much improves all MPs at once. 
A remaining ‘need’ of cash money could be tracked with RFID (radio frequency identifica-
tion), or a technology alike, so that every circulating monetary unit can be monitored.  
Demand for ‘consuming electronic money’ is also on the rise in the EMU: preliminary elec-
tronic money institutions have doubled in the last four years to 6500. €875m in E-money 
have been issued by non-MFIs, and €6bn by MFIs (ECB 2015c) in various ways and for many 
different electronic devices (but still with ‘bad fractional-reserve banking money’). But E-
money can only be efficient and effective in a full-reserve system with a strictly and invari-
able prohibition of all private money creation, including book money. As a result only legal-
ly allowed and efficient money would be used (Art. 128 of the Treaty): digitally and as 
cash.The higher efficiency would also profit the economy via heightening velocities and the 
marginal propensity to spend (Formula 50, Formula 51, Figure 74): the economy’s output 
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would boom again until enough jobs, prosperity, goods and services are reached for every-
body, and a basic free market economy can finally emerge, without loophole of PP depriva-
tion. This new MS would bear extreme benefits and chances but also new risks due to a 
new level of control and power over the money supply and economy that must be well sur-
veyed and orderly managed, IT logistics needs to be safe and compatible with interfaces.    
5.3 Recommendations for Economic Actors and Traders 
5.3.1 Understanding Monetary Transmission for a Better Forecasting 
Understanding monetary developments and transmission mechanisms that are described in 
this research will help economic actors and traders to better orient and embed their deci-
sion in the context of dynamically changing macroeconomic frameworks. MTC research 
helps to better forecast and predict the future of macro trends for businesses and traders.  
VAR forecasts provided here predict a slight future economic recovery for the Eurozone 
(see Figure 5). Due to the final-value-problem of forecast chain models, VAR forecasts - 
widely used should be interpreted carefully in economics - they may only provide some 
basic but helpful information about potential tendencies (6.1 Figure S3). To circumvent this 
drawback VAR models can be extended and combined with Pearson’s Time Matrix models, 
also known as dynamic correlations (6.1 Figure S4, 4.3.4) and ISLM-ADAS models (see 6.1 
Figure S7-12), New-Keynesian, and all other available models. The newly developed ISLM-
ADAS dynamical semi-quantitative model framework predicts a very low inflation this year 
and a rise in HICP starting in 2017 (see 6.1 Figure S13), in line with the Pearson’s Time Ma-
trix Model (6.1 Figure S4, 4.3.4). A reliability-weighted overlap of models is recommended.  
Once - or whenever - firms depend on profitability they need to find a strategic fit between 
the environment and its resources and competencies. Globalization and MP have had tre-
mendous effects on the real economy. More than ever, strategists have to include the in-
ternational and macroeconomic monetary, economic and fiscal developments into their 
calculations. Many investment decisions depend on NPV and internal cash flow (ICF) calcu-
lations and include WACC and other financial parameters to dynamically estimate profita-
bility and return on investment (ROI). Hence, slight changes in interest rates, nominal and 
real, or Fx rates, or the business cycle, consumption and investment, all have big implica-
tions for aggregate microeconomic decision making. Understanding past macroeconomic 
and monetary trend in the Euro are is helpful for future planning (a) of financial manage-
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ment (b) of supply and value chain management, (c) planning of marketing, consumption, 
and sales forecasts, (d) international management, and (e) a political recommendation for 
economic entities is given to support full-reserve banking that would profit all businesses. 
5.3.2 Updated Understanding of Monetary Transmission 
Although mainly basic but most important topics were covered, more sophisticated in 
depth research is needed but should be based on the given core framework of this study, as 
it provides the right perspective on the monetary system and its MP for applied research: 
with the key focus of how to improve efficiency and effectiveness of money the one and 
only key topic of economics - that was, beyond believe, forgotten by MP research. Econom-
ic decision makers need to be aware that an updated view is as important as a comprehen-
sive one. To enable the reader to update all figures in the main text all accession numbers 
of the figures in the result part and electronic references and internet pages are provided 
to get an own fast overview of the latest trends and developments in just a view clicks. The 
review may serve as a manual or work of reference for a quick review of the main trends.   
5.4 Concluding Remarks 
The Eurosystem has been established successfully, despite of many initial doubts in 1999, 
and has robustly protruded throughout three severe financial crises: the dotcom bubble, 
the FC and EC, and the ECB could manage to be on its main targets. But for all that, the in-
ternational reputation of the euro - as global monetary vehicle - has slightly and unneces-
sarily tapered off - mainly due to the EC and the malaise of the slow EU recovery also in 
comparison to the US or the EMU’s growth prospects of 2008 (EC 2008). This research ar-
gues that a primary cause is the fractional reserve system but this is also found in the US, 
which generate 175.000 new jobs per month in the last years (WB 2015). The reason for 
this difference is believed to be a higher entrepreneurial activity in the US (Bosma et al. 
2013), in fact most new US jobs are created by new businesses, a lack if a EC (but reoccur-
ring fiscal cliffs), a 1-year faster reaction of the Fed, more efficient and effective bail-outs 
after the FC, as the US got the big detail a bit more right (better for tax-payers, less good for 
non-banks), and because US regulators have more control and coordination over MFIs. Still 
the US also suffers from high losses due to fractional reserve banking and the fiscal cliffs are 
the direct consequence of it. Thus, this study in fact stresses the global need for more unbi-
ased MP reviews about the MS, also for a very broad group of people - and a MS change.
6 Appendix / 6.1  
Page | 175 
 
6 Appendix  
 A hyperlink to Table of Supplementary Figures, chapter 6.1, page 175. 
 A hyperlink to References - Bibliography, chapter 6.2, page 187. 
 A hyperlink to Sources, Data Retrieval and Processing, chapter 6.3, page 201. 
 
6.1 Supplementary Figures 
Supplementary Figure S1 Inflation Sub-index: Composition of the HICP Index .................. 176 
Supplementary Figure S2 Converging Global Long-Term Interest Rates (MEI,OECD stats) 176 
Supplementary Figure S3 Long-Run VAR(p-lag:12) Monthly Forecast (HICP, rGDP) .......... 177 
Supplementary Figure S4 Pearson’s DC (p-lag: 4) Forecast (Annual Data, EMU, nGDP) .... 177 
Supplementary Figure S5 Peason’s DC Test of the Pre-EMU’s M3/HICP Effects ................. 178 
Supplementary Figure S6 Inventory Early-Indicator Dependence on M2 and M3 ............... 178 
Supplementary Figure S7 Dynamic IS-LM-ADAS Model for Closed and Open Economies.. 179 
Supplementary Figure S8 A Positive Money Shock on Prices in the IS-LM-ADAS Model .... 180 
Supplementary Figure S9 A Positive Output Shock on Prices in the IS-LM-ADAS Model ... 181 
Supplementary Figure S10 A Positive Demand Shock on Prices in the IS-LM-ADAS Model 182 
Supplementary Figure S11 Overlay-Chart-Analysis of Demand, GDP Rate and Inflation ... 183 
Supplementary Figure S12 Modeling the ECBs recent QE Strategy in a ZNLB Scenario ..... 183 
Supplementary Figure S13 Semi-Quantitative IS-LM-ADAS/DC Prediction of Inflation ...... 184 
Supplementary Figure S14 ECB’s 2015 Official Inflation Forecast ...................................... 185 
Supplementary Figure S15 Euro Area Bond Yields .............................................................. 185 
Supplementary Figure S16 Phillips Curve and Taylor Model for the EMU .......................... 185 
Supplementary Figure S17 GDP and Innovation Correlation Interactomics Network ........ 186 
Supplementary Figure S18 MS Model Based on Markov Chain Probability Matrix using 
Parameters of all Empirical MTC1-16 Estimates and DC/VAR/ISLM-ASAD Time Dynamics 186 
6 Appendix / 6.1  
Page | 176 
 
 
 
Supplementary Figure S1 Inflation Sub-index: Composition of the HICP Index 
 
 
Supplementary Figure S2 Converging Global Long-Term Interest Rates (MEI,OECD stats) 
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Supplementary Figure S3 Long-Run VAR(p-lag:12) Monthly Forecast (HICP, rGDP) 
Explanation Figure S3 The pessimistic GDP growth rate illustrates a technical issue of VAR analysis 
tools if crisis outliers (FC+EC) are fully considered. This low growth pattern is overrepresented in 
future forecast models. Hence, yearly data must be weighted by probability of reoccurrence (these 
models are more realistic in quantitative terms, but not shown here). This shows that maybe all VAR 
models that are in use by ECB and other MP research are questionable as they are all not corrected. 
  
Supplementary Figure S4 Pearson’s DC (p-lag: 4) Forecast (Annual Data, EMU, nGDP) 
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Supplementary Figure S5 Pearson’s DC Test of the Pre-EMU’s M3/HICP Effects 
 
 
Supplementary Figure S6 Inventory Early-Indicator Dependence on M2 and M3 
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Supplementary Figure S7 Dynamic IS-LM-ADAS Model for Closed and Open Economies 
Explanation Figure S7 Keynesian models still form the very core of all relevant MP simulations. They 
are based on the Keynesian-Hicks IS-LM and ADAS framework (see The Keynesian IS-LM Model 
and the AD-AS Model) and are further adjusted in various ways for real world scenarios. This IS-
LM model was advanced by integrating the Aggregate-Demand-Aggregated Supply (ADAS) model 
into a monolithic graphical and arithmetically dynamic and semi-quantitative solution. The newly 
created core model consist of all known elements of Keynesian Economics and the Hicks model 
(Keynes 1936; Mankiw 2014; Hicks 1939) and integrates them into a common system of ‘eight mac-
ro models’ by adding some new features to the traditional model: The model incorporates eight 
widely used time-parametric  inter-acting sub-models: (1) the Keynesian Cross, (2) investment, (3) 
real money market, (4) IS-IM, (5) ADAS, (6) single and multiple Nx rates (7) single or multiple Fx 
rates (exchange rate), and optionally also (8) Net BOP-current account (balance of the BoP current 
account) models. This 8-fold co-model provides for a timed coordination of (1) a horizontal and (2) 
two vertical axes that are spanning throughout the sub-models, since they are arranged to repre-
sent the same variable: (a) the interest rate (to be assayed), (b) output, GDP, income and (c) Fx 
rates. Additional building blocks and adjustments are feasible. It integrates key ISLM/ADAS/Fx/NX-
related and accepted textbook knowledge (Mankiw 2014; Mathews et al. 2013; Giddy 1994; Giddy 
1976). MPs to maintain the objective price stability (see 2.1.3) during shocks can be modeled: as (1) 
money driven price level, (2) income-driven price level, and (3) demand-driven price level scenarios: 
they are exemplarily modeled in Appendix  S8-S13. Key theoretical MP-mechanics can be derived.   
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Supplementary Figure S8 A Positive Money Shock on Prices in the IS-LM-ADAS Model 
Explanation Figure S8  In this shock scenario various monetary stimuli (M) shift the real money bal-
ances (M/P) as supply (stroked line) moves to the right, thereby flattening the liquidity preference 
equilibrium, leading to lower interest rates (real, nominal, effective; multiple assays). A timed re-
sponse benefits (a) investment [which also shifts the AD curve over time and thus also output, later 
prices], (b) it changes the IS-LM equilibrium and (c) it depreciates the Fx rate (in the short, medium 
and long-run: i.e. SR, MT, and LR). A change in the IS-LM equilibrium (shift of the LM curve) has an 
effect on the output axis. As a consequence, aggregate demand’s LRAS function increases (shift to 
the right) and drives the short-run aggregate supply (SRAS) and AD curve to the right, in turn lead-
ing to higher prices in the mid-term and long-term and sticky price in the short run and immediate-
ly. The third key variable is the Fx rate (the foreign exchange rate) that is also implemented as an 
axis that integrates with three fields. If the interest rate falls as real money balances increase money 
also becomes less scarce. In an open economy (not shown): a lower interest rate effectuates a low-
er capital inflow/outflow ratio and short-term demand for the currency weakens (shift to the right). 
Following, a depreciated Fx rate shifts the export import ratio (Nx) towards less import and more 
export. This changes the Keynesian cross in feed-forward loop and benefits output and employ-
ment. Note: due to a fractional reserve banking system all Keynesian models have to be adjusted.  
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Supplementary Figure S9 A Positive Output Shock on Prices in the IS-LM-ADAS Model 
Explanation  Figure S9 A second quintessential factor of economics for price developments and MP 
is the income dependency of the price level over time. If income (Y, output) is growing it is known to 
have a negative effect on inflation: one can speak of ‘real output-driven deflation’. If there are more 
goods and services in the economy, and money stays constant, the effect is going to be that money 
becomes relatively more precious. If income increases, it shifts the IS curve to the right and finds a 
new IS-LM equilibrium at a higher interest rate, which lowers investment, and increases liquidity 
preference. It hereby deflates prices in the mid-term and in between the mid-term and the long-
run, and prices first become stable in the long run. Interestingly, the SRAS, real money balance, 
price level and interest rate fluctuate simultaneously, resulting in a temporary dynamic volatility 
which can be prevented by coevally adjusting the money supply. Hereby MP can easily achieve a 
non-deflationary growth and positive expectations if the timing derived from such a model - further 
specialized and adapted - is considered. The variety of scenarios also depends on the individual 
velocities of money which are included as parametric variables - as many other factors can be in-
cluded. If they remain unchanged a deflationary change would function-proportionally solidify.  
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Supplementary Figure S10 A Positive Demand Shock on Prices in the IS-LM-ADAS Model  
Explanation Figure S10 A special case within the Keynesian IS-LM models is the unique but long 
described ‘demand-driven inflation’. The IS-LM-ADAS model can verify the effect and add some new 
insights. The effect of demand on prices has been referred to in the Dynamic Aggregate Demand  
model (DAD) and to some extend in a demand Taylor model (Mankiw 2014), and also originally in 
Keynesian Theory (Keynes 1936). It is also known as demand-pull inflation, in contrasts cost-push 
inflation. The effect is a result of a gap between aggregate demand (AD) and aggregate supply in the 
short-run (see SRAS): if AD is higher than SRAS an inflationary constellation and potential develops 
(Keynes 1936), especially if demand increases suddenly, and marginal supply becomes more inelas-
tic, both can make prices rise faster. Generally, this could also drive wages and income but usually 
to a lesser extent than is needed for a robust demand driven growth addition without price distor-
tions. An anteceding sudden shift of AD to the right benefits output and has a faster effect on pric-
es. It early shifts the money balance, interest rates rise, and investment falls. The higher price level 
successively shifts the LM curve upward into a new equilibrium with a lower output. Planned ex-
penditure falls and the SRAS moves upwards, as prices. The LTAS de-stabilizes and a vicious cycle of 
inflation gains momentum with substantial risks to price stability, but with a lower probability in the 
real economy.  Real world demand, GDP and inflation trends are shown in Appendix Figure S11.  
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Supplementary Figure S11 Overlay-Chart-Analysis of Demand, GDP Rate and Inflation 
 
 
Supplementary Figure S12 Modeling the ECBs recent QE Strategy in a ZNLB Scenario  
Explanation Figure S12 After the Financial and Euro crises the ECB ‘had to’ decrease the key interest 
rates (especially the MRO) and thereby the nominal interest rates in the euro area, which has hap-
pened with some delay and pass-through inefficiency (see 4.3.1 and 4.3.2). Having these measures 
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implemented the ECB has exhausted its capacity to decrease the European central rates, and mon-
ey market and nominal market rates. This phenomenon is called the zero nominal lower-bound or 
ZNLB (see 2.4.5). The model also predicts a liquidity trap as suggested by Keynesian Theory but 
amends the model by all additional MTCs (e.g. equity effect on investment, among all other effects). 
QE are thus the extension of regular MP and the ZNLB is of course not the end of regulation of in-
terest rates. Approaches include buying government bonds from the market or ‘helicopter money’ 
for all people (e.g. via QE based tax or insurance deductions as MP instrument; only those that can 
benefit the local factor; regulated by an independent authority). Even if lending doesn’t respond to 
the ECB’s QE strategy there are still many other MTCs, that drive investment, but several suffer 
from low downstream efficiency, and much effectiveness is lost due to fractional reserve banking. It 
diminishes good incentives for investors and money holders - as money is created out of nothing by 
private MFIs and even publicly controlled MFI could potentially misuse private money creation. As 
long as there are free money loopholes there is no need to take the risk of value-adding investment. 
 
Supplementary Figure S13 Semi-Quantitative IS-LM-ADAS/DC Prediction of Inflation 
Explanation Figure S13 (ST) The IS-LM-ADAS model predicts that prices stay the same in the short-
run - this also corresponds with the correlation of M3 and inflation of year 0-3 after the monetary 
stimulus (Figure 49). (MT) The IS-LM-ADAS model predicts that prices go up in the medium term - 
this corresponds to year 4-6 after the monetary stimulus, showing a strong correlation (Figure 49). 
(LT) The IS-LM-ADAS model predicts a decline between the medium-term and long-term - and cor-
relation in inverse in between year 7-9 after the monetary stimulus. Due to the semi-quantitative 
nature of the model it can only predict a general trend and not a clear quantification of future HICP. 
The ECB’s official inflation forecast is given in Appendix  S14. 
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Supplementary Figure S14 ECB’s 2015 Official Inflation Forecast 
 
 
Supplementary Figure S15 Euro Area Bond Yields 
 
 
Supplementary Figure S16 Phillips Curve and Taylor Model for the EMU 
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Supplementary Figure S17 GDP and Innovation Correlation Interactomics Network 
 
 
 
Supplementary Figure S18 MS Model Based on Markov Chain Probability Matrix using Pa-
rameters of all Empirical MTC1-16 Estimates and DC/VAR/ISLM-ASAD Time Dynamics  
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6.3 Sources, Data Retrieval and Processing 
 
Figure 1 Schematic Representation of the Three Dimensions  
A non-quantitative representation to only illustrates the concept of money definitions.  
Figure 2 Schematic Overview of Central Bank’s Definition of Monetary Aggregates 
Based on (ECB 2012; ECB 2015c; ECB 2015b; DB 2015). 
Figure 3 Monthly Annual Growth Rate of HICP, M3, and of GDP (Moving Average) 
HICP index (monthly): ICP.M.U2.N.000000.4.ANR (ECB 2015c), 
M3 (monthly): BSI.M.U2.Y.V.M30.X.I.U2.2300.Z01.A (ECB 2015c), chain-linked GDP volume 
growth (quarterly): MNA.Q.Y.I8.W2.S1.S1.B.B1GQ._Z._Z._Z.EUR.LR.GY, quarterly data were 
represented as monthly annual moving average, non-adjusted (ECB 2015c). 
 
Figure 4 Money Aggregates M1, M2, M3, and Monetary Base M0 in the Euro Area 
M0 (changing comp., non-MFI, NG): ILM.M.U2.C.LT01.Z5.EUR (ECB 2015c) 
M1 (changing comp., non-MFI, NG): BSI.M.U2.N.V.M10.X.1.U2.2300.Z01.E (ECB 2015c) 
M2 (changing comp., non-MFI, NG): BSI.M.U2.Y.V.M20.X.1.U2.2300.Z01.E (ECB 2015c) 
M3 (changing comp., non-MFI, NG): BSI.M.U2.Y.V.M30.X.1.U2.2300.Z01.E (ECB 2015c) 
Figure 5 Vector Autoregression (VAR) Analysis of M3, GDP, and HICP Growth Rate 
VAR forecast analysis (Sims 1980), 12 monthly lags (1996-2015 monthly data); 
Autocorrelation was assayed for of the data sets: residua autocorrelation of GDP: p<0.0105, 
autocorrelation of M3: p<0.00721, and autocorrelation of HICP: 0.0517 (unadjusted month-
ly data set; cross-correlation of signal with itself, business cycle). The null-hypothesis of no 
autocorrelation can be rejected at the respective p values close and below to the standard 
threshold value of 0.01 indicates that the monthly unadjusted data is not fully inde-
pendently distributed, as anticipated. The null-hypothesis for no arch effect (autoregressive 
conditional heteroskedasticity) was tested: P-value of ARCH (GDP-equation): 2.59*10-6, 
(M3-equation): 0.66, (HICP-equation): 0.277. Thus, the p-values indicate that the null-
hypothesis for ARCH is to be rejected for the GDP-equation. The GDP equation must exhibit 
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autocorrelation in the squared series due to a dynamic conditional variance process on an-
nualized monthly data that is expected to be seasonally dependent; ARCH null hypothesis 
for HICP and M3 is rejected implying conditional homoskedasticity.  
HICP index (monthly): ICP.M.U2.N.000000.4.ANR (ECB 2015c); 
M3 (monthly): BSI.M.U2.Y.V.M30.X.I.U2.2300.Z01.A (ECB 2015c); 
GDP volume growth (quarterly): MNA.Q.Y.I8.W2.S1.S1.B.B1GQ._Z._Z._Z.EUR.LR.GY, quar-
terly data were represented as monthly annual moving average, non-adjusted (ECB 2015c). 
Figure 6 Quarterly Growth Rates of HICP, GDP and M3 in the Eurosystem, 1995-2015, and 
Figure 7 Yearly Growth Rates of HICP, GDP and M3 in the Eurosystem, 1995-2015 
HICP index (quarterly, annually): ICP.M.U2.N.000000.4.ANR (ECB 2015c). 
M3 (quarterly, annually): BSI.M.U2.Y.V.M30.X.I.U2.2300.Z01.A (ECB 2015c),  
GDP growth (quarterly, annually): MNA.Q.Y.I8.W2.S1.S1.B.B1GQ._Z._Z._Z.EUR.LR.GY. 
Figure 8 Money (M0-M3) Grows Faster than Inflation plus rGDP in the EMU 
Normalized data on equalization at 1999 level to illustrate factor development over time:   
Based on M0: ILM.M.U2.C.LT01.Z5.EUR, M1: BSI.M.U2.N.V.M10.X.1.U2.2300.Z01.E,  
M2: BSI.M.U2.Y.V.M20.X.1.U2.2300.Z01.E, M3: BSI.M.U2.Y.V.M30.X.1.U2.2300.Z01.E,  
and based on HICP index (quarterly, annually): ICP.M.U2.N.000000.4.INX (ECB 2015c),  
based on real GDP at 2010 market prices, p.a.: AME.A.EA19.1.0.0.0.OVGD, moving average. 
Figure 9 Income Velocities of Monetary Aggregates (M0-M3) and Real Income Velocities 
Simple ratio of real GDP and monetary aggregate; or nominal GDP and monetary aggregate 
M0 (changing comp., non-MFI, NG): ILM.M.U2.C.LT01.Z5.EUR (ECB 2015c) 
M1 (changing comp., non-MFI, NG): BSI.M.U2.N.V.M10.X.1.U2.2300.Z01.E (ECB 2015c) 
M2 (changing comp., non-MFI, NG): BSI.M.U2.Y.V.M20.X.1.U2.2300.Z01.E (ECB 2015c) 
M3 (changing comp., non-MFI, NG): BSI.M.U2.Y.V.M30.X.1.U2.2300.Z01.E (ECB 2015c) 
Real GDP at 2010 market prices, quarterly values, moving average, [M], Euro area, GDP and 
main components (output, expenditure and income) [nama_10_gdp], chain-linked real GDP 
at 2010 market prices (base) (Eurostat 2015), Nominal GDP (EU-19), at current prices, quar-
terly values, moving average, [M], Euro area (EA11-2000, EA12-2006, EA13-2007, EA15-
2008, EA16-2010, EA17-2013, EA18-2014, EA19)(Eurostat 2015). 
Figure 10 Transactions Velocity of Monetary Aggregates in the EMU 
6 Appendix / 6.3  
Page | 203 
 
The volume of total transaction is used instead of GDP (ECB 2015b), 
average observations across period, [2011=100] CPP.Q.I8.N.TH.TVAL.TP.3.INX,  
Euro area 19 (fixed composition); transaction value; hybrid/transaction linked; all property 
types; ECB; neither seasonally nor working day adjusted; arbitrary index values. 
Figure 11 Co-development of Income Velocity and Quantity of Monetary Aggregate 
Normalized data on equalization at 1999 level to illustrate factor development over time:   
Based on Figure 9 (changing comp., non-MFI, NG): ILM.M.U2.C.LT01.Z5.EUR (ECB 2015c). 
Figure 12 Velocity of the Monetary Base and Inflation (HICP index) 
HICP index (monthly): ICP.M.U2.N.000000.4.ANR (ECB 2015c), Real GDP at 2010 market 
prices, quarterly values, moving average, [M], Euro area (EA11-2000, EA12-2006, EA13-
2007, EA15-2008, EA16-2010, EA17-2013, EA18-2014, EA19), chain-linked real GDP at 2010 
market prices (base) (Eurostat 2015), M0 (changing comp., non-MFI, NG): ILM.M.U2.C.LT01. 
Z5.EUR (ECB 2015c), M1 (changing comp., non-MFI, NG): BSI.M.U2.N.V.M10.X.1.U2.2300 
.Z01.E (ECB 2015c). 
Figure 13 Growth Rate of the Velocity of the Monetary Base and Adjusted GDP 
Adjusted real GDP growth rate to minimize autocorrelation and seasonal fluctuations, mov-
ing average derived growth rate compared to v0 growth rate derived from M0 aggregate as 
M0 (changing comp., non-MFI, NG): ILM.M.U2.C.LT01.Z5.EUR (ECB 2015c), 
real GDP at 2010 market prices, quarterly values, moving average, [M], Euro area (EA11-
2000, EA12-2006, EA13-2007, EA15-2008, EA16-2010, EA17-2013, EA18-2014, EA19), chain-
linked real GDP at 2010 market prices (base) (Eurostat 2015), to indentify if the ‘ratio value’ 
per se has impact on the short term development irrespective of its  QTM and GDP identity. 
Figure 14 Quarterly Growth of the Velocity of Money in the Euro Area, 1999-2015 
Quarterly frequency transformation of the following data:  
M0 (changing comp., non-MFI, NG): ILM.M.U2.C.LT01.Z5.EUR (ECB 2015c), 
M1 (changing comp., non-MFI, NG): BSI.M.U2.N.V.M10.X.1.U2.2300.Z01.E (ECB 2015c), 
M2 (changing comp., non-MFI, NG): BSI.M.U2.Y.V.M20.X.1.U2.2300.Z01.E (ECB 2015c), 
M3 (changing comp., non-MFI, NG): BSI.M.U2.Y.V.M30.X.1.U2.2300.Z01.E (ECB 2015c), 
GDP (EU-19), at current prices, quarterly moving average, [M], Euro area (EA11-2000, EA12-
2006, EA13-2007, EA15-2008, EA16-2010, EA17-2013, EA18-2014, EA19), (Eurostat 2015). 
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Figure 15 Chart of EMU Money Multiplier m1, m2, m3 (M1-3/M0), from 1999-2015 
Ratio of monetary aggregate M1-M3 and the monetary base M0 using data from Figure 9. 
Figure 16 Capacities of the Traditional Money Multipliers and their Utilization  
Calculation was performed as described in the main text and in chapter 2.3.7, and based on 
Formula 14 and Formula 15. A new basic leverage formula was employed Formula 39. 
Figure 17 Capacity of Money Multiplication as M0 in the Euro Area 
Excess reserves BSI.M.U2.N.R.LRE.X.1.A1.3000.Z01.E (recently increasing again after Q2-
2015), and monetary aggregates as in Figure 9, calculation as explained in main text. 
Figure 18 Constancy of Mean Share of Money Aggregates (+SEM) from 1999-2015 
Monetary aggregates as in Figure 9, calculation of monetary shares as explained. 
Figure 19 Trends of Money Aggregate Shares as % Deviation from Mean, 1999-2015 
Based on Figure 18 derivation of residuals (deviation) from the average share multipliers.  
Figure 20 Aggregate Growth of Monetary Aggregates Derived Money Multipliers 
Based on the data of Figure 9 linear regression analysis with zero-base, R-squared. 
Figure 21 Money Balances in the Euro Area 
Ratio of monetary aggregate data Figure 9 and ICP.M.U2.N.000000.4.INX. 
Figure 22 Mean of Monthly Growth Rates of Real Money and its Aggregates 
Integrated mean monthly growth rate of real money balances and M0-4 based on Figure 21. 
Figure 23 Credit Debt to Euro Area Residents is not Covered by M3 
M3: BSI.M.U2.Y.V.M30.X.1.U2.2300.Z01.E (ECB 2015c) rechecked govern debt higher? 
Euro area 18 (fixed composition), reporting institutional sector general government - clos-
ing balance sheet/positions/stocks - debt securities - long-term original maturity, 
QSA.Q.N.I7.W0.S13.S1.N.L.LE.F3.L._Z.XDC._T.S.V.N._T (ECB 2015c), 
euro area 18 (fixed composition), reporting institutional sector General government - Clos-
ing balance sheet/Positions/Stocks - Debt securities - Short-term original maturity, 
QSA.Q.N.I7.W0.S13.S1.N.L.LE.F3.S._Z.XDC._T.S.V.N._T (ECB 2015c), 
Loans, Non-Banks (non-MFIs): BSI.M.U2.N.U.A20.A.1.U2.2200.Z01.E (ECB 2015c), 
Debt, Non-Banks (non-MFIs): BSI.M.U2.N.U.A30.A.1.U2.2200.Z01.E (ECB 2015c), 
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Equity and non-MMF investment, Non-Banks: BSI.M.U2.N.U.A50.A.1.U2.2200.Z01.E. 
Figure 24 Total Credit to Money (M3) Ratio as Macroeconomic and Crisis Indicator 
Ratio of total Eurosystem credit/debt and M3 as macro indicator, based on see Figure 23. 
Figure 25 Increasing Private and Public Indebtedness (as % of GDP) 
Short-term gov. debt: GFS.A.N.I8.W0.S13.S1.C.L.LE.GD.L._Z.XDC_R_B1GQ._T.F.V.N._T7, 
Long-term gov. debt: GFS.A.N.I8.W0.S13.S1.C.L.LE.GD.L._Z.XDC_R_B1GQ._T.F.V.N._T, 
Gov. interest exp.: GFS.A.N.I8.W0.S13.S1.C.D.D41._Z._Z._T.XDC_R_B1GQ._Z.S.V.N._T, 
and interest non-MFIs: derived from interests of all EMU-19 country (ECB 2015c; WB 2015). 
Figure 26 Public and Private Debt (as % of GDP) by Euro Area Countries 
EDP.A.N.??.W0.S13.S1.C.L.LE.GD.T._Z.XDC_R_B1GQ._T.F.V.N._T (ECB 2015c),  
IEAQ.A.??.N.V.LE.RFPA.S1V.A1.S.2.N.F.Z (ECB 2015c), ?? stand for: AT, BE, CY, DE, EE, ES, FI, 
FR, GR, IE, IT, LT, LU, LV, MT, NL, PT, SI, SK (ECB 2015c). 
Figure 27 Main Economic Indicators Time Series Analysis for Greece 
Based on time series and supplemented by recent media information (2013, 2014), 
MarketCap of listed companies (Greece) (current US$): CM.MKT.LCAP.GD.ZS (WB 2015), 
Domestic credit provided by financial sector (current US$): FD.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS (WB 2015), 
Central government debt (converted in current US$): GC.DOD.TOTL.GD.ZS  (WB 2015), 
Total Tax revenue (in US$): OECD-Stats (extracted Aug-2015) (OECD 2015), 
Total expenses (converted in current US$): GC.XPN.TOTL.GD.ZS (WB 2015), 
Industry value added (converted in current US$): NV.IND.TOTL.ZS (WB 2015), 
GDP (at current US$): NY.GDP.MKTP.CD  (WB 2015). 
Figure 28 Main Economic Indicators Time Series for Luxembourg (LOG) 
The same data items were extracted as in Figure 27 but for Luxembourg (WB 2015). 
Figure 29 Balance Sheet Assets and Liabilities of the Euro-System 
Consolidated balance sheet of the Euro-System: Asset data: ILM.W.U2.C.T000.Z5.Z01 total 
assets/liabilities, world not allocated (geographically), all currencies combined; ILM.W.U2.C. 
A010.Z5.Z0Z gold and gold receivables, world not allocated (geographically), not applicable 
(Z0Z); ILM.W.U2.C.A020.U4.Z06 Claims on non-euro area residents denominated in foreign 
currency, extra euro area, non-euro and non-euro area currencies combined; ILM.W.U2.C. 
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A030.U2.Z06 Claims on euro area residents denominated in foreign currency, euro area 
(changing composition), non-euro and non-euro area currencies combined; ILM.W.U2.C. 
A040.U4.EUR claims on non-euro area residents denominated in euro, extra euro area, Eu-
ro; ILM.W.U2.C.A050.U2.EUR Lending to euro area credit institutions related to MPOs de-
nominated in euro, euro area (changing composition), Euro; ILM.W.U2.C.A060.U2.EUR 
Other claims on euro area credit institutions denominated in euro, Euro area (changing 
composition), Euro; ILM.W.U2.C.A070.U2.EUR Securities of euro area residents denominat-
ed in euro, euro area (changing composition), Euro; ILM.W.U2.C.A080.U2.EUR General gov-
ernment debt denominated in euro, euro area (changing composition), Euro;  ILM.W.U2.C. 
A110.Z5.Z01 Other assets, world not allocated (geographically), all currencies combined; 
Liabilities data: ILM.W.U2.C.L010.Z5.EUR Banknotes in circulation, world not allocated (ge-
ographically), Euro; ILM.W.U2.C.L020.U2.EUR Liabilities to euro area credit institutions re-
lated to MPOs denominated in euro, Euro area (changing composition), Euro; ILM.W.U2. 
C.L030.Z5.EUR Other liabilities to euro area credit institutions denominated in euro, world 
not allocated (geographically), Euro; ILM.W.U2.C.L040.Z5.EUR Debt certificates issued, 
world not allocated (geographically), Euro; ILM.W.U2.C.L050.U2.EUR Liabilities to other 
euro area residents denominated in euro, euro area (changing composition), Euro; 
ILM.W.U2.C.L060.U4.EUR Liabilities to non-euro area residents denominated in euro, extra 
euro area, Euro; ILM.W.U2.C.L070.U2.Z06 Liabilities to euro area residents denominated in 
foreign currency, euro area (changing composition), non-euro and non-euro area currencies 
combined; ILM.W.U2.C.L080.U4.Z06 Liabilities to non-euro area residents denominated in 
foreign currency, extra euro area, non-euro and non-euro area currencies combined; 
ILM.W.U2.C.L090.U4.XDR Counterpart of special drawing rights allocated by the IMF, Extra 
euro area, special drawing rights (SDR); ILM.W.U2.C.L120.Z5.Z01 Other liabilities, world not 
allocated (geographically), all currencies combined; ILM.W.U2.C.L140.Z5.Z01 revaluation 
accounts, world not allocated (geographically), all currencies combined; ILM.W.U2.C.L150. 
Z5.Z01 Capital and reserves, world not allocated (geographically), all currencies combined; 
ILM.W.U2.C.T000.Z5.Z01 Total assets/liabilities, world not allocated (geographically), all 
currencies combined (based on ECB items, ECB 2015b).             
Figure 30 Open-Market Operations: MRO and LTRO and Outright Operations 
LTRO: ILM.M.U2.C.A052.U2.EUR (ECB 2015c), 
MRO: ILM.W.U2.C.A051.U2.EUR (ECB 2015c). 
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Figure 31 Standing Facilities: Marginal Lending and Deposit Facility 
Marginal Lending Facility: ILM.W.U2.C.A055.U2.EUR (ECB 2015c), 
Deposit Facility: ILM.W.U2.C.L022.U2.EUR (ECB 2015c). 
Figure 32 The Eurosystem’s Current Account Covers Required and Excess Reserves 
Credit institution current accounts: ILM.W.U2.C.L021.U2.EUR (ECB 2015c), 
Required Minimum Reserve: BSI.M.U2.N.R.LRR.X.1.A1.3000.Z01.E (ECB 2015c), 
Excess Reserve: BSI.M.U2.N.R.LRE.X.1.A1.3000.Z01.E (ECB 2015c). 
Figure 33 Interest Rates of the Short-term Money Market: Eonia and Euribor 
EONIA rate historical close: FM.Q.U2.EUR.4F.MM.EONIA.HSTA  (ECB 2015c), 
EURIBOR rate historical close: FM.M.U2.EUR.RT.MM.EURIBOR1MD_.HSTA  (ECB 2015c). 
Figure 34 Key Central Interest Rates in the Euro Area, 1Y-Euribor and 10Y-G-Bonds 
Data derived from: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/monetary/rates/html/index.en.html 
Deposit facility: FM.B.U2.EUR.4F.KR.DFR.LEV, Main refinancing: FM.D.U2.EUR.4F.KR.MRR 
_FR.LEV, EURIBOR-1Year historical close, average observations: FM.M.U2.EUR.RT.MM.EURI 
BOR1YD_.HSTA, 10-Year G-bond yields: FM.M.U2.EUR.4F.BB.U2_10Y.YLD. (ECB 2015c). 
The MROs rates shown here include both fixed rate and variable rate tenders. The MP of 
MROs has changed during the time course (i.e. 2000-2008: variable rate tenders) and only 
the ‘market effective’ relevant key rate is shown. Rate as percentage p.a. from (ECB 2015a). 
Figure 35 Key Interest Rates of the Fed, ECB, BoE and BoC 
Data was extracted from (BoC 2015; ECB 2015b; FRBSL 2015a; BoE 2015). 
Figure 36 Pass-Through Trend Development of 1Y-Euribor and 10Y-G-Bonds 
Based on Figure 34 Key Central Interest Rates in the Euro Area, 1Y-Euribor and 10Y-G-
Bonds:                          ;                       
Note: The pass-through is defined as the difference between the current ECB’s MRO rate and the 
nominal interest rate of 1 year EURIBOR, and 10-year Government Bonds rate (REUTERS) without 
time delay. The right figure shows the average pass-through rate with standard deviation error bars.  
Figure 37 NDER for Households and Moving Weighted Average 
MIR.M.??.B.A2C.AM.R.A.2250.EUR.N  (ECB 2015c), 
(?? stand for: AT, BE, CY, DE, EE, ES, FI, FR, GR, IT, PT, NL, IE, LU, SK, SI, MT, N) (ECB 2015c). 
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Figure 38 NDER for Corporations Moving Weighted Average 
MIR.M.??.B.A2I.AM.R.A.2240.EUR.N, 
(?? stand for: AT, BE, CY, DE, EE, ES, FI, FR, GR, IT, PT, NL, IE, LU, SK, SI, MT, N) (ECB 2015c). 
Figure 39 Unweighted Average of EMU Member NDER for Households and Corporations 
Based on unweighted-country average of Figure 37+Figure 38, convergence/heterogeneity 
view, and overlain by the ECB’s MRO rate to visualize the pass-through (ECB 2015c). 
Figure 40 Harmonized Interest Rates on 10-Year Government Bonds 
IRS.M.AT.L.L40.CI.0000.EUR.N.Z, IRS.M.BE.L.L40.CI.0000.EUR.N.Z, (ECB 2015c) 
IRS.M.BG.L.L40.CI.0000.BGN.N.Z, IRS.M.CY.L.L40.CI.0000.EUR.N.Z, (ECB 2015c) 
IRS.M.CZ.L.L40.CI.0000.CZK.N.Z, IRS.M.DE.L.L40.CI.0000.EUR.N.Z, (ECB 2015c) 
IRS.M.DK.L.L40.CI.0000.DKK.N.Z, IRS.M.ES.L.L40.CI.0000.EUR.N.Z, (ECB 2015c) 
IRS.M.FI.L.L40.CI.0000.EUR.N.Z, IRS.M.FR.L.L40.CI.0000.EUR.N.Z, (ECB 2015c) 
IRS.M.GB.L.L40.CI.0000.GBP.N.Z, IRS.M.GR.L.L40.CI.0000.EUR.N.Z, (ECB 2015c) 
IRS.M.HR.L.L40.CI.0000.HRK.N.Z, IRS.M.HU.L.L40.CI.0000.HUF.N.Z, (ECB 2015c) 
IRS.M.IE.L.L40.CI.0000.EUR.N.Z, IRS.M.IT.L.L40.CI.0000.EUR.N.Z, (ECB 2015c) 
IRS.M.LT.L.L40.CI.0000.EUR.N.Z, IRS.M.LU.L.L40.CI.0000.EUR.N.Z, (ECB 2015c) 
IRS.M.LV.L.L40.CI.0000.EUR.N.Z, IRS.M.MT.L.L40.CI.0000.EUR.N.Z, (ECB 2015c) 
IRS.M.NL.L.L40.CI.0000.EUR.N.Z, IRS.M.PL.L.L40.CI.0000.PLN.N.Z, (ECB 2015c) 
IRS.M.PT.L.L40.CI.0000.EUR.N.Z, IRS.M.RO.L.L40.CI.0000.RON.N.Z, (ECB 2015c) 
IRS.M.SE.L.L40.CI.0000.SEK.N.Z, IRS.M.SI.L.L40.CI.0000.EUR.N.Z, (ECB 2015c) 
IRS.M.SK.L.L40.CI.0000.EUR.N.Z (ECB 2015c). 
Figure 41 Further Increasing Pass-Through Inefficiency and MFI’s ‘Profits’ in the EMU 
Based on PT (formula of Figure 36 and predicated on the data of Figure 39 (ECB 2015c). 
Figure 42 Interest Rate Diversity for Corporations and Consumers in the Euro Area 
MIR.M.U2.B.A2I.AM.R.A.2240.EUR.N (APCR, hh), MIR.M.U2.B.A2B.A.C.A.2250.EUR.N (APRC, 
hh), MIR.M.U2.B.A2B.F.R.A.2250.EUR.N (NDER, cons.), MIR.M.U2.B.A2C.A.C.A.2250.EUR.N 
(APRC, hh), MIR.M.U2.B.A2B.A.C.A.2250.EUR.N (APRC, hh), MIR.M.U2.B.A2B.F.R.A.2250. 
EUR.N (NDER, cons.), MIR.M.U2.B.A2C.A.C.A.2250.EUR.N (NDER, hh), MIR.M.U2.B.A2C. 
AM.R.A.2250.EUR.N (NDER, hh), MIR.M.U2.B.L21.A.R.A.2240.EUR.N (NDER, od), MIR.M. 
U2.B.L21.A.R.A.2250.EUR.N (NDER, od), MIR.M.U2.B.A2Z.A.R.A.2240.EUR.N (NDER, hhrl), 
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MIR.M.U2.B.A2Z1.A.R.A.2250.EUR.N (NDER, hhrl), MIR.M.U2.B.A2Z3.A.R.A.2250.EUR.N 
(NDER, hhc), MIR.M.U2.B.L22.H.R.A.2240.EUR.N (NDER, hhc), MIR.M.U2.B.L22.H.R.A.2250. 
EUR.N (NDER, hh2a) (ECB 2015c).  
Figure 43 Important Corporate Interest Rates and Mean (Fractional) Pass-Through 
0.25m Corp (IRF up to 3 month): MIR.M.U2.B.A2A.D.R.2.2240.EUR.N (ECB 2015c), 
0.25m Corp (IRF 3 month, 1 year): MIR.M.U2.B.A2A.Q.R.2.2240.EUR.N (ECB 2015c), 
1.00m Corp (IRF up to 3 month-1 year): MIR.M.U2.B.A2A.Q.R.1.2240.EUR.N (ECB 2015c), 
1.00m Corp (IRF up to 3 month): MIR.M.U2.B.A2A.D.R.1.2240.EUR.N (ECB 2015c), 
and mean fraction pass-through, as described previously. 
Figure 44 Fractional Pass-Through Trends of Financial Products in the Euro Area 
Fractional PTs were calculated using the previous formula Figure 36 and data of Figure 42. 
Figure 45 Deviation and Extent Order of Pass-Through Rates 
Standard deviation and arithmetic mean (see Arithmetic Mean, Standard Deviation, Stand-
ard Error of the Mean (SEM)) based on data of Figure 44 (ECB 2015c). 
Figure 46 Major Euro Exchange Rate Developments from 1999 till 2015 
Fx rate (US$/€): EXR.D.USD.EUR.SP00.A (ECB 2015c), EER.19: EXR.A.E5.EUR.ERD0.A (ECB 
2015c), and the CNY/€ index was calculated base on EXR.A.CNY.EUR.SP00.A (ECB 2015c). 
Figure 47 The Fx Rate ($/€) depends on Real GDP but not on M2 (% of GDP) [US/EMU] 
World bank data (country data set, USA) (WB 2015) and ECB (ECB 2015c): Figure 46. 
Figure 48 Long-term Interest Rates and Fx Rates in the Euro Zone and the US 
World bank data (country data set, USA) (WB 2015) and ECB (ECB 2015c), and its ratios. 
Figure 49 DC Test for EMU M3, Inflation, real and nominal GDP (1999-2015) 
Dynamic (Time-Matrix )correlations (Walsh 2010, chapter 1, and references herein), using 
the annualized ECB data set of Figure 3, and nominal GDP (see Figure 9) (ECB 2015c). 
Figure 50 3D Graph Indicating a ‘Recommendable Direction’ for the ECB’s MPs in 2015 
Using 3D Function Blotter, and multivariate regression results, described in the main text. 
Figure 51 Reciprocity between the Growth Rate of the Velocity of the Monetary Base (v0) 
and the Seasonal Adjusted Unemployment Rate in the EMU from 1999-2015 (ECB 2015c). 
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Unemployment rate (as % of labor force): STS.M.I8.S.UNEH.RTT000.4.000, 
velocity (v0) as in Figure 12, chart analysis and Pearson’s correlation coefficient (see Pear-
son’s Correlation Test and Linear Regression Analysis) (ECB 2015c). 
Figure 52 Unit Labor Costs and its Deviation from Wages and Labor Productivity 
Unit labor cost: MNA.Q.Y.I8.W2.S1.S1._Z.ULC_PS._Z._T._Z.EUR.D.GY (ECB 2015c), 
Labor productivity: MNA.Q.Y.I8.W0.S1.S1._Z.LPR_PS._Z._T._Z.EUR.LR.GY (ECB 2015c), 
Labor cost index (wages and salaries, 2012=100) (quarterly 12 month moving average): 
STS.Q.I8.W.LCIW.NS0025.4.000 (ECB 2015c). 
Figure 53 Correlation of v1, labor Productivity and Employment Rate 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient (see Pearson’s Correlation Test and Linear Regression 
Analysis), and data from Figure 51, Figure 52, represented as annualized growth rate (in %), 
see Figure 9 (ECB 2015c). 
Figure 54 Price-to-Wage Ratios and the Velocity of Money 
Predicated on Figure 52 change as % starting in 2000 [=100%], price/wages, v2, Pearson’s 
correlation (see Pearson’s Correlation Test and Linear Regression Analysis), see Figure 9, 
wage-index: STS.Q.I8.W.LCIW.NS0025.4.000 (ECB 2015c). 
Figure 55 Chain-linked Development of Output Components and ‘The Big Ratios’ 
Euro Area 19 (fixed composition): neither working day nor seasonally adjusted, non-
transformed. MNA : National accounts, Main aggregates (Eurostat ESA2010 TP, table 1), 
Final consumption government (chain-linked): MNA.Q.N.I8.W0.S13.S1.D.P3._Z._Z._T.EUR. 
LR.N, Gross fixed capital formation (chain-linked): MNA.Q.N.I8.W0.S1.S1.D.P51G.N11G._T 
._Z.EUR.LR.N, GDP (chain-linked at market prices): MNA.Q.N.I8.W2.S1.S1.B.B1GQ._Z._Z._ 
Z.EUR.LR.N, Import (chain-linked): MNA.Q.N.I8.W1.S1.S1.C.P7._Z._Z._Z.EUR.LR.N, Exports 
(chain-linked): MNA.Q.N.I8.W1.S1.S1.D.P6._Z._Z._Z.EUR.LR.N, Inventory investment: MNA 
.Q.N.I8.W0.S1.S1.D.P5M.N1MG._T._Z.EUR.V.N that was transformed into a chain-linked 
data series using a HIPC index (2005=100) with two positions after the decimal point:  
ICP.M.U2.N.000000.4.INX, re-transformed for unbiased quarterly data chain linking. 
Figure 56 Real Interest Rate and Pass-Through of all EMU Countries 
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ECB MRO, weekly rate (ECB 2015c), Real-Pass-Through based on the difference in Figure 39 
of households (hh.) and corporations (corp.), margin of real interest rate NDER - MRO rate.  
Figure 57 The Effect Real Pass Through on GDP and Inflation 
Real Pass-through (from Figure 55), inflation (HICP, in %) and GDP growth (in %) (see Figure 
9) (ECB 2015c), Pearson’s correlation coefficient (see Pearson’s Correlation Test and Linear 
Regression Analysis), as indicated in the figure.  
Figure 58 BOP Account Trends in the Euro Area (*estimation) 
(left) Capital account: (EMU19, fixed composition, non-adjusted data, annualized, aggre-
gated view based on monthly transaction balance, vis-á-vis RoW), 2015 only based on 1Q-
2015 and estimated projection, based: BP6.M.N.I8.W1.S1.S1.T.B.KA._Z._Z._Z.EUR._T._X.N, 
data formatting and normalization as done for capital account: Current account: BP6.M.N. 
I8.W1.S1.S1.T.B.CA._Z._Z._Z.EUR._T._X.N, goods transaction balance: BP6.M.N.I8.W1.S1.S1. 
T.B.G._Z._Z._ Z.EUR._T._X.N, (right) Financial account: net lending/borrowing (from rest of 
world RoW) as aggregate of: direct investment: BP6.M.N.I8.W1.S1.S1.T.N.FA.D.F._Z.EUR 
._T._X.N, portfolio investment:  BP6.M. N.I8.W1.S1.S1.T.N.FA.P.F._Z.EUR._T.M.N, other 
investment: BP6.M.N.I8.W1.S1.S1.T.N.FA.O.F._Z.EUR._T._X.N, derivates BP6.M.N.I8.W1. 
S1.S1.T.N.FA.F. F7.T.EUR ._T.T.N, reserve assets: BP6.M.N.I8.W1.S121.S1.T.A.FA.R.F._Z.EUR 
.X1._X.N, net errors and omissions: BP6.M.N.I8.W1.S1.S1.T.N.EO._Z._Z._Z.EUR._T._X.N, net 
lending/borrowing of current and capital account: BP6.M.N.I8.W1.S1.S1.T.B.CKA._Z._Z._Z. 
EUR._T._X.N. (ECB 2015c). 
Figure 59 The EER-19 Fx Index and the Trade Balance 
EXR.M.E2.EUR.EN00.A (ECB nominal effective Fx rate EMU-18 vis-à-vis EER-19), 
EXR.M.E2.EUR.ERC0.A (ECB real effective Fx rate EMU-18 vis-à-vis EER-19), 
EXR.M.E5.EUR.EN00.A (ECB nominal effective Fx rate EMU-19 vis-à-vis EER-19 till 7-
2015),EXR.M.E5.EUR.ERC0.A (ECB real effective Fx rate EMU-19 vis-à-vis EER-19, CPI-
deflated), EXR.M.E5.EUR.ERP0.A (ECB real effective Fx rate EMU-19 vis-à-vis EER-19, pro-
ducer prices deflated), all (1999-Q1=100%), monthly transactions traded goods surplus EA-
19 vis-à-vis RoW (BP6.M.N.I8.W1.S1.S1.T.B.G._Z._Z._Z.EUR._T._X.N) and its 20-month mov-
ing average. Country names of EER-19 as indicated as abbreviations (ECB 2015c). 
Figure 60 Net Lending/Borrowing of Households, Government, MFIs, and Non-MFIs 
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Moving annualized average based on previous four quarters for MFIs, Gov (Government), 
HH (households, non-MFIs (all non-banks), (red line) net lending borrowing (ECB 2015c). 
Non-MFIs: QSA.Q.N.I7.W0.S11.S1._Z.B.B9._Z._Z._Z.XDC._T.S.V.N._T, Households: QSA.Q.N.I7.W0. 
S1M.S1._Z.B.B9._Z._Z._Z.XDC._T.S.V.N._T, Government: IEAQ.Q.I7.N.V.B9.Z.S13.A1.S.1.X.E.Z, Net  
lending/borrowing: IEAQ.Q.I7.N.V.B9.Z.S1.A1.S.1.X.E.Z, MFIs: IEAQ.Q.I7.N.V.B9.Z.S12.A1.S.1.X.E.Z. 
Figure 61 Cumulative Lending/Borrowing Affects Net External Debt and Assets 
Current account: BP6.M.N.I8.W1.S1.S1.T.B.CA._Z._Z._Z.EUR._T._X.N (ECB 2015c), 
Capital account: BP6.M.N.I8.W1.S1.S1.T.C.KA._Z._Z._Z.EUR._T._X.N (ECB 2015c), 
External Assets: BSI.M.U2.Y.U.A80.A.1.U4.0000.Z01.E (ECB 2015c), 
External Debt: BP6.Q.N.I8.W1.S1.S1.LE.NE.FA._T.FNED._Z.EUR._T._X.N (ECB 2015c); (net). 
Figure 62 Tobin’s Q Market-Cap of Listed Companies to Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
Market capitalization and gross fixed capital formation as macro parameters for a relative 
macro q ratio (WB 2015) for MTC3 purpose: it reflects the level of market capitalization and 
investment and includes local factor investment making it meaningful as macro indicator.  
Figure 63 Gross Fixed Capital Formation in Selected Countries 
Based on World Bank data: Gross fixed capital formation (WB 2015). 
Figure 64 Dependency of Q (WB derived) and MRO Central European Rate 
Based on World Bank data: Gross fixed capital formation, market capitalization (WB 2015). 
Figure 65 Tobin’s Q Theory of Investment in the Eurozone 
Based on Figure 64 (ECB 2015c), chart analysis and Pearson’s correlation coefficient (see 
Pearson’s Correlation Test and Linear Regression Analysis).  
Figure 66 The Equity Effect (Euro Stoxx50) on Consumption Expenditure in the EMU 
Pearson’s correlation coefficient (see Pearson’s Correlation Test and Linear Regression 
Analysis), Dow Jones ^SX5E, consumption (WB 2015),  
FM.M.U2.EUR.DS.EI.DJES50I.HSTA (ECB 2015c). 
Figure 67 Lending Activity to Corporations and Consumers Across the Euro Area 
Loans <1m: MIR.M.U2.B.A2A.A.B.0.2240.EUR.N (ECB 2015c),  
Loans >1m: MIR.M.U2.B.A2A.A.B.1.2240.EUR.N (ECB 2015c), 
Loans for consumption: MIR.M.U2.B.A2B.A.B.A.2250.EUR.N (ECB 2015c). 
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Figure 68 MFI Lending Activity with Corporations, Households, and Government 
Loans to non-MFIs (mainly firms): BSI.M.U2.N.A.A20.A.1.U2.2240.Z01.E (ECB 2015c),  
Loans for households/non-profit org.: BSI.M.U2.N.A.A20.A.1.U2.2250.Z01.E and (WB 2015). 
Figure 69 CAPM-derived Risk Premium in the EMU: NDER Yield Minus 1YG-Bond Rate  
Lending yield of households and firms (from Figure 39) minus 1-year G-bonds yield (instan-
taneous nominal forward rate): YC.B.U2.EUR.4F.G_N_A.SV_C_YM.IF_1Y (ECB 2015c). 
Figure 70 Economic Sentiment (ESI) and Confidence Indicators in EMU Countries 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/surveys/time_series/index_en.htm 
Primary data published by (Eurostat 2015; ECB 2015b). Based on NACE: nomenclature of 
economic activities, DGECFIN, European Commission)(Eurostat 2015). MCI formula is given 
in chapter 3.2.8. The ESI (Economic Sentiment Index) is a composite measure of the INDU 
(40%), SERV (30%), CONS (20%), RETA (5%), and BUIL (5%) sectoral sub-indexes.  
Figure 71 ECB’s Expected Inflation Announcements for the Euro Area 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/prices/indic/forecast/html/table_hist_hicp.en.html 
Primary data published by (ECB 2015b).  
Figure 72 Correlation of Deviation from Price Expectation and GDP Growth 
Based on: Figure 71, chain-linked GDP: MNA.Q.Y.I8.W2.S1.S1.B.B1GQ._Z._Z._Z.EUR.LR.GY  
Figure 73 Government Revenue and Expenditures in the Euro Area 
Based on the recent Country report (WB 2015), sourced in June 2015. 
Figure 74 The Marginal Propensity (MPCIS: MPC+MPI+MPS) Determines Output 
Graphical representation of the function of Formula 50 and Formula 51: The marginal pro-
pensity to consume/invest/spend is simplified to % in MPSCI; arbitrary value, G+T = const. 
annual revenue or deficit represented as % of output (GDP), non-aggregated.  
Figure 75 Balance Sheet of Euro Area MFIs: 30 Trillion in Assets and Liabilities 
Loans to MFIs: BSI.Q.U2.N.R.A20.A.1.U2.1000.Z01.E, (ECB 2015c) 
Loans to Government: BSI.Q.U2.N.R.A20.A.1.U2.2100.Z01.E, (ECB 2015c) 
Loans to Non-MFIs: BSI.Q.U2.N.R.A20.A.1.U2.2200.Z01.E, (ECB 2015c)  
Debt of MFIs: BSI.Q.U2.N.R.A30.A.1.U2.1000.Z01.E, (ECB 2015c) 
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Debt of Government: BSI.Q.U2.N.R.A30.A.1.U2.2100.Z01.E, (ECB 2015c) 
Debt of Non-MFIs: BSI.Q.U2.N.R.A30.A.1.U2.2200.Z01.E, (ECB 2015c) 
MMF: BSI.Q.U2.N.R.A42.A.1.U2.1000.Z01.E, (ECB 2015c) 
Equity and Non-MMF: BSI.Q.U2.N.R.A50.A.1.U2.0000.Z01.E, (ECB 2015c) 
Fixed Assets: BSI.Q.U2.N.R.A60.X.1.Z5.0000.Z01.E, (ECB 2015c) 
Remaining Assets and Cash: BSI.Q.U2.N.R.A7C.X.1.Z5.0000.Z01.E, (ECB 2015c) 
External Assets: BSI.Q.U2.N.R.AXG.A.1.U4.0000.Z01.E, (ECB 2015c) 
Total Assets Liabilities: BSI.Q.U2.N.R.T00.A.1.Z5.0000.Z01.E, (ECB 2015c) 
Deposit Liabilities, MFIs: BSI.Q.U2.N.R.L20.A.1.U2.1000.Z01.E, (ECB 2015c) 
Deposit Liabilities, Government: BSI.Q.U2.N.R.L20.A.1.U2.2110.Z01.E, (ECB 2015c) 
Deposit Liabilities, non-MFIs: BSI.Q.U2.N.R.L20.A.1.U2.2300.Z01.E, (ECB 2015c) 
Capital and Reserves: BSI.Q.U2.N.R.L60.X.1.Z5.0000.Z01.E, (ECB 2015c) 
Remaining Liabilities: BSI.Q.U2.N.R.L70.X.1.Z5.0000.Z01.E. (ECB 2015c; ECB 2015b) 
Figure 76 Equity Funds Asset Portfolio Time-line 
Remaining assets and derivatives: IVF.M.U2.N.10.AT1.A.1.Z5.0000.Z01.E, Shares and other 
equity: IVF.M.U2.N.10.A5A.A.1.Z5.0000.Z01.E, Investment fund and money market fund 
(other equity): IVF.M.U2.N.10.A52.A.1.Z5.0000.Z01.E, Non-financial assets: IVF.M.U2.N.10 
.A60.A.1.Z5.0000.Z01.E, Deposit and loan claims: IVF.M.U2.N.10.A20.A.1.Z5.0000.Z01.E, 
Securities other than shares: IVF.M.U2.N.10.A30.A.1.Z5.0000.Z01.E. (ECB 2015c). 
Figure 77 Euro Area Share Price Development as Portfolio Indicator 
OECD stats index of stock prices across the euro area (OECD 2015). 
Figure 78 Total Market Capitalization (TMC) Portfolio Trend 
Households, corporations, pension funds, insurance corporations (annual moving average): 
ICPF.Q.U2.N.V.LE.F611.S125.A1.S.2.N.E.Z (equity of households in life insurance reserves), 
ICPF.Q.U2.N.V.LE.F612.S125.A1.S.2.N.E.Z (equity of households in pension funds reserves), 
ICPF.Q.U2.N.V.LE.F51.S125.A1.S.1.N.E.Z (shares and other equity) equity investment funds: 
IVF.M.U2.N.10.L30.A.1.Z5.0000.Z01.E, holding of equity by MFIs: BSI.M.U2.N.A.A50.A.1.U2 
.0000.Z01.E, total shares denominated in Euro: SEC.M.I8.1000.F51100.M.1.EUR.E.Z, total 
market cap world bank method: annual world bank data (WB 2015), till 2013 only, equity 
and investment funds, non-MFIs: QSA.Q.N.I8.W0.S11.S1.N.A.LE.F5._Z._Z.XDC._T.S.V.N._T, equity 
of MFIs and non-MFIs is the sum of both above accounts, other equity given as difference. 
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Figure 79 EMU Monetary versus Equity Portfolio Trends 
Total shares denominated in Euro: SEC.M.I8.1000.F51100.M.1.EUR.E.Z, outstanding debt 
securities issued by EMU residents: SEC.M.I8.1000.F33000.N.1.Z01.E.Z, Gross issues of debt 
securities against cash flows: SEC.M.I8.1000.F33000.N.2.Z01.E.Z, and respective fold 
change, incl. debt securities against cash (flows): SEC.M.I8. 1000.F33000.N.2.Z01.E.Z8, 10-
Year G-Bond Yield: FM.M.U2.EUR.4F.BB.U2_ 10Y.YLD, 2-Year G-Bond Benchmark Yield: 
FM.M.U2.EUR.4F.BB.U2_2Y.YLD. (ECB 2015c; ECB 2015b; ECB 2015a). 
 
Appendix : Figure S1 
Figure S1 HICP index composition, subcomponents, dataset name: real time database (con-
text of euro area business cycle network); frequency: monthly; reference area: euro area 
(moving concept in the real time database context); adjustment indicator: neither seasonal-
ly nor working day adjusted, D.M.S0.N.P_C_COMM.X, RTD.M.S0.N.P_C_FOOD.X, RTD.M.S0. 
N.P_C_FOOD PR.X, RTD.M.S0.N.P_C_FOODUN.X, RTD.M.S0.N.P_C_GOOD.X, RTD.M.S0.N.P 
_C_HOUS.X, RTD.M.S0.N.P_C_IGXE.X, RTD.M.S0.N.P_C_MISC.X, RTD.M.S0.N.P_C_ NRGY.X, 
RTD.M.S0.N.P_C_OV.A, RTD.M.S0.N.P_C_OV.X, RTD.M.S0.N.P_C_RECR.X, RTD.M.S0.N.P_C_ 
SERV.X, RTD.M.S0.N.P_C_TRAN.X, RTD.M.S0.N.P_C_XEFUN.X, HICP: ICP.M.U2.N.000000.4. 
ANR, M0: ILM.M.U2.C.LT01.Z5.EUR, GDP at market prices: MNA.Q.Y.I8.W2.S1.S1.B.B1GQ. 
_Z._Z._Z.EUR.V.N, real GDP at 2010 prices, chain-linked: namq_10_gdp (EA, 4-2014). 
Appendix : Figure S2 
OECD.Stats MEI (OECD 2015), data extracted on 15 August 2015, 15:08 UTC (GMT) 
Appendix : Figure S3 
Based on monthly data (reduced from Fig. 5) from 1999-2015, 12 month lag VAR 
Appendix : Figure S4 
DC (Dynamic Time-Matrix Regression Analysis) (as in Walsh 2010, and references herein), 
but with standard deviation, moving average, 11 year lag (data: ECB 2015a) as in Figure 3. 
Appendix : Figure S5 
Performed as in Figure S4 but using different time interval (1991-2003), 11 year lag. 
Appendix : Figure S6 
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4Q (quarter) annual moving average of inventory changes (data from sources as described 
for Figure 55) Pearson’s correlation (see Pearson’s Correlation Test and Linear Regression 
Analysis) with deposit redeemable without notice in M2 and M3: BSI.M.U2.Y.V.L23.D.I 
.U2.2300.Z01.A. (ECB 2015c; ECB 2015b; ECB 2015a) 
Appendix : Figure S7-13 
The newly compiled graphical-arithmetical semi-quantitative IS-LM ADAS model is based on 
Keynesian economics (Keynes 1936; Hicks 1939; Mankiw 2014; Mathews et al. 2013; Giddy 
1976; Giddy 1994). Forecasts are based on integration of DC-timing and ISLM-ADAS results.  
Appendix : Figure S14 
The ECB’s own forecast data was sourced from (ECB 2015a; ECB 2015b), in July 2015. 
Appendix : Figure S15 
YC.B.U2.EUR.4F.G_N_A.SV_C_YM.IF_10Y, YC.B.U2.EUR.4F.G_N_A.SV_C_YM.IF_1Y,  
YC.B.U2.EUR.4F.G_N_A.SV_C_YM.IF_2Y, YC.B.U2.EUR.4F.G_N_A.SV_C_YM.IF_5Y, 
YC.B.U2.EUR.4F.G_N_A.SV_C_YM.SRS_10Y_1Y, YC.B.U2.EUR.4F.G_N_A.SV_C_YM.SR_3M, 
YC.B.U2.EUR.4F.G_N_A.SV_C_YM.SRS_10Y_2Y, YC.B.U2.EUR.4F.G_N_A.SV_C_YM.SR_5Y, 
YC.B.U2.EUR.4F.G_N_A.SV_C_YM.SRS_10Y_3M, YC.B.U2.EUR.4F.G_N_A.SV_C_YM.SR_10Y, 
YC.B.U2.EUR.4F.G_N_A.SV_C_YM.SR_1Y, YC.B.U2.EUR.4F.G_N_A.SV_C_YM.SR_2Y  
(ECB 2015c; ECB 2015b; ECB 2015a) 
Appendix : Figure S16 
Phillips Curve based on Figure 1 Figure 51, Taylor model based on 2.4.4 and 4.3.1. 
Appendix : Figure S17 
Extensive correlation studies were used as basis for the network model that reveals a key 
cluster of GDP and innovation dependent macroeconomic indexes/indicators and factors. 
This figure is available as part of my previous research Intrapreneurship2.0, HfWU-ISR 2014. 
Appendix : Figure S18 
Markov models were performed using ModelRisk probability distribution functions and 
VoseMarkovSample excel built in function. Modeling Parameters were derived from previ-
ous empirical research and based on estimates of MTC efficiency and weighted impact. 
 
